This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER SP
SUBJECT: BASQUE PARLIAMENT APPROVES PLAN TO SEEK GREATER 
AUTONOMY 
 
¶1. (U) Summary.  The Basque Regional Parliament surprised 
Spanish political observers by narrowly approving a proposal 
by the ruling Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) to seek 
increased autonomy from the national government.  Known as 
"Plan Ibarretxe," the proposal falls short of calling for an 
independent Basque state, but would give the Basque 
Government near total authority within its territory, limited 
Basque representation at the international level, and 
official recognition of the Basque people as a separate 
nation.  Plan Ibarretxe was not expected to win the necessary 
majority in the Basque Parliament, but unexpected support by 
three deputies affiliated with the outlawed ETA political 
front group Batasuna carried the day for the Basque 
nationalists.  The plan now moves to the national Parliament 
for consideration.  If approved at the national level, voters 
in the Basque Region would have to approve or reject the plan 
via a referendum.  Both the ruling Socialists (PSOE) and the 
opposition Popular Party (PP) have signaled their intent to 
reject Plan Ibarretxe in Parliament, effectively vetoing 
further action on the PNV proposal.  However, the Basque 
Government claims it will follow through with a popular 
referendum on its plan regardless of the vote in Madrid, 
setting the stage for a major constitutional crisis. 
 
¶2. (SBU) President Zapatero has thus far ignored calls by the 
PP to terminate Plan Ibarretxe on legal grounds by bringing 
it before the Constitutional Court, calculating that by 
allowing the political process to play itself out he can 
undermine Basque nationalist claims that Madrid is intolerant 
and undemocratic.  The PSOE hopes to parlay Ibarretxe's 
defeat in the national Parliament into electoral gains during 
Basque Region elections in May.  The PNV, which is in a 
coalition with two small leftist parties, is likely to use a 
political defeat in Madrid to stoke nationalist sentiments as 
part of its effort to win an outright majority in the Basque 
legislature.  Apart from being an enormous political 
challenge for Zapatero, the passage of Plan Ibarretxe is 
likely to further widen the deep rift between Basque 
nationalists and Basque supporters of the current autonomy 
statutes.  End Summary. 
 
//PLAN IBARRETXE: SEEKING BASQUE "FREE ASSOCIATION" WITH 
SPAIN// 
 
¶3. (U) Plan Ibarretxe, named after its author, Basque 
Regional President Juan Jose Ibarretxe, does not call for the 
creation of an independent Basque state.  It is a call for 
the re-negotiation of the existing autonomy statute (the 
"Statute of Gernika," negotiated during Spain's transition to 
democracy) to convert the Basque Region from an "autonomous 
community" such as Catalonia or Galicia into a region in 
"free association" with Spain.  It would enjoy near total 
autonomy on internal political and social matters, as well as 
limited representation at the international level. 
 
Key points include: 
 
- A definition of the Basque people as a "nation" residing in 
the nation-states of Spain and France. 
 
- The declaration that the Basque "nation" has the right of 
self-determination, based on consultation with the residents 
of Basque Country, Navarra, and Iparralde (French Basque 
region). 
 
- The recognition by Spanish and Basque authorities of both 
Spanish and Basque nationalities. 
 
- Increased Basque representation in EU institutions. 
 
- Control by the Basque Government over: education, tax 
collection, economic policy, health care, natural resources, 
and implementation of national (Spanish) laws. 
 
- The central government would retain control over: national 
defense, foreign policy, customs, control of airspace, and 
legal jurisdiction in criminal matters, intellectual property 
cases, and in the administration of civil law. 
 
//A SURPRISE VICTORY// 
 
¶4. (U) The conventional wisdom among political observers was 
that the PNV would fail to win a vote on Plan Ibarretxe in 
the Basque Parliament, but would then use that loss to 
challenge the nationalist credentials of its opponents in 
Basque elections in May.  This view was predicated on the 
fact that three deputies affiliated with the banned ETA 
political front group Batasuna had stated their opposition to 
Plan Ibarretxe as insufficient and unlikely to prevail in 
Madrid.  (NOTE: Batasuna was disbanded in 2002 under the Law 
of Political Parties, but Batasuna deputies in political 
assemblies were allowed to retain their seats as members of 
"Sozialista Abertzaleak," which is simply another name for 
Batasuna.  END NOTE.)  However, Batasuna's support for Plan 
Ibarretxe in a procedural vote in early December raised 
suspicions that the PNV had secretly negotiated Batasuna's 
support for the key vote on December 30.  This was confirmed 
when the measure passed by a 39 to 35 vote after hours of 
emotional debate.  Batasuna leader Arnaldo Otegi said that he 
had backed Ibarretxe despite his personal misgivings because 
of "the desire of the Basque people to be heard." 
 
