This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000579 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR RU
SUBJECT: FRENCH "EXPLAIN AND REASSURE" ON TRIP TO RUSSIA 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS 
 
ONS 1.4 B/D 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Barnier and Defense Minister 
Alliot-Marie visited Russia January 20-21 for bi-annual 
security consultations with their counterparts.  The 
consultations drew higher-than-expected visibility from the 
French press, although an MFA contact told us that the 
meetings followed a standard format and did not result in 
breakthroughs on either side.  The Russians complained about 
relations with the EU, but seemed more open to discussing 
Chechnya.  The French were concerned by what they considered 
a "tougher" line by the Russians regarding the frozen 
conflicts in Moldova and Georgia.  Given what they saw as 
firm Russian rejection of the OSCE's Border Monitoring 
Operation (BMO) in Georgia, they urged U.S.-EU discussion and 
agreement on how to respond to Russian concerns while still 
keeping some BMO capacity.  French officials were impressed 
with Defense Minister Ivanov, and consider him to be a 
potential successor to President Putin.  End summary. 
 
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RUSSIA FRUSTRATED WITH EU, OPEN TO DISCUSSING CHECHNYA 
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¶2. (C) On January 27, Poloff met with MFA DAS-equivalent for 
Russia and the former Soviet space Pierre Cochard to discuss 
the January 20-21 visit by FM Barnier and MOD Alliot-Marie to 
Russia.  Cochard agreed that the meetings took place under 
higher-than-normal visibility, and suggested that part of the 
reason may have been greater interest by the French press 
given the events that had occurred in Ukraine.  When asked if 
he agreed with the characterization by some in the French 
press that the two Ministers were sent to Russia to 
"reassure" the Russians in the aftermath of the Presidential 
election in Ukraine, Cochard said this was partly the case, 
but he said that the goal was above all to "explain" French 
positions.  Barnier told his interlocutors that France had 
wholeheartedly supported the EU's position on Ukraine, while 
continuing to press the EU to take heed of Russian concerns. 
According to Cochard, FM Lavrov raised Russian 
dissatisfaction with the current state of EU-Russia dialogue, 
comparing it to what he considered a more positive 
Russia-NATO dialogue.  Barnier, said Cochard, took the 
opportunity to remind Lavrov that the EU was not an 
international institution like NATO, and that the EU's 
supra-national authority meant it did not engage with states 
outside the Union in the same way as an international 
institution would.  Russia could not be a "26th member" of 
the EU.  Plus, Cochard added, everyone knew that Russia-NATO 
relations were not as rosy as the Russians described them. 
Barnier did express French openness to discussing a 
consultative role for Russia in any future EU peacekeeping 
operations. 
 
¶3. (C) Russia continued to bristle at the concept of the EU's 
"New Neighbor" policy, said Cochard.  It raised as well the 
need for EU attention to the issue of Kaliningrad.  On a 
positive note, Cochard said the French had perceived a slight 
improvement in Russian willingness to discuss Chechnya, and, 
he noted, so did the Germans.  (Cochard dismissed French 
press reports comparing Barnier's description of Chechnya as 
a "crisis" to previous FM Villepin's use of the word "war" as 
a "semantics game.")  Barnier raised three issues with Lavrov 
concerning Chechnya: NGO access to the area, the need for an 
inclusive political process and the case of a Russian AFP 
employee missing in Chechnya.  Lavrov said Russia was 
optimistic that NGOs could be allowed back in to Chechnya and 
that Russia would negotiate with any Chechen except for 
Mashkadov and Basayev.  Unprompted, Lavrov raised the 
impunity of Russian soldiers issue, and said that 
approximately 300 trials had been conducted against Russian 
military forces.  Cochard said the French perceived a greater 
Russian determination to crack down on violence and 
criminality by the Russian military stationed in Chechnya. 
 
