This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINGSTON 000100 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/CAR (BENT), INL/LP (KBROWN), DS/IP/WHA, DS/IP/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL KCRM PGOV SNAR JM
SUBJECT: 2004 A BANNER YEAR FOR CRIME IN JAMAICA 
 
REF: A. 03 KINGSTON 0991 
     ¶B. 04 KINGSTON 01956 
     ¶C. 04 KINGSTON 01608 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Sue M. Cobb for reasons 1.5 (b) & (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  For many Jamaicans, crime remained a major 
preoccupation throughout 2004.  According to the Jamaica 
Constabulary Force's (JCF) Crime Statistics Report (CSR) for 
2004, close to nine thousand major crimes were committed 
island-wide during the year.  By December 31, the number of 
homicides had skyrocketed to 1,469 (the most in Jamaica's 
history), with October the worst month, accounting for over 
157 murders. Because not all crimes are reported or come to 
the attention of the police, and because the criminal code 
contains many more varieties of major crimes than those 
listed in the CSR, the sum total of crime actually committed 
during 2004 may have been greater than is indicated by the 
CSR.  Incoming JCF Commissioner Lucius Thomas will have his 
hands full if he is to address the JCF's many shortcomings, 
and, with frequent, credible allegations of corruption in the 
police force and the political arena, there is little 
indication at present that the country's crime problem will 
be resolved soon.  His is likely to be a short honeymoon. 
End Summary. 
 
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Crime Rate Spirals Upward 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The latest Crime Statistics Report (CSR) compiled by 
the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) for the period covering 
January 1 through December 31, described a 29 percent 
increase in major crimes as compared with the same period in 
¶2003.  A total of 8,800 major crimes were committed, an 
increase of 2,003. (Note: the CSR lists major crimes as 
murder, shooting, rape, carnal abuse, robbery, breaking and 
larceny, but does not take into account other major crimes 
such as extortion and felonious wounding. End Note.)  The 
number of murders rose 51 percent, breaking and entering as 
well as shootings each followed with a jump of 46 percent, 
and robberies increased 23 percent.  The number of rapes 
dropped by 8 percent while carnal abuse and larceny offenses 
rose slightly.  According to the 2004 CSR, 28 percent of the 
murders committed were reprisals, 21 percent were domestic 
disputes (Note:  Domestic disputes are defined as 
disturbances between two individuals that know each other, 
but who may not necessarily be family members.  For example, 
an altercation between a store proprietor and customer would 
also fall within this category.  End Note.)  Sixteen percent 
went undetermined, 18 percent were gang related, while the 
remaining 17 percent consisted of drug, rape and mob-related 
motives. 
 
¶3. (C) In stark human terms, during the 12 months of 2004, 
1,469 people died through intentional criminal violence. 
This is the highest number of murders in Jamaica's recorded 
history.  As in previous years, the great bulk of the crimes 
committed were firearms related (murder and shootings).  At 
76 percent, the gun was by far the weapon of choice used in 
committing murders, followed by knives (13 percent), and 
machetes (5 percent).  The total number of reported crimes 
rose 31 percent in rural areas as compared with a 61 percent 
increase in the total for urban communities. 
 
----------------------------------- 
The Difficulty with Measuring Crime 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Statistics about crime are gathered by the JCF as one 
of its responsibilities.  To get this data, the JCF relies on 
the cooperation of police from each of its nineteen 
divisions.  The JCF requests information in more or less 
standardized forms, but the police are not required by law to 
comply.  The crime data at best only estimates the incidence 
of a selected number of crime categories.  The best 
conclusion that can be drawn from even the most carefully 
gathered statistics is that the actual incidence of crime is 
probably no less than indicated but may be much more 
extensive.  Many crimes are underreported, such as rape and 
extortion, in which the victim is likely to receive as much 
unwanted publicity as the criminal, or suffer retribution, 
while other crimes remain undetected and unsolved. 
 
