This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0833
INFO AMEMBASSY ABUJA 
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AMEMBASSY ASMARA 
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 
AMEMBASSY DAKAR 
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 
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AMEMBASSY PARIS 
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SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USLO TRIPOLI

UNCLAS  NDJAMENA 000115 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT KINCANNON AND MCCUTHCHAN, AF/C, INR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF CD SU PTER
SUBJECT: CHAD: 2004 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: STATE 245841 
 
¶1.  Summary: Chad continues to be a strong partner in the 
global war against terrorism.  Chad was not covered in the 
2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report.  Post responses are 
keyed to reftel paragraph 15. 
 
¶A.  The Government of Chad continues to take significant 
actions to support the global coalition against terrorism. 
In 2004, Chadian troops were trained as part of the Pan Sahel 
Initiative.  Chadian police and immigration officials 
participated in two Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) training 
programs in 2004.  A group of 24 Chadian police traveled to 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana for training in May and 24 Chadian 
police officers participated in the follow-up training held 
in N'Djamena in December.  The programs are designed to 
assist government officials in detecting the movement of 
suspicious goods or people across borders.  A noteworthy 
anti-terrorism event occurred in northern Chad earlier this 
year.  From March 8 to 11, Chadian security forces engaged 
the GSPC, a terrorist organization, which entered Chad from 
Niger.  Over 20 members of the GSPC and three Chadian 
soldiers were killed in the ensuing clashes.  In the days 
following the encounters, the MDJT captured GSPC leader 
Abderrazak el-Para.  The MDJT handed over el-Para to Algerian 
authorities in October 2004. 
 
¶B.  The GOC has fully cooperated with all USG requests for 
assistance.  There have been no instances in 2004 where the 
US asked the GOC for counter-terrorism cooperation aimed at 
preventing attacks and protecting US persons or interests. 
There were no terrorist attacks in Chad against US persons or 
interests.  During the year, the Government held a number of 
meetings to discuss the harmonization of its penal code with 
international conventions against terrorism. 
 
¶C.  The GOC military engaged with the Salifist Group for 
Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which is designated as a 
terrorist organization, in March 2004 (See paragraph A). 
 
¶D.  Chad's judicial system has not been called upon to 
respond to any acts of international or domestic terrorism. 
The GOC did not extradite or request the extradition of any 
suspected terrorists for prosecution during 2004.  Chad has a 
weak judicial system. Chad would not be a suitable forum for 
the prosecution of a terrorist.  All host country agencies, 
police, military and GOC officials are cooperative, but 
ill-equipped to combat terrorism. 
 
¶E.  The police lack the capability to deal with terrorism 
issues.  The police serve a political role in that they are 
one means by which the president secures his position. 
However, they are considered inferior to the armed forces. 
Combining that factor with an absence of resources creates a 
situation in which the national police force of Chad is not 
just minimally effective, but seriously marginalized.  The 
police have no tactical capability.  Police special 
operations capability is non-existent.  There is no 
bomb-disposal capability in Chad in the law-enforcement 
sense.  The police have no long-range or integrated 
communications capabilities and very minimal tactical radio 
capability.  The police are not properly equipped with 
weapons, and not equipped at all with other basic tools of 
law-enforcement.  Investigative capabilities within the 
different directorates of the national police are 
rudimentary, but can be effective nonetheless.  Relying on a 
wide-spread information-gathering network at the grassroots 
level, they are able to effectively monitor activities within 
their own borders.  Preventive-intelligence gathering is 
functional, but hampered significantly by communications 
problems. 
 
¶F.  Chad's shares land borders with five other countries. 
Chad does not have the resources to patrol its borders.  As a 
result, all of its borders are porous. 
 
¶G.  Chad participated in PSI training in June/July 2004. 
Chadian police and immigration officials received ATA 
training in June and August 2004.  The Chadian Law 
Enforcement community has been very receptive to ATA 
 
training.  The Chadian Police have received two ATA classes 
so far, Critical Incident Management and Vital Installation. 
The attitude towards this type of counter-terrorism training 
has been very positive.  The biggest responsibility in the 
future for the police and military is to control 
transnational terrorism and the difficult task of controlling 
their porous borders.  Physical security of the frontiers of 
Chad is the responsibility of the military, rather than the 
police, who control ports of entry.  The intelligence bureau 
of the national police force, also has responsibility for 
monitoring the borders of Chad in conjunction with the 
military.  RSO Chad has requested training in 2006 to improve 
Chad's rural border patrol operations and has requested that 
this training be coordinated with PSI to ensure that there is 
no duplication of effort between ATA and DOD. 
 
¶H.  The military unit that received PSI training has been 
re-designated as the "anti-terrorism unit". 
 
¶I.   For information on the Chadian military encounter with 
the GSPC, see paragraph A.  Internally, cooperation between 
the High Council for Islamic Affairs and the Government of 
Chad has resulted in the banning of specific groups and 
imams.  The Muslim community in Chad is largely 
self-regulating and the predominately Muslim Government is 
consistently ready to curb extremist activities. 
 
¶J.  The Chadian military conducts operation in the north to 
counter-terrorism and protect its borders.  The GOC has 500 
troops and participates in a joint border patrol with 200 
French soldiers along the border with Sudan.  This deployment 
is aimed at preventing cross-border attacks from Darfur and 
protecting Chad from Chadian rebel groups allegedly forming 
inside Sudan. 
 
¶K.  Chadian Government officials, from President Deby to low 
level police and immigration officials, demonstrate 
consistent support for counter-terrorism efforts and a strong 
desire for more C/T training. 
 
¶L.  As previously mentioned, the Chadian Government is 
willing to counter terrorist activities.  However, Chad is 
one of the poorest countries in the world and lacks the 
resources to strengthen its capacity to fight terrorism. 
 
¶M.  The GOC does not harbor or support the financial or 
training activities of terrorists.  In 2002, Chad ordered all 
of the country's banks to freeze any accounts suspected of 
suspected terrorist groups or organizations. 
 
¶N.  The GOC does not make public statements regarding states 
that sponsor terror. 
 
¶O.  Status of terrorist activity in Chad will be sent via 
classified e-mail. 
 
¶P.  Northern Chad is the area in which terrorist groups would 
be most likely to operate because of its inaccessibility. 
However, due to the extremely difficult desert terrain and 
harsh climate, a group wishing to operate in the north would 
require the assistance of locals to survive. 
 
¶Q.  The Chadian military encounter with the GSPC constitutes 
a preventive attack against terrorism.  Reporting on a 
terrorism-related arrest will follow in classified channels. 
 
¶R.  The Chadian military engaged with the terrorist 
organization GSPC in March 2004.  See paragraph A. 
 
¶2.  Embassy POCs are Kathleen FitzGibbon (P/E Officer), 
e-mail: fitzgibbonka@state.gov and Patrick Leonard (RSO), 
e-mail: leonardpa@state.gov 
 
 
¶3.  Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
WALL 
 
 
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