This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000106 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NP/ENCP, INR/SPM, PM/RSAT, EUR/PRA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2015 
TAGS: ETTC KSTC PARM PREL PINR PK EZ

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL SALE  OF CZECH PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TO PAKISTAN 
  REF: A. 04 PRAGUE 1870 
 
     ¶B. 04 SECSTATE 212634 
  Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Mark Canning for reasons 1.4  (a) (b) (c) 
 
¶1. (C) Reftel reported the request of the Czech government  for the U.S. government's opinion on the potential sale of a  passive surveillance system (PSS) to the Air Force of  Pakistan.  This cable offers additional technical and  background information on the system.  Note:  ref A  mistakenly made reference to a 90-day timeframe for receipt  of USG views on possible VERA sales.  In fact, our commitment  to the GOCR (ref B) was to undertake best efforts to provide  our views within 30 days.  MFA officials are asking about  when they can expect our views (ref A dated Dec 23, 2004).  We have explained that the holiday period could delay our  reply.  However, given recent MFA cooperation on USG request  to accelerate licenses for a number of weapons exports to  Iraq, Afghanistan and the U.S., it is in our continuing  interest to be as responsive as possible to the Czech  request. 
 
¶2. (C) Three Embassy officers (DAO, PolEc and ODC) met  January 19 with four representatives from ERA, the Czech  company that produces the passive surveillance system,  VERA-E.  The company was represented by its CEO, Miroslav  Sotona, its Commercial Director Milan Bernard, and two  marketing managers for ERA's military products.   The company  gave Embassy representatives a 20-minute briefing on the  firm's short history, its civil and military products, and  its recent unsuccessful attempts to sell its products in  Asia.  The company then openly answered all questions for  more than 2 hours. 
 
¶3. (C) ERA officials explained that, beginning in the late  90s, ERA initially attempted to market VERA-E to 22 NATO  countries and discovered that there was no interest in its  military radars. It is now convinced that most NATO countries  already have or can afford better, more powerful systems and  will never buy VERA.   Once ERA realized this, it switched  its marketing efforts to Asia, where it quickly found a  number of interested buyers. Contract were signed with China  and with Vietnam.  The firm then discovered that Czech  authorities would not approve the applications for export  licenses.  Altering its strategy, the company decided to do  what many western arms manufacturers do: offer one version  for allies and a more limited version for sale to non-allies. 
 This non-NATO version is the ASDD-01.   Reftel mistakenly  identifies the ASDD-01 as an earlier version of the VERA-E.  In fact, the ASDD-01 has never been manufactured.  The  ASDD-01 would be an intentionally weakened version of the  VERA that the company hopes  it will be allowed to sell to  non-NATO states.  The company explained that it tried to  reduce the capabilities of VERA to the point where sales to  non-NATO states would be politically acceptable,  but not so  far that the system would no longer be attractive to  potential customers 
 
¶4. (C) ASDD-01 stands for Air Situation and Detection  Display. The model, which again only exists in theory,  would  use the same principle as the VERA,  time difference of  arrival multilateration technique (TODA). It has roughly the  same tracking and location capabilities as the VERA-E,  but  lacks the VERA's identification, or fingerprinting,  capabilities. Both the ASDD-01 and the VERA-E are passive  radar systems.  Era provided the following explanation of the  differences between ASDD and VERA, on paper: 
  ASDD belongs to the category of ELINT/ESM measures.  It is  based on the wideband principle of electromagnetic signal  location and tracking. 
  The main differences between the VERA-E and the ASDD are as  follows: 
 
- The VERA-E,  which in general has been designed for NATO  partner countries, as developed by ERA, contains an advanced  level of precise identification of electromagnetic signal  emitters. The method of identifying such signal emissions is  sometimes called finger printing.  This identification has to  be based on algorithms and hardware technologies,  which make  possible fine interpulse and intrapulse signal analysis. 
This method can help to identify the signal emitter up to the  level of a specific radar installed onboard a specific  aircraft. 
 
- The ASDD utilizes the type identification of radar emitter. 
 This kind of identification is based on applied software and  hardware equipment.  The ASDD's identification process relies  in principle on just interpulse characteristics of the EM  pulse signal.  Based on this,  it is possible to define  general types of radar,  which might be used on many types of  aircraft. 
  Based on the above principles of emitter identification,  it  should be clear that the applied system databases are very  different.  The difference is in the radar parameters, which  go into the database, as well the emitter identification  based on the system's database.  In general,  there is a much  simpler database in the ASDD and a more complex database in  the VERA-E. 
 
¶5. (C) Regarding measures to prevent reverse engineering or  unauthorized copying of its products, company officials  explained that 90% of the system's capacity is in the  software, and that source codes would not be delivered to the  customer. 
 
¶6. (C) In a ironic twist on traditional marketing  presentations, ERA did all it could to call attention to the  shortcomings and limitations of its product.  The firm  pointed out that they still use previous generation analog  receivers.  They called attention to the fact that VERA-E  requires a number of vehicles and masts and is awkward to  deploy or move.  They noted that VERA-E can only pick up  radar emissions, not communications or other electronic  signals.  In answer to the question, ""what do you see if the  plane turns off its radar emitter?"" they said, ""nothing.""  ERA also said that it hopes the system the US has purchased  and is scheduled to test this fall will produce a ""realistic""  evaluation that destroys some of the myths about the capacity  of VERA-E in particular, and passive radar in general.  The  firm acknowledged that VERA-E had been developed on ""a Czech  budget""  and that it did not have the R&D resources that  competitive firms such as the Italian firm Marconi or the  French firm Thales have, and admitted that one of the main  attractions of VERA-E is its price, roughly 5 million US  dollars. 
 
¶7. (C) The company also explained that it wasn't even certain  that Pakistan is still interested, but that if permission is  granted to market the ASDD-01 in Pakistan, it would have to  build an ASSD-01 that could be taken there for testing.  If  Pakistan was satisfied with the results of the test,  production on its order would begin.  In 2003 Pakistan  expressed interest in buying six radar sets.  It is unlikely  that the radar sets would be ready before 2006.  ERA  officials said Pakistan has already signed contracts, worth  roughly 1.7 billion US dollars for a more powerful airborne  surveilance system ERIEYE.  According to ERA officials,  the  Swedish system incorporates both active and passive  technology.  ERA officials explained that if Pakistan were to  buy the ASDD-01, it would be used as the land component of an  integrated air defense system. 
 
¶8. (C) ERA answered all questions that were asked, at length. 
 The company shared information on prices and acknowledged  that although it has had recent success in selling civil  radar sets, its goal is to sell military sets as well, where  margins are much higher.  It was up front about its marketing  strategies.  ERA also offered to provide more information in  the future, should we have additional questions. 
 
¶9. COMMENT (C) If ERA assertions about Erieye's capabilities  are correct, and taking into consideration ERA's willingness  to dumbdown their product, post believes Washington should  consider a positive response on the question of the Czech  export of the ASDD to Pakistan.  Otherwise, the willingness  of the Czech MFA to consult with the USG on a voluntary basis  could come under attack, and even be put at risk in future  cases where we have a strong and direct interest in  preventing an export of the more capable VERA-E system, as  was the case recently with China. END COMMENT 
 
¶10. (U)  Post looks forward to receiving Washington's  advisory opinion. 
HILLAS