This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 000019 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TW
SUBJECT: POST-ELECTION LANDSCAPE: DPP DISAPPOINTED BUT NOT 
DEFEATED 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 03340 
     ¶B. TAIPEI 04103 
     ¶C. TAIPEI 04076 
     ¶D. TAIPEI 02662 
     ¶E. TAIPEI 04007 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
POST-ELECTION LANDSCAPE: DPP Down But Not Out 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  In the December legislative elections in 
Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gained both 
seats and vote share and remains the largest party in the 
Legislative Yuan (LY).  Nonetheless, almost all media 
accounts described it as a "defeat" for the DPP, and almost 
all sides of the political spectrum here have done the same. 
If there was a DPP "defeat," it can be ascribed to a 
combination of exaggerated expectations and poor tactics. 
Conversely, Kuomintang (KMT) success in maintaining a slender 
Pan-Blue majority was largely due to its tactical and 
organizational success.  Chen Shui-bian's attempt to energize 
voters with his controversial rhetoric failed to win votes, 
but it did make him the issue and consequently made what 
might have been a tactical setback into a national issue. If 
nothing else, this election surprised all observers because 
it broke a string of three successive DPP electoral 
successes, two presidential and one legislative. While the 
DPP may be perceived to have lost the election, it retains 
the initiative over its opponents. Chen continues to dominate 
both Taiwan,s domestic and cross-Strait Agenda, and that may 
mean continued domestic gridlock and cross-Strait tension. 
End Summary. 
 
 
Proclaiming Defeat 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Both local and International press coverage of 
Taiwan's LY election immediately proclaimed that the election 
was a defeat for the DPP and a rejection of President Chen 
Shui-bian. Both the Green and the Blue camps publicly 
delivered the same message. On the evening of the election, 
President Chen somberly announced that he was resigning as 
DPP Chairman to show that he accepted responsibility for the 
DPP falling short of his forecasts. The party Secretary 
General Chang Jun-hsiung and Deputy Secretary General Lee 
Ying-yuan promptly submitted their resignations as well.  KMT 
Chairman Lien Chan reveled in his first election victory, and 
LY President Wang Jin-pyng immediately began talking about 
what the Pan-Blue agenda for the next three years would look 
like. At a post-election conference in Taipei, however, Dr. 
Shelley Rigger, a US scholar of Taiwanese politics, cautioned 
that depictions of the LY election outcome as "a defeat for 
the DPP and a popular rejection of President Chen's moves 
toward independence"  were "too simple."  Dr. Lo Chih-cheng, 
Executive Director of the Institute for National Policy 
Research agreed with Dr. Rigger, saying, "The results of the 
election should not be overstated.  This was not necessarily 
a 'defeat' for the Pan-Green camp." 
 
DPP Made Gains, But "Set the Bar Too High" 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Numerically, at least, it is difficult to characterize 
the DPP as a loser in this election.  The DPP once again took 
more seats and a greater share of the vote than any other 
party, expanding its position in the LY by two seats.  Its 
share of the vote was the highest in any legislative 
election, continuing its steady growth trend over the last 
three elections, from 29.6 percent in 1998 to 33.4 percent in 
2001 to 35.7 percent in 2004.  The perception that the DPP 
"lost" the election was not a product of vote count, 
Academica Sinica election researcher Hsu Yung-ming told AIT, 
but rather a failure of expectations: "They set the bar too 
high," he explained.  Likewise, the Pan-Blue's perceived 
success in this election, despite losing seats and vote share 
compared to 2001, was a matter of beating everybody's 
excessively pessimistic predictions. 
 
