This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 000274 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CODEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL KWBG IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: EILAND ASSESSES THE CHALLENGES FACING SHARON AND 
ABU MAZEN FOR CODEL KERRY 
 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Norm Olsen for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  National Security Advisor Giora Eiland 
highlighted the following points in a January 9 meeting with 
Codel Kerry: 
 
-- Israel faces three main challenges in implementing 
disengagement: a fragile domestic political situation, 
operational difficulties to evacuate thousands of settlers, 
and the possibility of implementing the disengagement plan 
without a cease-fire agreement. 
 
-- Abu Mazen faces two main challenges: overcoming resistance 
to security sector reforms, and establishing a durable 
cease-fire that ultimately leads to the dismantlement of 
militant groups. 
 
-- The differences between Israeli and Palestinian 
perspectives on returning to the roadmap are underestimated. 
While the GOI will stick to its strict position on 
Palestinian fulfillment of roadmap phase one obligations, the 
Palestinians, Eiland predicted, will likely take the position 
later this year that they have performed well enough on 
reforms and in reducing the violence to move forward to 
negotiations. 
 
-- The U.S. could best contribute in the short term to 
promoting peace by isolating the negative influence of Iran 
and Hizballah in the Palestinian arena, continuing to push 
Egypt to secure its side of the border, and promoting the 
message that no compromises are acceptable in renouncing the 
use of terror. 
 
-- Arab states have no interest in resolving the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which provides them an excuse 
for deferring reform.  In Eiland's personal view, a Syrian 
withdrawal from Lebanon could undermine Israeli interests by 
leaving a vacuum in Lebanon that Iran would fill. 
 
-- The U.S. needs better intelligence to support urban 
operations in Iraq.  Key political challenges in Iraq are the 
need to get Iraqis to react against foreign involvement in 
violence in Iraq, and the need for the U.S. to demonstrate 
some sort of symbolic pull-back after the Iraqi election. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In a January 9 meeting, National Security Advisor 
Giora Eiland shared his views on Gaza disengagement, the 
future of the roadmap, Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Iraq with 
Senator John Kerry.  Also present were Senior Foreign Policy 
Advisor Nancy Stetson, Press Secretary David Wade, Army 
escort Col. Michael Barbero, A/DCM, poloff, conoff 
(notetaker) and NSC staff. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Israeli Challenges to Disengagement 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Eiland enumerated three challenges facing the GOI as 
it prepares to disengage from Gaza: 
 
-- Israeli domestic politics.  In Eiland's view, the 
political situation in Israel has never been as critical as 
in the past year, with frequent crises arising.  Even with 
the formation of a new, stable coalition, all problems will 
not be resolved.  Since the GOI decision to disengage last 
spring, the Prime Minister has not had full government 
support.  Therefore, the GOI is still needs to make a clear 
and explicit decision to dismantle the settlements.  Kerry 
queried why an additional decision is needed.  Eiland 
explained that the original GOI decision expressed only 
"general intent," and that an additional GOI decision is 
required in order to begin the actual dismantling of 
settlements.  Stressing that while there is GOI "intent" and 
a general plan and timetable for disengagement, the settlers 
in Gaza do not yet feel that a formal decision to evacuate 
them has been made.  The GOI could thus face legal challenges 
should it attempt to evacuate settlements with what the 
settlers would claim is insufficient notice.  Saying that he 
understands that approximately 50% of settlers would choose 
to stay in Gaza, Kerry asked whether the GOI is prepared to 
remove them.  Eiland said it was, that the Prime Minister has 
"crossed the point of no return" in this regard. 
 
-- Operational challenges.  Evacuating thousands of settlers 
will require significant military resources.  Kerry asked 
about reports that some within the military will refuse to 
participate in the evacuation.  Eiland played down these 
reports, stating that some "reservists" have said that they 
will not obey orders "if" called to perform disengagement 
duty.  Eiland commented that some people view the 
difficulties involved in settler removal as "the biggest 
challenge Israeli society has ever faced." 
 
-- Implementation of disengagement without a cease-fire 
agreement.   Eiland said attempts to evacuate settlers under 
fire may be not only difficult but "under certain 
circumstances, impossible."  He was quick to say, however, 
that the GOI is fully committed to disengagement, even in 
light of this challenge.  Though Abu Mazen might gain a 
cease-fire from the militant groups, the challenge would be 
in enforcing it. 
--------------------------- 
Challenges Facing Abu Mazen 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Eiland perceived two key difficulties facing Abu Mazen: 
 
-- Implementation of security reforms.  Abu Mazen faces 
strong opposition to the security measures he must take, and 
will be forced to reach compromises. 
 
