This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 000178 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MASS SN
SUBJECT: SFA: AMB LAVIN CALLS ON DEFENSE MINISTER TEO 
 
Classified By: Amb Frank Lavin; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Lavin reviewed with Defense 
Minister Teo Chee Hean progress to date in negotiations on 
the U.S.-Singapore Strategic Framework Agreement, in a 
meeting December 30.  The Ambassador expressed the 
frustration the U.S. government felt at the current stage of 
discussions, in part because of Singapore's unwillingness to 
come through on any of the requests we had made in three main 
areas: legal protections for U.S. service personnel, the 
ability of US personnel to bear arms, and the provision for 
personally owned autombiles.  Minister Teo took the 
Ambassador's points on board, but did not concede any ground. 
 The Minister also rejected the Ambassador's assessment that 
Singapore was not respecting the spirit of the 1990 MOU, as 
amended.  End Summary. 
 
A Strong Relationship 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador Lavin called on Minister Teo December 30, 
just as the extent of the damage wrought by the tsunami was 
becoming widely known and almost immediately after Singapore 
began to dispatch the first of its helicopters to affected 
areas of Indonesia and Thailand.  The conversation opened 
with a discussion of what assistance our respective countries 
were preparing to send to victims.  Upon hearing that the 
U.S. aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln would be steaming past 
Singapore on its way to Sumatra, Minister Teo offered 24-hour 
use of Paya Lebar airbase and Changi naval base for U.S. 
relief operations. 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador Lavin used this type of cooperation as an 
example of the excellent working relationship we now enjoy 
with Singapore, particularly on the military side.  The 
Ambassador expressed pride at the progress we have made 
together in the last few years as our operations here ramped 
up during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. 
Singapore staunchly supported us in both operations and is 
now providing military assets in OIF.  The relationship is 
"very positive," said Ambassador Lavin, and has great 
potential to grow, which is why we agreed with Singapore's 
suggestion that we try to negotiate a Strategic Framework 
Agreement to push the relationship to a higher level. 
 
Progress Stymied By GOS Approach 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Given these hopes, and the last year and half of 
negotiations, the U.S. government now was concerned at the 
apparent lack of progress in the talks, the Ambassador 
continued.  It was dismaying that issues like automobiles 
should rise to the level of a conversation between the 
Ambassador and the Minister.  We did not understand the 
apparent disconnect between the Singapore government's stated 
desire for an expanded "strategic" partnership and its 
unwillingness to provide for the most basic of requests 
regarding force protection, quality of life (personal 
vehicles) and legal protections for U.S. service personnel. 
How could we expand the relationship when we could not even 
resolve basic issues over the last several years? Further, 
the Ambassador noted, it was the USG's view that two of those 
issues (cars and arms) were actually provided for in the 1990 
MOU as amended, but now the Singapore government not only was 
not fulfilling its commitments under the MOU, but was even 
trying to roll back those commitments in its recent texts. 
 
¶5. (C) Minister Teo challenged the assertion that Singapore 
was not living up to the spirit or the letter of the 1990 
MOU.  Regarding certificates of entitlement (COEs) for 
automobiles, Colonel Gary Ang (who has been leading the 
Singapore Government's negotiations) stated that "currently 
there are no 'outstanding' requests for additional COEs.  We 
have always responded to your requests."  The Ambassador 
pressed him to define "outstanding" -- "For example, if we 
requested 100 COEs and you provided 10, would you say that 
that request was no longer outstanding?"  Ang replied, "yes." 
 Turning to Yeo, the Ambassador remarked that this was an 
example of the way Singapore seemed to be approaching these 
issues from a narrow, legalistic, and bureaucratic point of 
view.  It was difficult to square that approach with the 
notion that our countries should be significantly expanding a 
"strategic" relationship.  If we were unable to provide for 
even the number of U.S. personnel present now, how could we 
deal with expansions in the U.S. military presence that might 
be required by projects such as the proposed C-2 center, 
asked Ambassador Lavin.  This unreasonably restrictive 
approach on the part of Singapore called into question the 
viability of U.S. participation in projects like the C-2 
center.  Ultimately, the U.S. would have to place its assets 
where they were welcome and provided for, he added. 
 
Teo: Singapore Wants U.S. Here 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Minister Teo noted that discussions on the SFA had 
begun a year and half ago, when both nations faced serious 
challenges, in the war against terror and the fighting in 
Iraq.  "Singapore knew we would have to deal with these 
issues together over a long period of time.  Our strategic 
objectives have not changed over the years -- we want you out 
here in Asia," said Teo. "We expressed that in the 1990 MOU." 
 Singapore wanted the U.S. in Asia over the long run and had 
to create a sustainable political environment to allow that 
to happen. Singapore wanted the U.S. military to be 
comfortable in Singapore and for Singaporean citizens to be 
comfortable with the U.S.  "That means," said Teo, "that the 
U.S. will not be able to create the same kind of situation as 
you enjoyed at Clark airbase or enjoy in Tuscon." 
 
¶7. (C) Teo urged that we not let these limitations prevent us 
from moving the relationship forward.  He affirmed that 
Singapore was still serious about concluding the SFA and that 
his staff would work hard to do it.  Singapore was determined 
to live up to the commitments it has made and would make. 
Teo also alluded to an issue Singapore had hoped to resolve 
or improve during the negotiations, but on which the U.S. had 
failed to yield -- technology transfer.  Teo expressed great 
appreciation for the hard work of the Embassy and Ambassador 
Lavin personally for ensuring that Singapore got the best 
technology available.  That said, Singapore had hoped that 
the SFA's DCA would provide at least a nod to best-efforts on 
technology transfer to Singapore, a hope to which the U.S. 
seemed unable to accede, he remarked. 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador expressed appreciation for Teo's 
assurance that Singapore would fully live up to earlier 
commitments, which we took to mean in part that the 
automobile COE issue would be resolved at last. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment: The purpose of the call was to ensure that 
the Singapore government heard at the political level that 
wide-spread dissatisfaction exists within the USG on progress 
to date in the SFA talks, and that we viewed the main barrier 
to progress as the GOS's short-sighted and decidedly 
un-strategic, zero-sum approach to the negotiations.  The 
current mil-mil relationship with Singapore indeed is 
excellent and important to us.  Its staying precisely where 
it is now would be no tragedy.  Nevertheless, the 
Singaporeans themselves have asked to try to expand the depth 
and breadth of the "strategic" relationship. It is a pity 
that they have allowed their instinctive need to better their 
interlocutor in the negotiations to actually block progress 
toward any of our objectives, even relatively simple ones 
such as COEs for automobiles.  We understand that we will 
send to them shortly a line-in/line-out version of the MOU 
amendments; Embassy hopes that we can keep our sights focused 
on the three key issues as defined in the non-paper from OSD 
(COEs, right to bear arms, legal protections) and use 
progress on these items as a litmus test for Singapore's 
willingness to bring these negotiations to a successful 
conclusion.  Embassy also recommends that we scrub our own 
proposed DCA text again to see if some sort of language 
recognizing Singapore's desire for improved technology 
transfer can be accomodated. 
 
 
 
 
LAVIN