This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000299 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2014 
TAGS: PREL IZ FR
SUBJECT: YAWER-CHIRAC MEETING HIGH ON ATMOSPHERICS, BUT LOW 
ON RESULTS 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Alex Wolff, reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
¶1. (C) Presidential Advisor for Middle East Andre Parant gave 
us a brief, but upbeat readout January 14 of President 
Chirac's  meeting and working lunch with Iraqi Interim 
Government (IIG) President Ghazi al-Yawer January 13.  (Note: 
Yawer met with FM Barnier and the President of the National 
Assembly Debre today and departs France January 15; we will 
seek MFA and Iraqi embassy readouts next week.  End note.) 
Parant summed up the Yawer-Chirac discussions as having gone 
"very well," with very positive atmospherics but no 
significant operational results.  According to Parant, Chirac 
was largely in listening mode, seeking Yawer's views on the 
current and longterm situation in Iraq.  Yawer, meanwhile, 
presented himself as a true man of the people, as opposed to 
other political leaders who had spent most of their time in 
exile prior to the fall of Saddam's regime.  Parant commented 
that the GoF found Yawer to be an articulate and impressive 
interlocutor and viewed him as representative of most Iraqis 
who want more independence and sovereignty, which the IIG 
President stressed would take time and require the continued 
presence of U.S. troops. 
 
¶2. (C) Parant confirmed that Chirac reminded Yawer that the 
French offer to train Iraqi security forces (police) remained 
on the table; to this end, Chirac gave Yawer a letter on the 
French proposal and suggested that the Iraqi government send 
a mission to Paris to further discuss the issue.  Yawer 
responded by taking note of the offer, and affirming that his 
government would study the idea.  Explaining Yawer's limited 
response, Parant speculated that the Iraqi president may not 
have been previously aware of the French offer or was not in 
a position to act on it.  He expressed hope that others in 
Yawer's delegation could pick up action on the training 
offer, which the GoF hoped would be met with an Iraqi 
response.  Other points stressed by Chirac, according to 
Parant, included French readiness to help Iraq (no further 
specifics), GoF support for the political calendar and 
maintaining the January 30 election date, the GoF's support 
for the compromise reached on Iraq's Paris Club debt, and 
French readiness to participate in Iraq's reconstruction, 
within the limits posed by the difficult security situation. 
 
¶3. (C) Parant described Yawer as realistic and sober on the 
current situation in Iraq, but optimistic on the medium to 
longterm.  Yawer described the current situation as very 
difficult, with terrorists seeking to derail the political 
process, the borders porous to foreign infiltrators, and 
Iraq's neighbors, namely Syria and Iran, playing a negative 
role.  Yawer criticized the CPA decision to dissolve the 
Iraqi army as responsible for many of the current security 
problems.  At the same time, Yawer voiced optimism on 
prospects for elections and greater than expected Sunni 
participation. The Iraqi President told Chirac that rumors of 
a Sunni boycott were greatly exaggerated, with voter 
participation problems limited to one to two provinces in 
which terrorists -- not a boycott -- would keep voters at 
home.  Yawer also stressed to Chirac his belief that Iraq was 
not headed towards civil war, and asserted that there was a 
prevailing Iraqi identity which prevailed over sectarian and 
ethnic divisions.  Yawer also commented that there appeared 
to be two camps within Iraq's Shi'a community: those under 
the influence of Iran, and a much-larger group who favored a 
uniquely Iraqi, "lighter" version of Shi'ism. 
 
¶4. (C) Parant noted that Chirac briefly raised the 
disappearance of French journalist Florence Aubenas, last 
seen in Baghdad January 5, and asked if the Iraqi government 
might have any information on her case.  Parant said Yawer 
appeared to have concluded that Aubenas was being held 
hostage by criminals seeking a ransom, but this appeared to 
be more speculation than a conclusion based on proven 
information.  (Note: The GoF is still not calling Aubenas 
case a kidnapping.  End note.) 
 
¶5.  (C) Comment: Given the low-key manner in which the Yawer 
visit has taken place, more than one French daily has 
described the visit as a indicative of a "timid" French-Iraqi 
rapprochement.  Though the Yawer visit was short on results, 
his presence here appears to have served a useful purpose in 
smoothing French dealings with the IIG just a few weeks 
before its dissolution.  It also exposed the GoF to a more 
constructive assessment of the longterm situation in Iraq 
than that typically heard from French press or most French 
officials.  End comment. 
 
¶6. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
Leach