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Viewing cable 05PARIS327, VISITING AF/W DEPUTY DIRECTOR DISCUSSES COTE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05PARIS327 2005-01-18 15:40 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Paris
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000327 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2014 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV XY FR
SUBJECT: VISITING AF/W DEPUTY DIRECTOR DISCUSSES COTE 
D'IVOIRE, SENEGAL, TOGO AND OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES WITH 
FRENCH MFA 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: During a January 10 meeting with visiting 
AF/W Deputy Director Larry Andre, French MFA DAS-equivalent 
for West Africa Bruno Foucher stressed deep GoF pessimism on 
Cote d'Ivoire (CdI).  GoF demarches to regional leaders prior 
to the Libreville Summit called for African Union (AU) 
reinforcement of the UN arms embargo on CdI, establishing a 
simplified political calendar on the basis of Accra III, and 
reinforcement of ONUCI by 1200 troops, to come mainly from 
Africa. France was not ready to call for further CdI 
sanctions yet, but if the situation continued to deteriorate, 
the UNSC should sanction lower-level actors. The GoF was 
eager to begin consulting on sanctions lists with the U.S. 
and within the UN CdI sanctions committee as a warning to the 
parties.  Foucher described a turnaround in the GoF position 
on a referendum as a means of ratifying the Linas-Marcoussis 
changes to Article 35 of the CdI constitution, which the GoF 
now opposed and viewed as a tool for President Gbagbo to 
negate this key element of the Linas-Marcoussis accords. 
Foucher reported "rumors" that former U.S. Ambassador Render 
was a possible candidate to replace SRSG for CdI Tevoedjre, 
and suggested France welcomed her "candidacy."  He also 
reported that a senior MFA official had received an ominous 
warning from CdI Assembly leader Mamadou Coulibaly, that the 
GoF should be vigilant to possible kidnappings or other 
security problems in Abidjan.  Foucher confirmed that the GoF 
had made permanent reductions in its embassy staffing in 
Abidjan, and that French cooperation programs with CdI were 
practically frozen. 
 
2. (C)  On Senegal, Foucher revealed that President Wade 
demanded the departure of French Ambassador to Senegal Jean 
Didier Roisin (who will be replaced by the current Elysee 
Middle East advisor Andre Parant in February), after Roisin 
met with former Prime Minister Idrissa Seck.  Foucher 
expressed satisfaction with the situation in Togo and 
asserted that Eyadema had completed 20 of the 22 commitments 
for resumption of EU cooperation, and that goal posts should 
not be moved now.  He stressed GoF concerns on Guinea-Bissau, 
both on the amnesty granted to accused coup plotters and the 
dire economic situation.  Foucher also described Guinea as in 
a catastrophic situation and noted President Conte appeared 
under increasing pro-reform influence of his interior 
minister and other younger generation officials.  On ECOWAS, 
Foucher described French views as close to those of the U.S. 
and described it as an institution only as strong as its 
president; possible candidates for the next president, to be 
chosen January 18, included the Presidents of Mali and 
Gambia.  End summary. 
 
PESSIMISM ON COTE D'IVOIRE 
------------ 
 
3. (C) Foucher opened discussion on Cote d'Ivoire by 
describing France as "extremely pessimistic, like the U.S." 
The GoF was not at all satisfied with how the parties had 
worked together in recent months, and, for this reason, had 
sought to use the opportunity of the Libreville AU summit to 
move the process forward.  Prior to the summit, the GoF had 
demarched heads of state in AU capitals with a five-part 
message, calling for the summit to: 
-- demand reinforcement of the UNSC arms embargo, which 
required effective CdI enforcement in the north and south; 
-- agree to begin work in the UNSC CdI sanctions committee on 
a draft list of individuals subject to sanctions, based on 
violations of human rights and incitement of hatred; 
-- establish a simplified calendar for the peace process on 
the basis of Accra III, with priority on beginning the 
cantonment of parties for disarmament and avoiding a 
referendum on modification of article 35 of the constitution; 
-- call for the reinforcement of ONUCI, with about 1200 
supplemental troops, primarily from Africa; and 
-- ask for international supervision of elections, involving 
the AU and the UN. 
 
