This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000163 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS GOI EXTERNAL GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: IDF CHIEF OF STAFF DISCUSSES PALESTINIAN 
ELECTIONS, DISENGAGEMENT, IRAN, AND SYRIA WITH CODEL KYL 
 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Norman H. Olsen; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Israeli Defense Force (IDF) Chief of Staff 
LtG Moshe Ya'alon told CoDel Kyl January 7 that recent events 
have ushered in "an era of strategic opportunity" in the 
Middle East.  He said that Israel is facilitating Palestinian 
elections and believes that Abu Mazen is strong enough to 
control terrorism -- including by Hamas and Islamic Jihad -- 
if he makes a strategic decision to do so.  Ya'alon noted 
that the IDF is ready to implement disengagement from Gaza in 
July.  He urged international sanctions against Iran to 
prevent Tehran from acquiring the capability to produce 
nuclear weapons.  He also suggested that USG influence on 
Egypt could end weapons smuggling through Sinai and that 
international pressure could help reduce support for 
terrorism by Lebanon, Syria, and Iran.  He ascribed improved 
security within Israel to the IDF's offensive operations in 
the Palestinian territories and to the construction of the 
security barrier.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) CoDel Kyl met with Ya'alon in the Israeli Ministry of 
Defense on January 7.  The Congressional delegation consisted 
of Senators Jon Kyl, Lisa Murkowski, and Mel Martinez, and 
Representative Adam Smith, as well as Congressional and 
military staff.  They were joined by Charge d'Affaires Norm 
Olsen, Defense Attache Colonel Timothy Murphy, and poloff 
(notetaker).  Ya'alon was accompanied by Commander of the IDF 
Media and Communications Division BG Ruth Yaron, Chairman of 
the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Yuval 
Steinitz, and staffers from the Knesset, IDF, MOD, and MFA. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
New Opportunities and the Palestinian Elections 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3. (C) Ya'alon called 2005 "an era of strategic opportunity," 
brought about by the U.S. presidential election, death of 
Arafat, approval of PM Sharon's disengagement plan, and 
upcoming elections in Iraq.  He said that Israel is doing its 
best to facilitate Palestinian elections.  The IDF is acting 
with restraint and avoiding operations in urban areas to the 
extent possible, despite what he said were 100 terrorist 
incidents last week.  If the terrorist attacks continue after 
the elections, however, he cautioned that he is "not sure 
what will happen on Monday or Tuesday." 
 
¶4. (C) Senator Martinez asked if Abu Mazen will have control 
of the PA security forces after the election.  Ya'alon 
replied that this appears to be the case, provided the 
Palestinian leadership implements the proposed security 
reforms and takes advantage of logistical support offered by 
Egypt, the EU, and UK.  Israel will do its best to let Abu 
Mazen succeed and will give him "a few weeks" to organize his 
forces, said Ya'alon.  This process must occur in a matter of 
"days, not years," he cautioned.  Ya'alon maintained that it 
is not a question of capabilities, but of a political 
decision to stop terror.  He said Palestinian security forces 
were prepared to crack down on terrorists after Arafat's 
death, but "never received the order."  Ya'alon noted that 
Abu Mazen wants to convince the terrorists to voluntarily 
refrain from attacks, but "there is no way to convince 
without a stick." 
 
¶5. (C) In response to a question by Senator Kyl, Ya'alon 
replied that PA forces are strong enough to deal with Hamas 
or Islamic Jihad.  Ya'alon stressed that Abu Mazen must act 
or Hamas will control the Palestinian agenda.  He added that 
the USG and others should focus on Hizballah, whose 
capabilities are concentrated in areas outside of PA control. 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
IDF Ready to Implement Disengagement in July 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Ya'alon insisted that the IDF is ready to implement 
disengagement in July.  Israel prefers to coordinate with the 
Palestinians, he said, but is prepared to act unilaterally if 
necessary.  Ya'alon predicted that extremists will increase 
their attacks in the summer in an attempt to create the 
impression of an Israeli retreat.  After this period, the PA 
will see it in their own interest to make disengagement a 
success and build a case for disengagement from parts of the 
West Bank.  Outside forces such as Iran, Syria, and their 
client groups will seek to undermine the PA efforts, he said, 
but Israel will work to counter these threats. 
 