¶5. (U) Under the terms of the current autonomy statute, Plan 
Ibarretxe now goes to the national Parliament to be debated 
and submitted to a vote.  The debate will likely begin in 
late February.  If the measure were approved at the national 
level, it would permit the Basque Government to organize a 
referendum on Plan Ibarretxe.  However, there is little 
chance Ibarretxe will reach this next step, since both the 
PSOE and the PP strongly oppose PNV efforts to increase the 
Basque Region's already considerable independence.  If the 
plan is rejected by the national Parliament, there is no 
recourse for the PNV and the project would have no legal 
standing.  However, Juan Jose Ibarretxe declared that Basque 
Government would proceed with a referendum regardless of 
whether the plan is approved or rejected in Madrid, arguing 
that it would be undemocratic to deny Basque voters the 
opportunity to determine the nature of their relationship 
with the GOS.  Calling a referendum without the approval of 
the national Parliament would be a criminal act punishable by 
imprisonment or other penalties. 
 
//NEGATIVE REACTIONS// 
 
¶6. (U) Both the PSOE and the PP responded to the passage of 
Plan Ibarretxe by reiterating their determination to preserve 
the existing autonomy statutes and attacking the PNV for 
accepting the support of Batasuna deputies who have refused 
to renounce ETA terrorism.  Basque President Ibarretxe 
retorted that he had accepted Batasuna's support for his plan 
just as the PP and PSOE would have accepted Batasuna's vote 
against the PNV proposal.  PP leaders called on the GOS to 
sidetrack Plan Ibarretxe before it reached Parliament by 
referring the matter to Spain's Constitutional Court, 
claiming Ibarretxe was secessionist and therefore 
unconstitutional.  Zapatero rejected the PP recommendation, 
saying his Government would refuse to negotiate with the PNV 
on the autonomy statutes, but would let Plan Ibarretxe 
proceed to the national Parliament in line with existing 
legal provisions. 
 
¶7. Although Zapatero agreed to meet Ibarretxe in early 
January, he said that the GOS would not agree to the 
"government to government" talks on Ibarretxe requested by 
the PNV.  He told journalists on January 1 that "there is no 
space for this plan within the Spanish Constitution.  It is a 
thing of the past and should have been withdrawn long ago." 
GOS Minister for Public Administration Jordi Sevilla told 
journalists that the Government's aim is for "the Basque 
people to defeat the plan themselves" by rejecting the PNV in 
the May regional elections.  Zapatero thereby hopes to 
undermine Basque nationalist claims that the central 
government is both undemocratic in its actions and deaf to 
the legitimate aspirations of the Basque people.  However, 
Zapatero said the GOS would consider legal action if the 
Basque Government chose to proceed with a referendum after 
Plan Ibarretxe had been considered (and rejected) by the 
national Parliament.   Perhaps to show the Government's 
mettle, Attorney General Conde Pumpido announced that the GOS 
would pursue charges against Batasuna leaders, including 
Arnaldo Otegi, for organizing an "illegal" meeting of the 
group in November during which participants expressed support 
for dead or jailed ETA members. 
 
//A DANGEROUS COURSE// 
 
¶8. (SBU) This is the most significant domestic political 
crisis faced by Zapatero since he took office in April 2004. 
He is gambling that by giving the proposal a hearing in 
Parliament that Plan Ibarretxe will fail due to its legal and 
political contradictions without undue intervention on the 
part of the GOS.  However, if the PNV ignores the decision of 
the national Parliament and carries out a referendum on Plan 
Ibarretxe as threatened, it will present the GOS with a 
serious constitutional crisis and expose Zapatero to 
opposition recriminations that he should have acted more 
forcefully.  Moreover, the PNV's challenge to Madrid's 
central authority calls into question GOS plans to "review" 
and possibly reform autonomy statutes with other regions, a 
move widely interpreted as a GOS concession to PSOE-allied 
regionalist parties in Catalonia and elsewhere in Spain. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Basque civil society faces an even greater challenge 
than Zapatero.  With radical Batasuna openly backing an 
initiative of the moderate PNV, the divisions between Basque 
nationalists and their Basque "consitutionalist" opponents 
are greater than ever.  The Basque electorate is divided 
roughly in half between the two groups.  The 
constitutionalists believe that Batasuna's role in the 
approval of Plan Ibarretxe has exposed the PNV as apologists 
for violent radical nationalists and that Plan Ibarretxe is 
only the first step in a move toward eventual secession from 
Spain.  Already, PP leaders in the constitutionalist 
stronghold of Alava have said they would not accept the 
implementation of Plan Ibarretxe.  Meanwhile, the PNV argues 
that by coopting part of ETA's political message, it is 
siphoning off the terrorist's political support and drawing 
would-be radicals into the legitimate political arena.  The 
legal and political sparring over Plan Ibarretxe is likely to 
dominate the Spanish political scene through the May regional 
elections. 
MANZANARES