¶5. (C) Some observers have questioned whether the JCF figures 
reflect reality.  The police have been accused of reporting 
serious crimes as lesser offenses in order to create the 
appearance of less crime in their divisions.  Furthermore, 
available crime statistics deal with only a select few 
categories, and even assuming reliable data within these 
categories, the total crime picture of Jamaican society is 
incomplete.  The CSR is based upon "crimes known to the 
police".  Also missing from this picture are the complex yet 
apparently frequent illicit activities of Jamaica's 
widespread organized criminal elements, as represented by the 
"community leader", "shotta" (slang for gunman), "gangster" 
or "don" (Ref A).  Added to this equation is the fact that 
statistics are compiled manually.  The JCF does not have an 
automated system, thus the compilation of statistics is 
subject to human error. Aware, however, that no problem - 
whether medical, scientific, or social - can be attacked 
successfully until its dimensions are known, the JCF 
leadership is trying to implement more accurate central 
reporting methods. 
 
---------------------------- 
Corruption Hinders Progress 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) In 2004, there were a number of graphic illustrations 
of the weakness of law enforcement and political institutions 
in combating crime.  One particularly stark example:  at the 
time of his murder in July 2004, alleged Spanish Town "One 
Order" gang leader Oliver "Bubba" Smith was using a vehicle 
registered in the name of his alleged criminal deputy, Andrew 
"Bun Man" Hope, and Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) MP Olivia 
"Babsy" Grange. (Ref B)  Police questioned Grange for several 
hours regarding her connection to Smith and Hope.  She denied 
knowing Smith and claimed that she only guaranteed a loan for 
Hope, who is one of her "constituency workers."  During a 
four hour search of Smith's home, the police found a green 
Jamaica Labour Party t-shirt with the words "One Love Babsy 
Cares" written on the front and "One Order Central St. 
Catherine" written on the back.  The investigation into 
Grange's relationship with Smith has been dropped. 
 
¶7.  (C) Deputy Commissioner of Police Lucius Thomas, who is 
to become the new Commissioner of the JCF on January 19 (Ref 
C), recently told Poloff that every illegal operation in 
Jamaica - gangs, drug runners, extortionists, etc. have at 
least two to three JCF officers involved.  He stated frankly 
that it is impossible for illegal activity to take place in 
Jamaica without some sort of JCF assistance.  In an effort to 
address corruption in its ranks, the JCF is to implement new 
reform policies under the Professional Standards Branch of 
the JCF.  This new unit's core function will be to target and 
investigate police misconduct and corruption.  It is 
anticipated that its policies will be implemented after the 
new JCF commissioner is sworn in on January 19. 
 
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Comment 
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¶8. (C) Somewhat ironically, embattled former JCF Commissioner 
Forbes may have been yet another "casualty" of 2004's soaring 
crime rate, and of widespread public dissatisfaction with the 
JCF's seeming impotence in effectively confronting the 
problem.  In his departing remarks, Forbes publicly invited 
other senior JCF officers to consider early retirement in 
order to allow "new blood" to circulate within the JCF 
leadership. We shall see how many others follow - or are 
compelled to follow - Forbes's lead in retiring. 
 
¶9. (C) There is every reason to believe that crime in Jamaica 
will remain a significant public concern during 2005.  Some 
commentators note a lasting solution to the problem rests not 
only with law enforcement, but with the public.  Effective 
policing requires a level of trust in the JCF that does not 
currently exist and that citizens cease tolerating the many 
types of illicit activities that often occur openly without 
comment or action.  It can be a vicious cycle, however, the 
general lack of trust in the JCF is often a direct result of 
corruption in the force, heavy handed or incompetent 
policing, fear of reprisals, and the JCF's unresponsiveness 
to emergency calls.  Forbes's departure offers the 
possibility of an improvement in JCF performance, but the new 
commissioner may well have a short honeymoon.  It remains to 
be seen whether he and other senior officers will succeed in 
making the JCF more effective in its assigned role.  End 
Comment. 
COBB