¶7. (C) Senator Kyl asked how Israel will ensure security in 
Gaza after disengagement.  Ya'alon replied that the IDF will 
increase its intelligence capabilities and deploy along the 
border behind the existing security barrier.  Ya'alon 
cautioned that if attacks continue after disengagement, 
Israel will respond, even if it must redeploy ground forces 
into Gaza.  Ya'alon said that he has recommended that Israeli 
forces remain in the Philadelphi strip along the border with 
Egypt until the PA demonstrates "responsible and effective 
leadership."  He added that any redeployment from Philadelphi 
before that point would be a "disaster" and result in Gaza 
degenerating into "Hamasstan, Al-Qaedastan, Hizballahstan." 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Dealing with Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Steinitz stressed what he said is the important role 
that the Arab countries play in encouraging Palestinian 
terrorism.  Ya'alon noted that Iran, Syria, Hamas, Hizballah, 
Islamic Jihad, and others see the adoption of western values 
in the region as a threat.  They decided to increase 
terrorism in the region "the day Arafat died" in order to 
prevent Abu Mazen from reaching an agreement with Israel.  He 
claimed that 75 percent of attacks by Palestinian terrorists 
are financed by Iran, and that the main operational 
headquarters for terrorism in the Palestinian areas is 
operated by Hizballah in Beirut. 
 
¶9. (C) Addressing the topic of weapons smuggling, Ya'alon 
said all of Israel's borders are quiet except for the one 
with Egypt.  He described the Sinai, however, as a "paradise 
for smugglers."  Steinitz told the CoDel that "Egypt is doing 
to us what Syria is doing to you in Iraq."  Despite what 
Ya'alon described as a "very good atmosphere" in 
Egyptian-Israeli relations, Cairo refuses to address the 
problem.  He claimed that the only way to change the Egyptian 
tolerance of smuggling is for the USG to threaten financial 
consequences. 
 
¶10. (C) Ya'alon said that even the Europeans understand that 
Iran "is determined to acquire military nuclear 
capabilities."  He said there is still a chance to attempt to 
convince Tehran to give up its military program (primarily 
the fuel cycle), but described the EU-3 agreement as "not 
enough."  He reiterated Israel's view that the IAEA should 
report Iran to the UNSC.  Representative Smith asked how Iran 
and Syria should be dealt with and about the possibilities of 
greater cooperation with Europe.  Ya'alon said the best way 
to deal with external support for terror is through political 
and economic sanctions.  The USG and Israel should work to 
convince the Europeans to be more aggressive in this regard, 
he added. 
 
¶11. (C) Ya'alon said that Israeli intelligence experts had 
briefed their European counterparts on the Iranian nuclear 
threat.  While there is some cause for optimism, he added, 
certain "key" political leaders such as German FM Joschka 
Fischer still need to understand that Iran represents "not 
just unconventional capabilities, but an unconventional 
regime," which makes the threat to Europe tangibly different 
than that posed by Russia during the Cold War.  Ya'alon said 
there is no chance to influence Iranian policy without 
political and economic sanctions.  Such sanctions might also 
facilitate internal political change in Iran, he added. 
 
-------------------------- 
Israel's Strategic Paradox 
-------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Ya'alon described what he called Israel's "strategic 
paradox."  Despite its unbroken string of conventional 
military victories and status as a regional superpower, 
Israel still faces neighbors who question its "right to exist 
as a Jewish state."  Unable to challenge the IDF, Israel's 
enemies began a "subconventional war" targeting civilians 
with terror, primarily mortar, rocket, and suicide bomber 
attacks.  They intend to use both terror and demographics to 
drive Israelis out.  Ya'alon described the Intifada as a 
political decision by the Palestinian leadership and not a 
popular uprising.  He claimed that Fatah leaders saw the Oslo 
accords as a "Trojan horse" that allowed them to return to 
the West Bank and Gaza and commence terror operations. 
 
¶13. (C) Ya'alon said the IDF faces "new challenges" in 
dealing with the terrorist infrastructure.  One part of this 
task is to address the educational system, incitement, and 
ideology supporting terror, he said.  Ya'alon expressed full 
support for the USG's strategy of fostering democracy and 
education in the region.  The other component is eliminating 
capabilities, where, he added, "the best defense -- even with 
terrorism -- is offense, no doubt about it."  Israel has 
arrested "thousands" of terrorists and continues to apprehend 
15-20 a day.  According to Ya'alon, Israel enjoys four 
important advantages in its war against terror: intelligence 
dominance, air superiority, precision munitions, and 
information dominance (i.e., the ability to transmit 
intelligence to the IDF end-user and systems in real time). 
In the West Bank, Israeli security forces have freedom of 
movement and can make arrests with relatively small numbers 
of troops.  In Gaza, however, troops are not based in the 
cities, necessitating larger deployments for each operation. 
Ya'alon said that these offensive operations, combined with 
the construction of the security barrier, are "the main 
reason we now enjoy a relatively fair security situation" 
inside Israel. 
 
¶14. (U) This message was cleared by CoDel Kyl. 
 
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