 
Strategy and Tactics Matter 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The DPP's high expectations affected more than just 
the way the outcome was perceived, it likely affected the 
outcome itself.  DPP over-optimism caused it to nominate too 
many candidates which distributed the DPP vote too thinly in 
some districts (see Ref A for a more detailed explanation of 
the importance of vote distribution in Taiwan's single 
non-transferable vote multi-member district electoral 
system).  In Taoyuan County, for example, the DPP took five 
of twelve seats in 2001, but won only four of (now) thirteen 
seats this year.  The reason was not a fall in support -- DPP 
vote share this year (34.2 percent) was virtually unchanged 
from 2001 (33.4 percent) -- but rather that the DPP nominated 
six in 2001 and seven this year, spreading its votes too 
thinly.  The three DPP candidates who lost received about 
30,000 votes each, just shy of the 32,000 vote threshold of 
victory.  Had the DPP stayed with six nominees, it would have 
almost certainly kept its five seats and very likely taken a 
sixth.  Similar over-nomination probably cost the DPP one 
seat each in Taichung and Changhua Counties and in Taipei 
City. 
 
¶5. (C) Conversely, the KMT's unexpected success on December 
11 can be partially attributed to its conservative nomination 
strategy stemming from its memory of its losses in 2001. 
Whereas in 2001 the KMT heavily overnominated, enabling only 
53 of its 97 district candidates to win, this year the KMT 
nominated only 74 candidates, of whom 61 won seats in the LY. 
 
LY Politics: Almost Everything is Local... 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) The contrasting nomination strategies led to 
contrasting slates of candidates. Most KMT candidates were 
veteran politicians, often incumbents with large support 
networks of their own.  The DPP, in contrast, ran slates 
packed with newcomers, in an effort to cultivate new leaders 
and replace the many veteran legislators who now encumber 
senior government positions. Local DPP campaign headquarters 
that supported these newcomers, moreover, often consisted of 
little more than a handful of volunteers in small, 
rudimentary, rented offices.  In this election, Hsu argued, 
the KMT was able to utilize its local organizational 
advantage to mobilize supporters behind its candidates in a 
way the DPP was unable to match. The widely rumored impact of 
DPP targeted distribution of government largesse does not 
seem to have swung the balance as some had expected. 
 
... National Issues Misfire 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Chen Shui-bian attempted to run a national campaign 
for a "Pan-Green majority" that he hoped would mobilize the 
50.11 percent of voters who had supported him in the March 
2004 Presidential election and discourage pro-independence 
DPP voters from defecting to the more fundamentalist Taiwan 
Solidarity Union (TSU).  At campaign rallies around the 
island, he emphasized the issues of "Taiwan identity" and 
"national sovereignty" that had galvanized his supporters in 
March.  This Chen-led campaign strategy may have contributed 
to the poor TSU showing, but it may also have scared off 
middle-of-the-road voters, whom some DPP strategists insist 
are crucial to the DPP,s long-term goal of becoming the 
majority party. Some in the Pan-Blue camp have seized on 
Chen,s failure in order to characterize the election as a 
popular rejection of Chen and his policies, and have called 
for a greater Pan-Blue role in forming the government (Ref 
B).  Moderates in the New Tide faction of the DPP have also 
criticized Chen's risky campaign rhetoric in an attempt to 
steer the party toward their positions and to increase the 
faction's leverage in formation of the new government (Ref 
C).  They argue Chen's move to dominate the electin resulted 
in a depressed turnout that hurt the DPP without hurting the 
TSU. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
Centrists Sat Out the Election, But Didn't Swing Blue 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶8. (C) Yu Ching-hsin, Deputy Director of National Chengchi 
University's Election Study Center, cautioned against drawing 
hasty conclusions, stressing that "this election had nothing 
to do with these (national) issues."  Despite the prominence 
given to Chen's rhetoric by the media, he explained, few LY 
candidates even mentioned issues of sovereignty or 
independence in their own campaigns, and most voters based 
their decision on local, not national, factors.  He dismissed 
speculation by some commentators that Chen's rhetoric had 
driven large numbers of nervous centrists to vote for 
Pan-Blue candidates.  Pan-Blue vote share was actually at an 
all-time low in this election, he noted, and all of the KMT's 
gains were at the expense of the People First Party (PFP), 
its Pan-Blue ally, rather than the DPP.  Pointing to the 
record low turnout (59%, compared with 81% in the March 2004 
presidential election and 66% in the 2001 LY election), Yu 
suggested that alienated centrist voters instead decided to 
sit out this election altogether.  "On both sides, the only 
voters who came out were core supporters," he said.  Hsu 
Yung-ming offered a similar assessment, explaining that the 
DPP's failure to achieve its oft-repeated goal of attaining a 
Pan-Green legislative majority was due, not to any change in 
voter sentiment, but rather to its inability to effectively 
mobilize its own supporters.  He suggested that part of the 
reason for DPP voter apathy was, ironically, Chen's 
domination of the campaign agenda and media spotlight.  "(KMT 
Chairman) Lien Chan never appeared on TV," he explained, "so 
there was nothing to get them (DPP voters) riled up." 
 
