This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000208 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2015 
TAGS: PREL KPAL FR
SUBJECT: NEGATIVE FRENCH RESPONSE TO U.S. PROPOSALS ON 
UNIFIL RENEWAL 
 
REF: A. STATE 4247 
 
     ¶B. BEIRUT 65 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Paul Mailhot, reasons 1.4 (b) 
 and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and comment: Senior MFA officials, stressing 
that they had consulted with the Elysee, rejected the 
U.S-proposed inclusion of a preambular reference to UNSCR 
1559 in the draft renewal resolution for UNIFIL (ref a), 
which they described as counterproductive to our shared goal 
of pressing for Syrian and Lebanese compliance with 1559 and 
potentially undermining the parties' confidence in UNIFIL. 
The French appear convinced that even a minimal preambular 
reference to 1559 will effectively break the line of 
separation which France had sought to maintain between UNSCR 
1559 and the peace process, which will in turn serve Syrian 
claims that it will not withdraw from Lebanon until a 
comprehensive peace has been achieved.  French officials 
stressed their desire to work with us in New York to find a 
compromise on the UNIFIL renewal text.  They affirmed 
readiness to add tougher language on Lebanese sovereignty and 
independence and the need for Lebanon to extend its authority 
in the South, as well as more frequent reporting 
requirements.  French officials were less negative, but still 
cautious, on asking DPKO to examine UNIFIL's force structure, 
stressing opposition to reducing UNIFIL at a time when they 
believe we should be asking it to do more.  The French also 
suggested that including the 1559 reference in the UNIFIL 
renewal could complicate the task before new UN Special Envoy 
Terje Roed-Larsen, before his first visit to the region in 
his new capacity.  Syria reportedly asked Larsen to delay a 
planned early January visit for two weeks, during which the 
SARG suggested there might be unspecified "positive 
developments" on Lebanon.  French officials summed up by 
stressing their desire to proceed cautiously on looking for 
ways for UNIFIL to advance the objectives of 1559 
implementation.  Although French officials prefaced their 
January 11 remarks to us by expressing concern over perceived 
U.S. lack of cooperation on a UNSC press statement on the 
January 9 Blue Line clashes, we don't see the French offering 
a quid pro quo between the press statement and the UNIFIL 
renewal text.  End summary and comment. 
 
¶2.  (C) Poloff reviewed reftel talking points on U.S. views 
on UNIFIL renewal with MFA DAS-equivalent for UN/Political 
Affairs Jean-Pierre La Croix and MFA UN/Middle East desk 
officer Alice Guitton January 11, and with MFA DAS-equivalent 
for Egypt/Levant Affairs Christian Jouret January 10.  (Note: 
As the MFA IO Directorate has the lead on this issue, La 
Croix provided the definitive GoF response, which he said was 
made in consultation with Presidential Technical Advisor on 
the Middle East/Americas Andre Parant. End note.)  La Croix 
responded to our points by stressing shared U.S. and French 
objectives on Lebanon.  As co-sponsors of 1559, we shared a 
desire to promote Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and the restoration of Lebanese authority 
throughout Lebanon, and the GoF, like the U.S., wanted to 
reinforce these concepts in the UNIFIL renewal resolution. 
Nevertheless, the GoF remained convinced that it would be 
counterproductive to include a preambular reference to UNSCR 
1559 in the UNIFIL renewal, which, in the French view, would 
not advance 1559 implementation.  On the contrary, the GoF 
concluded that a 1559 reference would "do exactly what the 
Syrian and Lebanese governments wanted," namely validate the 
Syrian effort to link its domination of Lebanon to lack of a 
comprehensive Middle East peace.  Contrary to U.S. analysis, 
the GoF believed that Syria would welcome a 1559 reference in 
the UNIFIL renewal in order to reinforce its "chronological 
approach" to enforcement of UNSCR's -- i.e, implement 242, 
425 et al, first, and then Syria can get around to 
implementing UNSCR 1559.  La Croix summed up by stressing 
that France, in pursuing UNSCR 1559, had sought to establish 
a line of separation between Syrian domination of Lebanon and 
the peace process; in the French view, a mere preambular 
reference to 1559 in the UNIFIL renewal would break that line 
of separation and slow prospects for implementation. 
 
