This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000407 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2015 
TAGS: PARM FR UN
SUBJECT: FRENCH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON MARKING AND TRACING 
OF SA/LW 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 9788 
 
     ¶B. SECSTATE 10065 
 
Classified By: Political Minister/Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for Reaso 
n 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY. On January 20, poloff met with Jean-Francois 
Guillaume, the MFA Action Officer responsible for small arms 
and light weapons nonproliferation, who explained that the 
French will support European initiatives at the second 
negotiation session of the UN Program of Action on Small Arms 
and Light Weapons in the interest of maintaining EU cohesion 
on the matter.  He said France is not a strong proponent of 
making the document legally binding or of introducing new 
initiatives that could hinder the success of the session. 
However, if consensus emerges during the course of the 
session behind one or more of the measures France would fall 
in line.  He added that NGOs and countries such as Germany 
that are calling for more radical measures both have an 
interest -- for different reasons -- in seeing the working 
group session fail.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
A Legal Vs. Political Instrument:  The U.S. Must Make Its 
Position Clear From the Outset 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Guillaume explained that the GOF's priority is to 
have a successful working group session that is consistent 
with U.S. objectives of creating an instrument with "timely, 
realistic and practical measures to mitigate the illicit 
trade of SA/LW in conflict or post-conflict situations" 
(reftel).  He said that France would remind its European 
partners of the importance of this priority, but added that 
several European members are giving in to pressures from NGOs 
to go further.  Guillaume said that the U.S. must make clear 
from the outset its position that the instrument will not be 
legally binding; if not, he said, several countries will try 
to force it through as a legal instrument when it is close to 
completion. 
 
----------------------------- 
How Some Countries and NGOs Could Benefit from a Working 
Group Failure 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Guillaume described Ambassador Thalmann's draft text 
as "exhaustive," and said that a simpler, cleaner text would 
have been more effective.  However, he said, he suspects that 
Ambassador Thalmann too has given in to pressures from NGOs 
to adopt stricter measures.  Ironically, he explained, the 
goal of countries like Germany and NGOs like Amnesty 
International may be the same - to set the instrument up for 
failure.  Germany, he said, which introduced many of the more 
radical measures, is falling under political pressure at home 
due to the fact that it is a major supplier in the worldwide 
small arms market.  By championing a strict instrument it can 
be seen as a "white knight" by the NGOs and then claim "we 
tried" when the measures do not win consensus.  Guillaume 
said that Germany has been "very pushy" in introducing new 
SA/LW measures that run the risk of sinking the instrument. 
On the other side of the spectrum, Guillaume explained, NGOs 
would like to see the efforts of the working group fail so 
that they can push for a regional convention that deals with 
SA/LW in much the same way that the Ottawa Convention deals 
with land mines. 
 
¶4.  (C) In addition to the question of whether the instrument 
should be legally binding or include ammunition, Guillaume 
said that efforts to make the instrument retroactive could 
further endanger the instrument (a retroactive instrument 
would require countries to mark weapons that currently 
exist).  He added that any efforts to reopen debate on the 
definition of SA/LW would demand an additional 3 to 6 
sessions to address.  Guillaume noted that Ambassador 
Thalmann did not include explosive mines in his draft.  While 
Guillaume agreed that there is no need to include mines in 
the definition, the fact that they weren't included could 
open debate on the subject that would be counterproductive. 
Nevertheless, he said, keeping the 1997 definition may be the 
most practical solution (Guillaume said that he did not know 
how the U.S. views this issue, stating concerns about 
ambiguities regarding MANPADS). 
 
----------------- 
France and the Inclusion of Ammunition in the Instrument 
----------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) France, Guillaume said, agrees in principle with the 
concept of including ammunition in the instrument, but he 
said that they proposed using NATO labeling standards that 
are already in place.  (He added that France would like the 
instrument to deal only with weapons of war and not with 
weapons associated with criminal activity, which he said will 
need to be dealt with separately).  Guillaume recalled that 
Germany originally introduced the measure in March of 2004 
and that demand for it stemmed from the belief that many 
war-torn countries are saturated with illicit weapons already 
and the only means of controlling violence now is to 
effectively monitor and curtail movement of ammunition. 
Still, he said, France is only in favor of promoting measures 
that are already being implemented such as NATO standard 
labeling of ammunition. 
Wolff