This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000757 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IN CH
SUBJECT: STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH CHINA JUST THE BEGINNING, 
BUT "GAP IS STILL WIDE" ON BOUNDARY ISSUES 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 719 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: "If China had proposed a strategic dialogue 
a few years ago, we would have been wary," MEA Joint 
Secretary (East Asia) told PolCouns and Poloff on January 31, 
 
SIPDIS 
adding that the PRC now seems willing to engage with India on 
issues of global importance.  Echoing Foreign Secretary 
Saran's comments (reftel), Kantha described the recent 
India-China meetings as upbeat but relatively weak on 
substance.  He reported that Beijing offered private support 
for India's Security Council bid, and that the countries 
discussed Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and 
Taiwan.  More sensitive topics, including Burma, Nepal and 
Central Asia, were not addressed.  Despite the positive 
atmospherics ahead of Wen Jiabao's expected March visit, 
Kantha said "the gap is still wide" on the boundary issue, a 
matter India is not prepared to let go unresolved.  He 
reiterated Indian interest in an invitation to the East Asia 
Summit, providing there is consensus within ASEAN.  End 
Summary. 
 
Willing to Engage 
----------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) On January 31, following up our previous discussions 
with the MEA on the India-China strategic dialogue (reftel), 
MEA Joint Secretary (East Asia) Ashok Kantha briefed PolCouns 
and Poloff, remarking that "if China had proposed a strategic 
dialogue a few years ago, we would have been wary." 
Underlining the improving ties between New Delhi and Beijing, 
Kantha said that although the PRC had previously wanted to 
confine India to South Asia, "now China seems eager to 
discuss bigger issues with us."  Kantha attributed this 
change to Beijing's desire that India-US relations not become 
"warmer than necessary" and commented that the Chinese want 
something more than the current officially recorded 
"cooperative, constructive relationship."  While India has no 
objections to simply re-labelling the relationship, "it 
should not lead to obligations," he said. 
 
¶3.  (C) Kantha was impressed by the upbeat tone of the 
meetings, telling PolCouns that Vice Foreign Minister Wu 
Dawei made an effort to highlight the positive aspects of 
India-China ties during his discussions with Foreign 
Secretary Saran.  It was also useful to understand those 
 
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issues where Beijing and New Delhi do not agree, he remarked. 
 Calling the talks the beginning of a process, Kantha 
expressed the hope that at later discussions would be more 
substantive. 
 
UN Security Council 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) According to Kantha, China privately supports India's 
candidature for membership on an expanded Security Council. 
Publicly, the PRC is not willing to go beyond "expressing 
understanding" for India's bid for a Security Council seat 
and indicating support for India to play a more important 
role in international affairs. 
 
Global Review 
------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) According to Kantha, Dawei was upbeat on Afghanistan, 
describing the election of President Karzai as a positive 
step.  However, Dawei went on to describe US actions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan as "the biggest tragedy of our times," 
complaining that the US had overthrown two regimes (the 
Taliban and the Saddam Hussein regime) that it had created 
(sic).  Kantha found this part of the Chinese presentation 
overdrawn. 
 
¶6.  (C) Kantha described Dawei as upbeat on the US approach 
to Iran, telling Saran that the US seemed to favor a 
"Libya-type solution" and that there was a good possibility 
of a "soft landing" there. Dawei also provided a readout on 
North Korea, arguing that six-party talks should resume. 
 
¶7.  (C) Although India raised the AQ Khan proliferation 
network as a matter of concern, Kantha commented that China 
was not prepared to engage substantively on the subject of 
Pakistan's nuclear program, despite underlining general 
concerns about non-proliferation. 
 
Boundary Talks 
-------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Asked about the status of the boundary discussions, 
Kantha emphasized that the GOI was not willing to defer 
resolution of the boundary question indefinitely. 
Working-level discussions on the boundary dispute would 
continue, he said, but larger issues would have to wait until 
India appoints another Special Representative to replace the 
late NSA JN Dixit.  Noting that "the gap that separates us is 
still wide," Kantha emphasized that both sides must make 
tough decisions.  From New Delhi's perspective, territorial 
concessions in the Eastern sector is "out of the question, a 
non-starter," and even concessions in the Western sector 
would be difficult.  He argued that China should accept the 
territorial status-quo in furtherance of their broader 
bilateral agenda. 
 
Regional Organizations 
---------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) According to Kantha, despite Beijing's interest in 
SAARC, Chinese involvement there would be premature because 
"SAARC needs to get its act together."  China's involvement 
could detract from the core issues, he added. 
 
¶10.  (C) Asked about the East Asia Summit, Kantha described 
two schools of thought within ASEAN regarding India's 
participation there.  While some would like to see a 10 3 
arrangement, with ASEAN nations plus Japan, China and South 
Korea, others argue that this would be no different from 
ASEAN plus three.  Beijing has argued that ASEAN should take 
the lead in the East Asia Summit, he said, but remarked that 
China has offered to host the second Summit before 
participants had even decided whether to have another Summit, 
a move which "makes us nervous."  He reiterated Indian 
interest in an invitation to the East Asia Summit, providing 
there is consensus within ASEAN. 
 
¶11.  (C) Kantha reported that China was "warming up" to the 
idea of an India-Russia-China trilateral meeting, but 
emphasized that "relations with the US are so important, we 
do not want a trilateral dialogue to become a group." 
Discussion would focus instead on economic issues, he stated. 
 He suggested that the Russians were still the strongest 
advocate of this trilateral forum. 
 
Taiwan 
------ 
 
¶12.  (C) China raised the issue of Taiwan and briefed India 
on Taiwan's "secessionist legislation."  Kantha noted that 
Dawei had raised the issue in a "pro forma" manner, 
suggesting that Beijing accepts India's "low-key" approach to 
the issue.  Our interests in Taiwan are economic, he 
underlined. 
 
Comment and Action Request 
-------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Kantha repeatedly stressed the convergence of US and 
Indian interests with respect to China and underlined the 
need to expand the US-India regional dialogue to include the 
PRC.  He also reiterated Indian requests for EAP officials at 
the DAS level or above to come to New Delhi for discussions 
on our interests and concerns related to China. 
MULFORD