This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000248 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL LE SY PTER PINR FR UNSC
SUBJECT: ELYSEE MIDDLE EAST ADVISOR ON UNIFIL RENEWAL, 
LEBANON-SYRIA DEVELOPMENTS, HIZBALLAH 
 
REF: A. PARIS 208 
     ¶B. STATE 4247 
     ¶C. BEIRUT 98 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and comment: The Elysee appears solidly behind 
the MFA in opposing a preambular reference to UNSCR 1559 in 
the UNIFIL renewal resolution, though it suggests greater 
flexibility than the MFA on asking DPKO to review UNIFIL's 
force structure (ref b).  During a January 12 meeting, 
Presidential Middle East advisor Andre Parant repeated 
serious concerns expressed to us by the MFA (ref a) that a 
preambular reference to UNSCR 1559 would serve Syrian 
arguments and undermine both UNIFIL and prospects for 1559 
implementation.  Although Parant clarified that the GoF had 
not made a "definitive decision" to reject the preambular 
reference, we viewed this comment as an attempt to be 
diplomatic, not a sign of greater flexibility.  Parant 
conceded that there could be value in signaling to Syria and 
Lebanon that UNIFIL's presence was not open-ended, and he did 
not repeat concerns expressed by the MFA (ref a) on the 
dangers of reducing UNIFIL's size.  Parant suggested that the 
January 9 Blue Line clashes launched by Hizballah toughened 
GoF resolve to see the GoL extend its authority in the South, 
but will not affect the GoF position on EU designation of 
Hizballah.  On Lebanon/Syria developments, Parant dismissed 
Syria's purported transfer of the Lebanon file to Walid 
Muallim as window-dressing, though he cited the 
marginalization of FM Shara as a side benefit.  Parant added 
that former PM Hariri had briefed the GoF on his recent lunch 
with the SMI Chief in Lebanon (ref c), and the GoF was not 
afraid that Hariri would cut a deal with the Damascus.  At 
the same time, the Elysee had advised Hariri to be more 
forthright in aligning with the opposition and urged 
opposition elements to develop a long-term strategy for 
cooperation beyond the electoral law.  In this context, 
Maronite Patriarch Sfeir will visit Paris to meet with Chirac 
in late January.  Parant described the U.S. and French 
Ambassadors in Beirut as a formidable team and concluded that 
U.S. and French efforts on 1559 implementation were having a 
positive effect, both in widening maneuvering room for the 
Lebanese opposition and pressuring the SARG and GOL, which 
were in increasing disarray.   End summary and comment. 
 
PREAMBULAR REFERENCE, EXAMINING FORCE STRUCTURE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Poloff reviewed ref (b) talking points on U.S. views 
on UNIFIL renewal with Presidential Advisor on the Middle 
East Andre Parant late January 12.  On including a preambular 
reference to 1559 in the UNIFIL renewal text, Parant repeated 
concerns expressed to us by MFA officials earlier this week 
(ref a), though in a less categorical, more diplomatic 
fashion.  First stressing the GoF's desire to continue to 
work "hand in hand" with the U.S. on this issue, Parant said 
the GoF had not taken a "definitive decision" on the 
preambular reference and was willing to discuss this further 
in New York.  Parant stressed, nevertheless that GoF saw 
serious "dangers" in including the preambular 1559 reference, 
which would break the "line of separation" which the GoF had 
sought to maintain between 1559 and the peace process, and in 
turn serve Syrian arguments that it would remain in Lebanon 
until a comprehensive peace was achieved.  The 1559 reference 
could also potentially undermine confidence in UNIFIL, which, 
as a Chapter 6 operation, required the consent of the 
Lebanese government (and others) to remain in place. 
Repeating points made by the MFA (ref a), Parant expressed a 
strong preference for indirect references to 1559 in the 
UNIFIL renewal, by toughening language on Lebanon's 
territorial integrity and independence and restoring full 
control in the South.  He cautioned, though, that seeking to 
shift UNIFIL's mandate towards supporting 1559's call for 
dismantling of militias was "not realistic," as UNIFIL 
remained a Chapter 6 operation.  Parant summed up his view 
that we would resolve the 1559 reference issue quickly in New 
York, and added that the French Embassy in Washington had 
surmised that the State Department was more adamant on the 
1559 reference than the NSC.  He quipped that one could hear 
similarly differing messages, at times, between the MFA and 
Elysee on Lebanon.  Poloff expressed hope we would reach 
agreement quickly, but stressed that the points we presented 
fully represented USG views. 
 
¶3. (C) Parant suggested that the GoF, while cautious on any 
possible changes to UNIFIL's mandate, might be willing to 
accept the U.S. proposal to ask DPKO to examine UNIFIL's 
force structure and report back at a later date.  Without 
reviving the arguments made to us by the MFA on the need to 
preserve, vice reduce, UNIFIL's size, Parant conceded that 
there could be value in signaling to the GOL and SARG that 
UNFIL's presence was not to be taken for granted.  Although 
Parant did not fully endorse this U.S. proposal, he 
speculated that the GoF would be "ready to follow" the U.S. 
on this point. 
¶4. (C) Asked what impact the January 9 Blue Line clashes 
initiated by Hizballah would have on the UNIFIL renewal and 
GoF views on Hizballah, Parant stressed that the incident 
only reinforced GoF convictions on 1559 implementation and 
the need for the GOL to extend its authority throughout the 
South.  On the other hand, Parant stressed that there was no 
change in the GoF reservations on EU terrorist designation of 
Hizballah, which he said would result in the EU losing all 
leverage it might have on Hizballah.  At the same time, 
Parant sought to stress that the GoF analysis of Hizballah 
was not so far from that of the U.S., and that, typically, we 
differed on means not objectives.  (Comment: Other MFA 
officials have responded in a similar negative fashion, when 
asked recently whether the changed circumstances of UNSCR 
1559 and the GoF crackdown on Al-Manar could presage a shift 
on Hizballah designation.  End comment.) 
 