(Note: Foucher provided Deputy Director Andre with a French 
language text of the GoF non-paper, which was faxed to AF/W 
and Embassy Abidjan. End note.)  Foucher conceded that there 
had been a turnaround in the French position on the 
referendum on article 35 of the CdI constitution.  France now 
opposes the referendum, which it views as a tool for Gbagbo 
to negate the Linas-Marcoussis accords and effectively 
eliminate RDR leader Alassane Ouattara from the political 
process.  When Andre noted that the GoF had demarched the USG 
to express a contrary position just last October, Foucher 
reported that the GoF was divided on the issue even at that 
time, and those in the GoF who had advocated the October 
position were "no longer dominant." 
 
4. (C) Foucher also stressed French eagerness to begin 
discussions in the UNSC CdI sanctions committee on lists of 
persons subject to UN sanctions, as suggested in the GoF 
demarche to AU capitals (para 2).  Foucher agreed with 
Andre's assessment that the lists should include persons from 
both sides of the conflict, and stressed that the UNSC needed 
to show the parties that it was working on the issue.  The 
GoF believed we should start with lower level officials, 
particularly those directly responsible for human rights 
violations or inciting hatred.  To demonstrate GoF 
seriousness on the issue, Foucher showed Andre a draft list 
that the MFA had put together of such individuals, which it 
was vetting with the Elysee.  According to Foucher, the GoF 
wanted to proceed by discussing the lists in the sanctions 
committee now, as a sort of warning to the parties; then, if 
the situation deteriorated further, we should move to 
sanctioning individuals. 
 
5. (C) On potential mediators in the CdI conflict, Foucher 
reported that the GoF had heard rumors that former U.S. 
Ambassador to CdI Arlene Render was under consideration to be 
named the next SRSG on CdI, replacing Albert Tevoedjre. 
Foucher indicated that the GoF would welcome Render's 
appointment, as she had significant expertise and it would be 
positive to have an American in such a key position.  Foucher 
added that Gbagbo had rejected former Moroccan Ambassador to 
France Aboulhasan in the SRSG position, prompting the UN to 
continue the search for a suitable candidate.  As for the 
efforts of South African President Mbeki, Foucher said the 
GoF could only support his efforts, though it was clear that 
the South African president knew less about CdI than its 
Gabagbo-skeptic neighbors and that he was close to Gbagbo. 
 
6. (C) Foucher expressed alarm on potential deterioration of 
the security situation in CdI, describing the pro-Gbagbo 
militias as ready to begin massacres "at a moment's notice." 
French A/S-equivalent for Africa Bruno Joubert, during the 
recent reinvestiture of President Kufour in Ghana, had 
received a disturbing warning from CdI National assembly 
leader Mamadou Coulibaly, who advised him that the French 
should be vigilant on security in Abidjan and be on the 
lookout for possible kidnappings.  Joubert, Foucher said, had 
interpreted the message as threatening.  Asked by Andre about 
staffing of the French Embassy in Abidjan, Foucher confirmed 
that the GoF had drawn down staff considerably, consolidated 
them on one site, and would make permanent cuts in staffing 
due to the continued difficult security environment and 
forecast that this situation would not improve significantly 
in the foreseeable future.  The French embassy had just 
received a new shipment of armored cars, having previously 
just one in its possession.  Meanwhile, French cooperation 
activities in CdI were essentially suspended, with a few 
credits remaining open in case the situation dramatically 
improves. 
 
SENEGAL: NEW AMBASSADOR 
------------ 
 
7. (C) Moving to other topics, Andre asked Foucher about the 
circumstances surrounding the replacement of French 
Ambassador to Senegal (and former MFA Africa Director) 
Jean-Didier Roisin, who had been at post only since August 
2003.  Foucher confided that Rosin had been removed at the 
request of President Wade, who was angered by the French 
Ambassador's having invited former Senegal Prime Minister 
Idrissa Seck (now seen by the GoF as out of favor) to lunch 
and complained to President Chirac.  Wade had demanded the 
replacement of Rosin's predecessor under similar 
circumstances.  Roisin's replacement will be current Elysee 
Technical Advisor on Middle East/Americas Andre Parant, whom 
Foucher stressed had significant Africa experience.  (Note: 
Parant is an excellent, longtime embassy contact and we will 
report bio information on him septel.  End note.)  Roisin 
would remain in Senegal for the state visit of President 
Chirac February 2-3, and Parant would not arrive until later 
that month.  Foucher stressed that Roisin was moving to a 
plum assignment as French Ambassador to Switzerland. 
 