-- Need for a permanent cease-fire agreement.  Abu Mazen must 
convince militant groups not only to accept a cease-fire, 
which he has failed to do so far, but also to agree to give 
up their weapons and be dismantled.  Eiland explained that 
this process would have to take into account the unique 
characteristics of the various militant organizations. 
Hamas, he said, is a real cultural and spiritual movement, 
whose strength will not diminish should it temporarily cease 
violent activity.  In contrast, the strength and finances of 
the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades are based solely on violent 
opposition to Israel, without which, the group has "no other 
flag to hold."  In order to convince al-Aqsa to stop the 
violence, Abu Mazen must compensate it for lost revenues and 
try to integrate its militants into the PA security forces. 
 
¶5. (C) Kerry asked how long the PA would need to reconstitute 
its police forces.  Eiland countered that this is not the 
real problem.  PA security forces count some 30,000 members. 
While some of the PA security force infrastructure has been 
destroyed, the main capabilities remain.  The "real problem" 
is neither a lack of capacity nor a lack of willingness, but 
rather a lack of "legitimacy" to act against terror, which 
Eiland attributed to Arafat's legacy.  The PA security 
forces, Eiland cited as an example, have, since Oslo, 
arrested hundreds of Palestinians who confessed to murdering 
Israelis.  The charges against the confessed murderers, 
however, stated only that they acted "against the interest of 
the Palestinian people," and none were punished.  Most 
important now will be the PA response to future terror 
attacks against Israelis, i.e., whether it investigates, 
brings perpetrators to justice, and sentences the guilty for 
murder. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Israeli vs. Palestinian Perspectives on the Roadmap 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶6. (C) Eiland commented that differences between the Israeli 
and Palestinian views of the peace process have been 
underestimated.  Once the magnitude of these differences 
comes to light, the post-Arafat "honeymoon" between the GOI 
and PA could disappear. 
 
¶7. (C) The GOI, Eiland said, accepted the roadmap only 
because of its sequencing, which places security first. 
While the GOI is now preoccupied with implementing 
disengagement, it is ready to return to the roadmap once the 
PA takes the necessary security steps.  The Palestinians, on 
the other hand, will soon likely try to push the peace 
process forward toward final status issues by claiming to 
have met their roadmap phase one obligations.  They will 
point, Eiland predicted, to: 
 
-- The, by most accounts, fair and legitimate presidential 
election as proof of democratic reform. 
 
-- Finance Minister Fayyad's transparency measures as proof 
of economic reform (quite legitimately, Eiland acknowledged). 
 
-- The anticipated consolidation of the security forces under 
an empowered interior minister as proof of security reform. 
 
-- A significant reduction in violence, if the cease-fire 
succeeds. 
 
¶8. (C) The GOI response, according to Eiland, would be to 
defer political negotiation until it sees real security 
action on the ground.  He noted that 70-80% of Israelis 
believe that the GOI paid insufficient attention to security 
in the Oslo process, a mistake that the GOI will not repeat. 
 