¶3.  (C) Responding to our assessment of the common elements 
between UNSCR 1553 (on UNIFIL's most recent extension) and 
UNSCR 1559, La Croix stressed that support for Lebanon's 
"territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence" were 
elements of UNSCR resolutions long predating 1559.  The GoF 
believed that we could stress "ideas" or elements from UNSCR 
1559 -- such as the need for the GoL to return authority to 
the South -- and toughen references in the UNIFIL renewal 
text to Lebanon's sovereignty and independence, without 
creating a specific linkage between UNIFIL and 1559.  In the 
GoF view, repackaging UNIFIL as a tool of UNSCR 1559 
implementation would undermine the confidence of the Lebanese 
and Syrian governments, which in turn could affect UNIFIL's 
continued ability to carry out its vital mission. 
¶4.  (C) La Croix was less negative, but still apprehensive on 
the U.S. proposal to ask DPKO to examine the UNIFIL force 
structure.  On the one hand, La Croix said the GoF saw merit 
in asking DPKO to examine the efficacy of ongoing PKO's.  At 
the same time, there was a special context to UNIFIL's 
current situation in the aftermath of the adoption of UNSCR 
1559, and the GoF wanted to remain prudent.  In the GoF view, 
if we wanted UNIFIL to have any role in helping advance 
implementation of UNSCR 1559, it needed to be more active, 
issue more reports, and look more closely at elements 
relevant to 1559 -- all conditions which would suggest the 
need to preserve UNIFIL, not reduce its size.  The GoF 
believed UNIFIL could be a part of UNSCR 1559 implementation, 
but wanted to proceed discreetly and cautiously, without 
associating the Syrian presence in Lebanon with the peace 
process, and without weakening UNIFIL's ability to carry out 
its mission. 
 
¶5.  (C) Turning to French expectations of the UN role on 
UNSCR 1559 implementation, La Croix stressed the GoF's 
preoccupation with pressing for Syrian non-interference in 
Lebanon's upcoming legislative elections.  La Croix described 
Terje Roed-Larsen, newly-appointed UN Special Representative 
for UNSCR 1559 implementation, as the U.S. and France's 
"ally" on this issue and said the GoF had hoped Larsen could 
visit the region at the earliest opportunity.  Larsen had 
hoped to make such a visit earlier this month, but was told 
by the Syrians to delay the visit two weeks, pending a 
possible "positive development" on Lebanon.  (Comment: La 
Croix evinced skepticism that such a positive gesture was 
forthcoming from the Syrian side.  End comment.)  The GoF 
wanted Larsen to pass a strong message to the Syrians on 
Lebanon's electoral law, and have Larsen and his subordinates 
visit the region frequently in the run-up to the April UNSYG 
report.  The GoF had already specified to Larsen that it 
hoped the April report would follow the same format as its 
predecessor, namely list obligations on UNSCR 1559 
implementation, one-by-one, with an assessment of whether 
each condition had been meet.  La Croix added that if, by 
April, neither the Syrian or Lebanese governments had taken 
UNSCR 1559 into account, there would be unspecified 
"consequences" for French bilateral relations with both 
governments.  He added that the GoF was seeking to raise the 
European profile in pushing for UNSCR 1559 implementation and 
supporting Larsen's efforts; the GoF had successfully pressed 
for mention of 1559 in the most recent European Council 
declaration, and was considering asking the next EU General 
and External Affairs Council (GAERC) meeting to invite Larsen 
to attend and brief ministers on his efforts. 
 
¶6.  (C) Comment: La Croix prefaced his remarks to us by 
stressing the GoF's disappointment that, at the time of our 
meeting, the U.S. and Algeria were, in the GoF view, impeding 
agreement on a UNSC press statement condemning the January 9 
Blue Line clashes that ended with the death of a French UN 
observer in southern Lebanon.  While the apparent resolution 
of the press statement will improve atmospherics with the 
French in New York as we discuss UNIFIL renewal, in no way 
did La Croix suggest that France was willing to offer a quid 
pro quo or link the press statement with its position on 
UNIFIL renewal.  To us the French opposition to including the 
preambular reference appears quite firm, although the French 
appear ready to engage in New York on other ways to toughen 
the renewal resolution.  We also see little potential for the 
Elysee to overrule the MFA on this, as La Croix is an 
authoritative, well-connected interlocutor and we do not 
doubt his assertion that the Elysee is on board with the 
position he articulated.  At any rate, we will meet with 
Elysee Middle East Advisor Parant on the evening of January 
11 to press further on this issue and see if there is hope of 
bringing the GoF around on this.  End comment. 
Leach