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Viewing cable 05NEWDELHI388, SAARC SUMMIT: WHAT'S THE HOLD UP?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05NEWDELHI388 2005-01-14 10:30 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy New Delhi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000388 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL ETRD BG PK IN SAARC

SUBJECT: SAARC SUMMIT: WHAT'S THE HOLD UP? 
  REF: A. NEW DELHI 303 
     B. 04 NEW DELHI 7426 
  Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt.  Reason 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: The GOI has not yet agreed to the proposed  February 7-9 dates for the SAARC Summit, and media reports  indicate New Delhi has suggested February 6-7 instead.  The  MEA remains tightlipped about the reasons for delay, but some  New Delhi foreign policy watchers speculate that the SAARC  indecision is connected to the major upcoming elections in  the states of Bihar and Jharkhand, or the unsuccessful talks  with Pakistan on the Baglihar Dam.  India is likely  ultimately to agree to a Summit in February.  Further  postponement of the Summit would put off progress on SAFTA  negotiations, as well as a first-time meeting between PM  Singh and Bangladeshi PM Khaleda Zia.  End Summary. 
 
 
2.  (C) MEA Deputy Secretary (SAARC) Oscar Kerketta told  Poloff on January 12 that there was still ""some haggling""  going on over the proposed dates.  While Kerketta said that  the ""majority"" had accepted February 7-9, not all member  states were on board (but declined to specify which countries  had not yet agreed).  A well informed journalist reported  that as of January 13, India was the only member who had not  accepted the Summit, but predicted a decision within a few  days.  The media reported on January 14 that India has  suggested February 6-7 to Islamabad, which currently holds  the SAARC chairmanship until Dhaka takes over at the Summit. 
  Elections No Excuse 
------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Some commentators have attributed New Delhi's  resistance to the February dates to upcoming elections in the  battleground states of Bihar and Jharkhand, noting that  February 7-9 falls between the first two phases, February 3  and 15.  ""Hindustan Times"" Deputy Editor Pramit Pal  Chaudhary, however, dismissed this notion, remarking on  January 13 that ""nothing big is on the stake for the Congress  party"" in these states.  Raj Chengappa of ""India Today"" came  to the same conclusion, as did the ""Business Standard's""  Aditi Phadnis, who said ""Sonia Gandhi, not PM Manmohan Singh,  would be required for campaign and other poll exercises,"" and  that ""assembly elections were not a potent reason for  postponing the Summit."" 
  It Wouldn't Be the First Time 
----------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Although the Dhaka Summit will mark SAARC's twentieth  anniversary, it will only be the thirteenth summit, as seven  summits have been nixed because of neighborly animosity. 
While this meeting does not appear to be in any imminent  danger of being called off, observers in India suspect  bilateral friction may be at the root of New Delhi's slow  response to Dhaka's proposal.  Debunking the explanation that  New Delhi wishes to avoid high-level travel during the state  elections, political commentator Zafar Agha suggested that  poor atmospherics between India and Pakistan following  Islamabad's threat of World Bank arbitration to resolve the  Baglihar Dam dispute (Ref A), have prompted New Delhi's  reluctance to confirm the Summit, which normally includes  bilateral meetings on the sidelines. 
 
5.  (C) MEA officials have given other reasons for India's  hesitation.  MEA Director (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives) 
TS Sandhu said it would not be appropriate for the PM and 
  SIPDIS  Foreign Minister to be seen on non-tsunami related travel  while parts of the country are still recovering from the  disaster.  Kerketta of the SAARC desk ascribed the delay to  ongoing discussion among the members as to which documents  are to be signed, but he mentioned four agreements (Customs  Mutual Assistance Agreement, SAARC Arbitration Rules,  Multilateral Double Taxation Treaty, Promotion and Protection  of Investment Agreement) that the MEA expects to be finalized  in Dhaka. 
  The Problems With Postponing 
---------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) ORF Senior Fellow Jayshree Sengupta, who takes an  admittedly pessimistic view of the organization (""SAARC does  not have a bright future""), recently told Poloff that if  India were to put off the Summit it would delay action on  South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) negotiations and also  postpone release of the Poverty Commission Report.  Sengupta  described the report as useful in highlighting that all the  SAARC countries suffer from the same problems.  MEA Joint  Secretary (SAARC) V. Ashok had outlined an ambitious schedule 
  SIPDIS  for SAARC implementation in a November 22 conversation with  PolCouns (Ref B).  While he did not think the Dhaka Summit  would include any significant announcements on SAFTA itself,  he noted that the four agreements would be important to  facilitate trade and investment in the region. 
Comment: Baglihar Theory Holds No Water 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Despite the chatter among some commentators, we do  not buy the theory that the GOI is using SAARC as a tool to  show its displeasure with Islamabad.  This judgment is  reinforced by the MEA's January 13 confirmation that Foreign  Minister Natwar Singh will travel to Pakistan (shortly after  the Summit) on February 15.  If India were as upset with  Islamabad as some suggest (and we have seen little evidence  of this), holding Natwar's visit hostage would be more  effective with Islamabad than quibbling over SAARC.  Postponing the Summit considerably would also put off the  PM's first meeting with Bangladeshi PM Khaleda Zia, which  provides an opportunity to make inroads into New Delhi's  recent difficulties with Dhaka.  On balance, we still expect  the GOI to agree to a Summit (and the PM's first trip to any  of India's neighbors) in February. 
MULFORD