------------------------------ 
Keeping Peace Process on Track 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) Kerry expressed concerns about both continuing 
settlement growth since his last visit two years ago, and the 
possibility that the peace process could be derailed for lack 
of specific target dates for settlement dismantlement and 
final status discussions.  He asked why the GOI is reluctant 
to set forth its parameters for final status.  Eiland 
reiterated that the GOI is fully committed to disengagement 
and pointed to the danger in taking on too many challenges 
simultaneously.  The GOI commitment to disengagement, he 
argued, should convince the Palestinians that Israel will 
leave settlements.  The GOI will not, he said, discuss final 
status issues now because of domestic political constraints, 
although "most of us" understand that final status will 
follow the lines of the Clinton parameters.  Eiland pointed 
out that Sharon is the first prime minister to support a 
two-state solution and to commit to settlement evacuations 
even without a Palestinian partner.  Kerry acknowledged that 
this was significant.  Eiland said that support for 
disengagement could erode should the Prime Minister commit to 
more than this without first seeing a corresponding effort to 
reduce terror attacks.  Kerry commended the Prime Minister 
for his willingness to expend political capital to try to 
change things.  Kerry asked in what ways the U.S. can support 
disengagement efforts.  Eiland responded that the U.S. could 
help to isolate outside negative influence in the Palestinian 
arena, specifically from Iran and Hizballah; continue to push 
Egypt to secure its side of the border; send the message that 
no compromise will be accepted in renouncing the use of 
terror. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Economic Viability in Gaza/Egypt's Role 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Stressing the importance of an economically viable 
Gaza, Kerry asked about possible arrangements for 
facilitating trade out of Gaza, e.g., via an airport and/or a 
seaport.  Eiland responded that the most important trade link 
is the Gaza ) Egypt border.  If Egypt solves the security 
problems as it is expected to do, then Israel can exit the 
Philadephi strip and Gazans will be free to trade with the 
rest of the world.  PM Sharon has indicated that discussions 
about an airport and naval port would then also be possible. 
In response to Kerry's query about what reassurance Israel 
needs about smuggling activity in the Philadelphi strip, 
Eiland commented that Egypt, in order to stop illegal 
activity, must send the "right message" to the leaders of the 
smuggling networks.  Currently, he said, they receive only a 
warning that is not blunt enough.  Asked whether Israel would 
have the necessary level of security following a pullout from 
Philadelphi, Eiland said the GOI would not need to act if 
Egypt assumes responsibility.  Kerry queried about additional 
financial needs, to which Eiland replied that disengagement 
enjoys the full cooperation of the international community, 
including a large role for the World Bank, which ensures that 
the economic dimension of disengagement will be one of the 
strongest. 
 
------------------ 
Role of Arab World 
------------------ 
 
¶11. (C) Eiland charged that the Arab world is not interested 
in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, despite 
impressions it gives to the contrary.   The actions of the 
Arab world are "much more destructive than constructive." 
For example, he said that 70% of the funding and weapons used 
by Hamas can be traced, respectively, to Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt.  He asserted that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
suits the interests of the Saudi regime by providing an 
excuse to resist the democratic reforms expected of it 
post-9/11.  Other Arab regimes likewise use the conflict as 
an excuse to resist reform.  Kerry asked whether Eiland's 
analysis extended to Jordan's King Abdallah.  Eiland said he 
had heard the King use the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an 
excuse for not undertaking reforms. 
 
¶12. (C) Another form of regional support for Palestinian 
terrorism, Eiland continued, is Iranian sponsorship of terror 
attacks.  In response to concerns about the relative quiet 
during Abu Mazen's term as prime minister in 2003, Iran, he 
said, established a special department in Lebanon, connected 
to Hizballah, to recruit Arab Israelis and Palestinians in 
order to continue terror attacks.  Now 70%-80% of terror 
attacks originating in the West Bank are directed by 
Hizballah, not Hamas or Islamic Jihad. 
 
¶13. (C) Alluding to press reports that Eiland has questioned 
whether a Syrian departure from Lebanon would serve Israeli 
interests, Kerry asked whether Eiland thought that the Syria 
Accountability Act would inadvertently provide Hizballah 
greater freedom to do what it wants.  Eiland remarked that 
this is a delicate matter, but that, in his personal view, 
the main threat to Israel from Lebanon is not Syria, but 
Iran.  If Syria leaves Lebanon, then Iran, whose hitherto 
hidden ambitions he said include control of Lebanon, could 
assert control. 
 
---- 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶14. (C) In response to Kerry's request for Eiland's 
perspective on U.S. operations in Iraq, Eiland commented that 
the U.S. made many mistakes after the initial military 
success.  The good news, however, is that politicians 
responsible for the security situation in Iraq now understand 
their early mistakes.  Two categories of challenges, military 
and political, remain.  On the military side, the U.S. must 
find a way to obtain better, more reliable intelligence about 
the situation on the ground.  The U.S. had not understood, 
prior to acting in Iraq, that good intelligence is essential 
for operations in urban areas.  The political challenges are 
twofold.  One is to get Iraqis to react against the foreign 
involvement, by Al-Qaeda and others, in Iraqi violence.  He 
pointed, for example, to the 308 Saudis apprehended in 
Falluja.  The second political challenge is for the U.S. to 
demonstrate some form of symbolic pull-back after the Iraqi 
elections.  The elections, he said, will not change reality 
on the ground, but should be used by the Americans to say 
that the time has come to hand over authority.  Symbols, 
Eiland said, are important, and perceptions are often much 
more important than reality. 
 
¶15. (U) Codel Kerry did not have an opportunity to clear this 
message. 
 
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