GUINEA-BISSAU 
----------- 
 
8. (C) Asked about the situation in Guinea Bissau, Foucher 
observed that the GoF was much less involved there than 
Portugal.  The GoF hoped the political transition was 
returning to normalcy, with elections on track for May 2005. 
In the wake of the recent mutiny, the President and PM had 
managed to remain in place, though they were running scared. 
Foucher described as "scandalous" the fact that the murderers 
of the Army Chief of Staff had been offered amnesty with no 
punishment.  He summed up that the GoF remained worried about 
the political as well as economic situations, which remained 
grave. 
 
TOGO 
---- 
 
9. (C) Foucher responded positively when asked whether the EU 
was likely to resume full economic cooperation with Togo.  He 
stressed that the GoF was content with the situation in Togo, 
and supported the efforts of the government to move towards 
legislative elections.  He stressed that while the European 
Commission (EC) had previously questioned whether progress 
was genuine in Togo, the recent visit of EU commission 
representative Louis Michel had improved the situation. 
During Michel's trip to Togo, he saw "everyone" and observed 
two types of opposition, those who were constructive, vice 
those who were purely anti-regime.  Foucher claimed that 
Michel had observed a real Togolese government seeking to 
advance, and added that Togo had met 20 of the 22 demands 
made by the EU.  Foucher added that even once EU cooperation 
resumed, the EC would not give "carte blanche" to the 
Togolese, and that "every euro" of EU aid would be tightly 
controlled.  Deputy Director Andre expressed skepticism on 
Foucher's positive assessment of the Eyadema government and 
questioned whether elections would indeed take place as 
scheduled, or if they could be free and fair, citing 
continued GoT harassment of political opposition.  Andre 
questioned whether President Eyadema was ready to make the 
reforms which Foucher described as forthcoming.  Foucher 
responded that Togo had fulfilled 20 of the 22 commitments 
asked of it although no one thought it would be willing to 
meet the conditions. It would be unjust to add new conditions 
or move the goal posts now.  Also, Togo served as an 
important example to Guinea, as it sought to negotiate a 
contract with the EC on conditions for resumption of EU aid. 
Foucher cited the sentiment expressed by some African 
governments that we are more kind (or less demanding of) 
governments which come about via coups rather than those 
trying to reform themselves. 
 
GUINEA 
----- 
 
10. (C) Foucher shared Andre's view that Guinea remained in a 
catastrophic economic situation.  For the first time, Guinea 
was seeking aid from France, a move which it had avoided 
given its long history of uneasy rapport with France. 
Foucher credited the Guinean decision to open talks with the 
EU on resumption of aid to the influence of younger ministers 
on President Conte, particularly the Minister of Interior. 
As for Conte's health, Foucher said it was impossible to 
predict how long he might last as the Guinean leader had long 
defied expectations of his imminent demise.  Foucher said the 
GoF preferred to take a step-by-step approach in encouraging 
Guinea's readiness for the post-Conte era, rather than a 
"blank slate" approach.  He downplayed French security 
cooperation with Guinea, claiming he was unsure whether such 
cooperation existed. 
 
ECOWAS 
--- 
 
11. (C) Asked for French views on the evolution of ECOWAS, 
Foucher said he saw the situation much in the same was as the 
U.S.  So far, ECOWAS had failed to become a strong 
institution independent of its leadership; it was only as 
strong as its president.   Foucher said the GoF was aware of 
two possible candidates, to be chosen January 18 as next 
ECOWAS president: President Toure of Mali or President Jammeh 
of Gambia.  Andre noted that the USG had presumed the next 
ECOWAS president, following tradition, would be Francophone, 
and was unaware that Jammeh was in the running.  Foucher said 
that the GoF had heard the rumor of a possible Gambian 
presidency directly from Ghanaian President Kufour in Accra. 
 
Leach