This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000621 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IN NP PK

SUBJECT: INDIA WELCOMES MORE CONTACT BETWEEN KASHMIRIS 
  REF: 04 KATHMANDU 2464 
  Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr.  Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: The Pugwash-sponsored conference on Kashmir  held in Kathmandu last December has reinforced growing GOI  receptivity towards contact between Kashmiris from India and  Pakistan, and New Delhi is considering proposals for a  follow-on meeting, possibly in Srinagar, according to Kashmir  Interlocutor NN Vohra.  Kashmiri separatist participants  called the seminar ""very good,"" even ""spectacular"" -- better  than other events in Europe or North America in recent years,  because its venue allowed for much broader participation and  more extensive interaction between Kashmiri activists and  those who write about the issue.  While the New  Delhi-Hurriyat dialogue remains completely stalled, GOI  openness to more cross LOC contact is positive, and meetings  like this can serve as placeholders of sorts until conditions  improve for restarting a formal dialogue.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Academic and policy conferences on Kashmir tend to be  of limited value for several reasons: 1) usually sponsored by  a clearly pro-India or pro-Pakistan group, they are perceived  as ""biased,"" thus depriving them of credibility with major  constituencies; 2) the ""right people"" are not there, usually  because they boycott, are prevented from leaving their  countries, cannot obtain visas, or do not want to accept  travel funds from the organizers or cannot/do not wish to pay  their own way; and 3) discussion reviews well-worn positions  and does little to advance the thinking of people who matter  (GOI, GOP, and major players in J&K).  These weaknesses have  been part of the Kashmir seminar landscape for decades, and  continue to characterize the vast majority of periodic  efforts by academics, politicians, and others to discuss this  issue seriously outside India and Pakistan. 
  Unqualified Success 
------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Following the December 11-14 seminar, our  conversations with a number of the participants (as a  supplement to Kathmandu's timely and useful report (reftel))  indicate that this event was unusually successful, because  many Kashmiris and other well-informed observers attended,  and because they represented most major shades of  non-official GOI and Kashmiri opinion.  Perhaps most  importantly, the session proved to GOI skeptics that India  can benefit from facilitating more contact between Indian and  Pakistani Kashmiris, including separatists.  Press reports  that this was the first such meeting of Kashmiri leaders from  both sides since 1947 were somewhat exaggerated, in that  Kashmiris have met at conferences outside the country in the  past, but we are unaware of a case in which such a large  number of influential Kashmir-related people (ca. 45) met for  so many days at one time, and spoke so extensively with each  other. 
  Separatists 
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¶4.  (C) Moderate All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)  leaders were uniformly positive about the event, praising the  organizers in particular for bringing Kashmiris from both  sides of the LOC together for four days of talks, and  expressing appreciation that New Delhi did not block their  travel.  Mirwaiz Umar Farooq told D/Polcouns recently that  the very fact that the meeting took place was a great  achievement.  Until his plane departed, he had expected the  GOI to prevent him and other Kashmiris from going, and he was  surprised to be able to attend at all.  (We know that NSA  Dixit personally intervened to make this travel possible.)  Well-organized conferences cannot fix the Kashmir problem,  but similar meetings would be useful in bringing people  together who would otherwise have little or no opportunity to  communicate with each other on this issue, he stated. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Hurriyat's Prof. AG Bhat was struck by the fact  that the Indian authorities had allowed him to travel without  an Indian passport or other official GOI-issued document, but  on the basis of a piece of paper he had drafted himself.  It  was his first ever trip outside India (he is in his 60s), and  he clearly relished the opportunity to meet so many people he  had only read about.  Some participants came with open minds,  others were ideologues, and still others represented official  Indian and Pakistani positions, but this produced  ""spectacular"" interactions, and a certain ""togetherness,"" he  said.  He characterized the general consensus among  participants as: 1) there is no military solution to the  Kashmir problem; 2) the Kashmiris should not suffer any  longer; and 3) Kashmir is a hurdle in the path of progress  for the peoples of India and Pakistan. 
 
¶6. (C) Representing pro-independence views, ""Kashmir Times""  editor Ved Bhasin called the seminar ""a meeting of minds.""  Discussion was open, and there was none of the bitterness he  had expected.  The most notable part was a separate dialogue  between Kashmiris conducted by Kashmiri-American Farooq  Kathwari.  JKLF leader Yasin Malik did not attend, and his  representative Ghulam Rasool Dar did not contribute to the  discussion, according to participants.  The GOI also  permitted a representative of Shabir Shah's pro-independence  faction of the Hurriyat to travel, which no one expected. 
Hardline pro-Pak activist SAS Geelani's did not attend,  although he was approached. 
  Non-Official Indians 
-------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Former Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan G  Parthasarathy highlighted the unusual mix of Kashmiris from  both sides of the LOC, who discussed their views frankly at  great length, focused on ways to make Kashmiris' lives more  secure, and agreed to meet again.  He described a consensus  among participants that the LOC ceasefire should be made  permanent, that violence of all kinds should end, and that  all concerned should refrain from actions that incite  violence.  A reduction of GOI and GOP security presence would  also be welcome.  He was struck by the yearning for more  contact between Kashmiris.  He criticized New Delhi's  position on documentation for the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus,  arguing that as India claims this territory as its own  anyway, passports should not be necessary.  He was also  skeptical of the argument that more cross LOC travel would  increase terrorism, and called for greater interaction  between Kargil and Skardu, not just J&K and POK.  Finally, he  noted the absence of leaders from the Congress Party, BJP,  PDP and National Conference, and from the Northern Areas in  Pakistan (some were invited).  Strategist C Raja Mohan added  that the conference was not supposed to come up with any  solutions, but if the initiative were sustained, it might  come up with a ""wee bit of political space"" for Delhi and  Islamabad to explore. 
  GOI Positive 
------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) The GOI has also been unusually positive about this  event, not because it was ""pro-Indian"" (it was not), but  because senior officials have been changing their minds about  the utility of such meetings.  In a conversation with  D/Polcouns on January 24, Kashmir Interlocutor NN Vohra  summarized New Delhi's position as ""not only to allow it to  happen, but to ensure that it would.""  MEA Joint Secretary  (Pakistan, Afghanistan Iran) AK Singh told Polcouns that the  conference was a success from the Foreign Ministry's  perspective.  The GOI intelligence agencies had reservations  about some participants' travel, but Dixit intervened to  guarantee that they be able to go.  Several particpants told  Vohra of unusually candid exchanges between Kashmiris in  particular, whose positions faced scrutiny in a semi-public  manner.  Vohra welcomed the fact that the sloganeering that  passes for debate on Kashmir was subjected to debate.  Vohra  also confirmed a late December ""Hindu"" story which reported  that the GOI is keen to allow more contact between Kashmiris,  including with APHC leaders.  This receptivity extends to  those from Pakistani Kashmir who wish to visit India, he  said. 
  Comment 
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¶8.  (C) The Pugwash meeting was only a seminar, but it had  one important consequence: it reinforced evolving GOI  attitudes on the utility of contact between Kashmiris and  others who think about the problem.  Interaction between  Indian and Pakistani Kashmiris has always been subject to  political interference from New Delhi and Islamabad, but we  are struck by the event's positive after-effects in official  Delhi, which holds the door open for more such meetings in  the future.  This kind of event cannot be a substitute for  the stalled dialogue between New Delhi and the moderate  Hurriyat, but it can serve as a placeholder until conditions  for formal talks improve.  APHC leaders noted the greater GOI  openness.  In the absence of significant initiatives on the  New Delhi-Srinagar axis, more contact of this nature between  Kashmiris can only be positive. 
MULFORD