¶4. (C) During a January 26 lunch with the DCM, MFA Political 
Director Stanislas Lefebvre de Laboulaye (who participated in 
the "two   two" meeting between Foreign Ministers and Defense 
Ministers in Moscow), said the French side was impressed by 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, who they see as a potential 
successor to Putin.  Laboulaye described the talks as 
wide-ranging and cordial except for an exchange on the OSCE 
Secretary General in which Barnier became irritated because 
 
SIPDIS 
of Lavrov's snide and dismissive comments about the EU.  In 
their meeting with Putin, said Laboulaye, the French came 
away with the sense that the Russian President was not 
thinking strategically, focusing almost exclusively on 
short-term tactics. 
 
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RUSSIANS "DIFFICULT" ON FROZEN CONFLICTS 
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¶5. (C) Lavrov raised standard Russian talking points 
regarding ratification of the CFE treaty, to which Barnier 
reiterated the standing position that Russia must fulfill its 
Istanbul commitments.  Lavrov said there was no connection 
between the two.  Cochard said this conversation then segued 
into the presence of Russian troops in the separatist region 
of Transnistria.  The French were taken aback when Lavrov 
said that even if there was a resolution between Moldova and 
Transnistria, Russia would not necessarily withdraw its 
troops.  Lavrov said the presence of people in Transnistria 
with "possible claims to Russian citizenship" meant that 
Russia would have to keep a long-term presence in the area. 
 
¶6. (C) The Russians also warned of the "contagion effect" of 
a potential decision by the international community to grant 
Kosovo independence.  Lavrov specifically cited Abhkazia and 
Transnistria as two breakaway regions that would most likely 
declare independence if Kosovo did so.  The French believed, 
said Cochard, that this was a clear signal from the Russians 
that acquiescing to Kosovo "independence" would result in a 
quid pro quo of Abhkazia and Transnistria declaring their 
"independence" as well.  Cochard said the "difficult" 
positions on the frozen conflicts by Lavrov and Ivanov came 
as a surprise to the French delegation. 
 
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THE OSCE AND THE BMO 
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¶7. (C) On January 20, the first day of consultations, Barnier 
asked Lavrov to agree to support the candidacy of French 
diplomat Marc Perrin de Brichambaut to head the OSCE.  At 
first, Lavrov complained, saying that Europeans were over 
represented within the OSCE.  Later, however, he announced 
that if Brichambaut was the consensus candidate, Russia would 
not stand in the way.  The following day, said Cochard, 
Lavrov was more positive, and said that Russia would support 
Brichambaut's candidacy. 
 
¶8. (C) Barnier raised three additional issues regarding the 
OSCE: budgetary questions, the OSCE's election monitoring 
role and the Border Monitoring Operation (BMO) in Georgia. 
On all of these questions, said Cochard, the Russians were 
difficult.  Lavrov was "very firm" on Russia's push to reduce 
its financial contributions to the OSCE, saying this was an 
"indispensable" issue.  Lavrov also questioned the utility of 
the OSCE's election monitoring role, given that elections in 
Afghanistan and Iraq were riddled with many more errors than 
those in the Ukraine and Belarus, and yet the OSCE reserved 
its harshest judgment for the elections in the latter two. 
Regarding the BMO, Lavrov described the mission as "overly 
expensive" and "not useful."  Cochard said the French left 
convinced that Russia would not negotiate its position on the 
BMO, but that there might be an opening to reorient the BMO 
towards a training mission, with an initial period that still 
maintained the BMO's monitoring capabilities.  Cochard said 
there was a split within the EU on how hard to press the 
Russians regarding the BMO, and that it was of great 
importance for the U.S. and the EU to form a unified position 
on the BMO's future role. 
 
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GENERAL AGREEMENT ON OTHER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 
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¶9. (C) The four ministers also discussed the Middle East, 
Iran, and UN reform and in general, found broad agreement on 
these issues, said Cochard.  Russia and France agreed to form 
bilateral working groups to further discuss UN reform and 
OSCE reform.  Barnier raised France's preoccupation with the 
role Syria plays in Lebanon and the need to preserve Lebanese 
independence.  Lavrov responded that Syria had an important 
stabilizing role to play in Lebanon and that in general, it 
believed the "international community" was asking too much of 
Syria. 
Leach