DISMISSIVE OF SARG, BUT CONFIDENT IN HARIRI 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Turning to Lebanon-Syria developments, Parant 
dismissed the Syrian elevation of Walid Muallim to Vice 
Minister and the purported transfer of the Lebanon file from 
SMI to the Syrian MFA as so much "window-dressing."  Parant 
stressed that the GoF remained "totally skeptical" of this 
and other superficial SARG gestures, such as a possible new 
redeployment, which did not suggest any fundamental change in 
the Syrian approach in Lebanon.  While the GoF had no 
illusions on the significance of Muallim's promotion, one 
useful side-benefit was the public perception that that 
Muallim's elevation was a disavowal of FM Shara, which was 
largely how Arab governments were interpreting the SARG 
decision. 
 
¶6. (C) On former PM Hariri's recent lunch with Syrian 
Military Intelligence (SMI) chief in Lebanon Rustom Ghazale 
(ref c), Parant noted that Hariri had briefed the GoF on the 
discussion, which took place in a new dynamic, not the least 
since Ghazale had to go see Hariri and not the other way 
around.  Hariri had told the GoF that he had a frank 
discussion with Ghazale and assured the SMI chief that while 
UNSCR 1559 was not "anti-Syrian," the old framework for 
Syrian-Lebanese relations was no longer acceptable.  Syria 
needed to change, and there could be no more Syrian tutelage 
of Lebanon.  Parant said Ghazale reportedly responded by 
stressing to Hariri that Damascus was aware of this situation 
and thinking of ways for its Lebanon policy to evolve, citing 
the Muallim decision. 
 
¶7. (C) Parant noted that former PM Hariri was a more frequent 
visitor to the Elysee, ever since he left government.  The 
GoF did not view Hariri as trying to "cut a deal" with the 
Syrians, and saw Hariri as very sincere in trying to "stay 
above the melee" and proceed carefully, without totally 
associating himself with the opposition.  The GoF had advised 
Hariri, nevertheless, to do more to reinforce and associate 
himself with the opposition, and to clarify ambiguity on 
where he stood.  On the possible structuring of electoral 
districts, Parant speculated that the opposition would 
achieve unity on the issue, as Hariri had shown willingness 
to accept the smaller "kaza" districts which were not 
advantageous to him electorally.  Nevertheless, the GoF had 
urged the Lebanese opposition to develop a long-term 
governance strategy beyond a temporary alliance on the 
electoral law, to plan for the expected arrival of a new 
government after spring elections -- of which Hariri was the 
only credible choice as PM.  To shore up French support for 
the opposition and keep pressure on the SARG and GOL, 
President Chirac planned to welcome Maronite Patriarch Sfeir 
to Paris in late January, following on Chirac's meeting with 
Walid Jumblatt last December. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
-------- 
 
¶8. (C) Looking beyond the UNIFIL renewal, Parant stressed 
that the GoF's overriding preoccupation remained Lebanon's 
spring elections and the need to remain vigilant on the 
electoral law.  The GoF hoped to see UN Envoy on UNSCR 1559 
Terje Roed-Larsen in the region soon, and looked to the April 
SYG report to deliver an important message on the electoral 
law and the need for non-interference in elections prior to 
their taking place.  Parant commended Deputy Secretary 
Armitage's January 2 visit to Damascus and Ambassador 
Feltman's subsequent public remarks in Beirut which 
effectively quashed Syrian attempts to distort the U.S. 
position on Lebanon.  Parant described the U.S. and French 
ambassadors in Beirut as a formidable team, and assessed that 
U.S and French efforts were having a positive effect, by 
giving the Lebanese opposition more maneuvering room and 
keeping the pressure on the GOL and SARG, which were in 
increasing disarray on the issue.  The GoF was seeking 
greater EU support in calling for 1559 implementation, and 
found no opposition, but not a great deal of enthusiasm among 
other capitals.  At the same time, Parant cautioned that we 
all needed to be careful in "measuring" pressure on the SARG, 
so as not to provoke a brutal reaction, of which Lebanon 
would be the first victim. 
 
BIOGRAPHIC NOTE 
--------- 
¶9.  (SBU) Parant, who has concentrated on the Near East and 
Africa throughout his career, has been nominated as French 
Ambassador to Senegal; his last day in his current position 
as Technical Advisor for Middle East/Americas will be January 
21, before arriving in Dakar by February 25 (after the Chirac 
state visist to Senegal in early February.)  Septel will 
report detailed biographic information on Parant and his 
replacement, Dominique Boche (most recently MFA Special 
Advisor on Religious Affairs), who takes up his functions 
January 21. 
Leach