 
Reversing Expectations 
---------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) If the DPP numbers were up, why is everyone convinced 
that the DPP lost? President Chen may be largely to blame. 
Beginning immediately after March 20, he made this 
legislative election into the second half of the presidential 
election, calling on his supporters to give him a working 
majority in the LY so that he could push his program through 
the legislature. He reminded voters that the KMT had held 
both executive and legislative power for fifty years and 
called on them to give him three years of that power to show 
what the DPP could do. He then made himself the primary DPP 
campaigner, dominating the media with his calls for 
Taiwanization and his predictions that the Pan-Green would in 
fact secure effective control of the LY.  KMT supporters 
during the LY campaign had persuaded themselves that they 
were about to lose. A variety of KMT candidates told AIT that 
they were de-emphasizing their party ties in their campaigns 
and discouraging Lien Chan from visiting their districts. 
Senior KMT politicians, like Taichung Mayor Jason Hu and 
Taoyuan Magistrate Eric Chu were openly discussing the 
long-term benefit to the KMT of its expected defeat. As a 
result, many observers and politicians were surprised by the 
Pan-Blue,s success in holding its ground in the LY. After 
triumphing in two presidential elections and one LY election, 
the DPP and the Pan-Green had stumbled. 
 
Don,t Underestimate the Counter Puncher 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) While the DPP seems momentarily in disarray, and the 
KMT is still celebrating its victory, President Chen remains 
in control of Taiwan,s domestic and cross-Strait agenda. 
While his resignation from the DPP Chairmanship and the 
anticipated resignation of Premier Yu Shyi-kun may both 
appear to acknowledge defeat, he appears to be turning these 
resignations into an opportunity to orchestrate competition 
for the DPP presidential nod in 2008, blessing the election 
of Presidential Office Secretary General Su Tseng-chang as 
new party chairman and perhaps Kaohsiung Mayor Frank Hsieh 
(Chang-ting) as the new premier.  When the PRC announced its 
plans to enact an anti-secession law, Chen quickly seized 
this as an opportunity to remind Taiwan that this was another 
example of mainland animosity toward Taiwan and its 
self-respect. Chen may have expressed humility and urged 
cross-party reconciliation and cooperation in his New Year's 
Day speech, but he also excoriated Mainland China for 
threatening Taiwan and regional stability. 
 
¶11. (C) In the waning days of the current LY session, the KMT 
had hoped to seize the initiative, but it finds itself once 
more fighting within the terms of the DPP agenda.  The ten 
major economic projects, the special budget for defense 
acquisitions, even proposals for Taiwan legislation on 
cross-Strait relations all play to DPP themes.  If these 
trends continue, President Chen and the DPP will emerge from 
the appearance of political defeat to continue to dominate 
Taiwan,s political landscape. If that proves true, President 
Chen may well decide to continue his accustomed 
confrontational and divisive approach, and the result may be 
continuing internal political deadlock and increased 
cross-Strait tension. 
PAAL