This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000144 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO MCC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2015 
TAGS: PGOV KMPI KMCA KCOR YM KHUM DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: RECENT JUDICIAL RESHUFFLE: REFORM OR VANDETTA 
 
REF: SANAA 2421 
 
Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 ¶1. (U) Summary. Most legal experts view a recent reshuffle 
of the Yemeni judiciary by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) 
more as a vendetta against supporters of rebel cleric Hussein 
al-Houthi (reftel) than as a serious effort to reform Yemen's 
weak judiciary.  What is required, they note, is a political 
will at the highest levels to undertake a serious overhaul of 
the system rather than just a reshuffling of some individuals 
in it. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Citing the need to combat corruption, the ROYG 
announced a reshuffle of the judiciary, which began on 12/22 
with the dismissal of 22 judges for corruption, designation 
of eight judges for investigation of &alleged violations 
committed in the course of their work,8 and the forced 
retirement of 108 judges with full benefits. 
 
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The Numbers 
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¶3. (U) The rearranging of the judiciary is actually more 
widespread than the official announcement.  Papers reported 
that at the national level 25 new judges were appointed to 
the Supreme Court, and 2 judges were promoted to the SJC 
while 159 appellate judges exchanged posts.  District level 
courts saw the appointment of 68 chief and 172 associate 
judges. 
 
¶4. (U) At the Attorney General's (AG) level, 52 judges were 
assigned to the AG,s office, 23 heads of public prosecutions 
124 appellate prosecutors and 187 general prosecutors were 
also shuffled.  (Note: In Yemen, it is not uncommon for the 
Prosecutor's/Attorney General's office and the judiciary to 
act interchangeably. End Note). 
 
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You can blame it on Sa'da (kind of() 
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¶5. (C) Most in Yemen judicial circles including a former 
minister, two UNDP experts and some prominent defense 
attorneys, view the reshuffle as ¬hing new.8 
Interlocutors, including a prominent former Minister of 
Justice and member of the Upper Shura Council, report that 
plans for conducting judicial reform had been on Saleh,s 
desk for a long time and that reshuffles occurred in the past 
without any effect.  (Note. This is the third judicial 
reshuffle Yemen has undergone since 1997.  In 2003 the SJC 
fired 13 judges.  In 2002 it dismissed 35 judges and 
prosecutors.  Both times the ROYG cited corruption as the 
primary cause. End Note). 
 
¶6. (C) Most legal actors advise that the forced retirement 
was actually a political move aimed primarily at Zaidi-Shiite 
judges, who until the reshuffle essentially formed the 
backbone of the judiciary.  This, they point out, is Saleh,s 
way of castigating those Zaidi blocs (and rewarding those 
Sunni-Shafi' blocks) he feels were not loyal enough to him 
during the Sa'da rebellion. (Reftel).  The reshuffle 
effectively diminished the Zaidi majority in the judiciary 
from 65% to 40% of total judges.  Several interlocutors 
anticipate that once Saleh feels more secure in the balance 
of the power structure there would be a return of several of 
the 108 judges to the bench and/or AG,s office in some 
fashion. 
 
¶7. (C) Several also note that, contrary to widespread 
sentiment, corruption is not the primary problem of the 
judiciary.  Instead, they note the judiciary needs, more than 
anything, to be independent of the executive branch.  They 
also cite the need for a stronger and more credentialed 
judiciary to arbitrate justice, a higher transparency in the 
system, and the need for a more efficient system to assure 
rule of law. 
 
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Where there is a (political) will there is a way... 
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¶8. (C) The recent reshuffle also came on the heels of the 
Minister of Justice, Dr. Adnan Omar al-Jafri (MOJ) announcing 
to an American Bar Association (ABA) delegation, in Yemen to 
assess the need for reform in Yemen,s judicial system, that 
the MOJ is launching a ten-year reform effort aimed at 
strengthening Yemen,s judiciary.  Interlocutors remain 
skeptical of any true change from the either the reshuffle or 
the MOJ,s 10 year plan.  Although the judiciary itself seems 
prepared for a change, the political will &is not there,8 
said a former minister and Shura Council member.  The power 
base, which includes several high-ranking ministers and 
executive branch officials, they argue, is too entrenched and 
conservative to effectuate any true independence from the 
executive branch.  Others note that Saleh himself has lost 
interest in the judiciary and would need to re-engage in 
order to refocus national and international efforts for 
judicial reform. 
 
¶9. (C) Several insiders also point out that although an 
advocate for change, Jaffri is currently embroiled in a 
struggle over his role and reform agenda with several 
conservative groups within the judiciary and Ministry of 
Justice who are interested in keeping the status quo.  Others 
critique that he is not close enough to Saleh to effectuate a 
change. 
 
¶10. (C) A consensus in judiciary circles note that true 
political will and reform can be created by strengthening the 
judiciary in technical and political ways, a fostering of 
political will among several groups within the executive 
branch, and partnership to help all understand the benefits 
of a strong and independent judiciary.  Several also urged 
the need for &practical proposals, 8 such as criteria 
building in legal education, to foster partnership and 
develop the judiciary. This, most of them urge, would take 
time but was possible. 
 
¶11. (C) Comment: The view that the reshuffle is motivated by 
last summer's Sa'da fighting is widespread in the Yemeni 
legal community.  If true, then we are witnessing executive 
tampering at its height.  If Sa'da is the motivation for the 
reshuffle, then the ROYG is likely also realigning the 
judiciary in preparation for widespread prosecutions of Sa'da 
dissidents in the upcoming year. 
 
¶12. (C) Comment Continued: Although several interlocutors are 
skeptical of the reshuffle in itself, discussions reveal that 
judicial reform, if long-term and multifaceted, is possible. 
Finally, no matter what the motivation of the executive 
branch, the reshuffling is likely to have some impact on 
corruption and spark more efforts for judicial change at 
least within the Yemeni bar.  All are resigned, however, to 
the fact that serious reform is a long term prospect in 
Yemen. End Comment. 
KRAJESKI