This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EU TU EU
SUBJECT: TURKEY GETS A DATE FROM THE EU, ISTANBUL REACTS 
 
 
¶1. (u) Summary: The December 17 EU decision to begin 
membership negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 was 
greeted in Istanbul with a mixture of relieved satisfaction 
and lingering skepticism.  Following the initial euphoria 
after the decision was announced, some Turks in academic 
circles already have begun to air their concerns and 
reservations about the qualifying language and conditions. 
Others, meanwhile, recognize the need to begin preparing for 
a long and difficult negotiating process and to downplay 
public expectations for what EU membership will mean for 
Turkey.  End Summary. 
 
"Full Membership" or Nothing At All... 
 
¶2. (sbu) Frustrated by decades of rejection and a sense of 
having been wronged on the Cyprus issue, many we spoke to in 
the days leading up to the December 17 decision were prepared 
to reject anything other than a "fair" invitation.  Istanbul 
Muncipal Housing Construction Director Ismet Yildirim, who 
claims to be close to the Prime Minister, openly told poloff 
that he hoped the offer would be rejected. "What do we need 
the EU for anyway?" he added.  Even some secular types who 
have long supported EU membership and opposed the ruling AKP 
admitted that they would fully support PM Erdogan if he felt 
compelled to reject a sub-standard offer.  Views here seem to 
have been influenced by the ruling AKP's tough rhetoric in 
the weeks before December 17.  Asked what would constitute a 
"fair" invitation, Turks here listed: 1) a specific starting 
date for negotiations in 2005; 2) negotiations for "full" 
membership, not some sort of special status or restricted 
membership; and 3) no preconditions on Cyprus.  Cyprus, in 
particular, seems to have been the most emotional issue. 
Educated Turks here invariably conceded that Turkey would 
"eventually" have to recognize Cyprus if it hoped to join the 
EU as a fellow member, but none of them was willing to accept 
such recognition as a pre-condition for negotiations. 
 
Exasperation and Suspicion Make (Some) Room for Euphoria, 
Pride, Relief 
 
¶3. (u) Following the initial euphoric reaction to the 
decision, we engaged a range of contacts for their views. 
Despite some qualifying language in the text of the decision 
and ongoing debate in academic circles, those we spoke with 
by and large accepted the December 17 decision as a victory 
for Turkey and the AKP government.  Even those who voted 
against AKP in the November 2002 elections admitted that they 
never would have imagined that AKP could deliver on their EU 
promises.  Cigdem Nas, a professor at the EU Institute of 
Marmara University, told poloff that the decision was not a 
surprise, but merely the latest step in a process that has 
lasted over 40 years and left most Turks with "EU fatigue." 
Exasperated by the process, Turks here nevertheless feel 
relieved and proud that Turkey is finally on the verge of 
beginning negotiations.  They have suspected for years that 
the EU has been leading them on and raising the bar; many 
believed that this day would never come.  Despite the 
decision, in fact, suspicion remains.  Many are still 
convinced the EU will use Cyprus, negotiatin delays, or some 
other means to prevent Turkey fom ever joining the EU. 
 
A Pyrrhic Victory of ou Minds? 
 
¶4. (u) Such suspicions continue to fueldebate amongst more 
informed observers over wheter the decision was a victory at 
all.  Noting that he was saddened by the inappropriate 
"carnival" atmosphere that greeted the decision and deeply 
worried about some of the qualifying language and conditions 
(particularly on Cyprus), former ANAP FM Bozer told a Kadir 
Has University audience that "it was a victory of our minds, 
but not our hearts."  Can Baydaroglu, former VP of the 
Turkey-Europe Foundation, echoed Bozer's concerns, 
specifically singling out the onerous new requirements that 
the 31 EU chapters be negotiated sequentially (rather than 
simultaneously) and that the EU Council separately approve 
the closing of each chapter.  Although the government has 
promised to restart the Cyprus negotiations, few here are 
hopeful that a solution can be found before Turkey is due to 
begin negotiations in October 2005.  An NTV journalist summed 
up a widely-shared view when she remarked that "what little 
leverage there was on the Greek Cypriots was lost when the EU 
accepted them as a candidate at the 2002 Copenhagen Summit." 
Opinions differ, however, on whether Turkey should sign the 
Ankara Protocol (thereby implicitly recognizing Cyprus) in 
the absence of an agreement, even if failure to do so would 
jeopardize Turkey's EU prospects. 
 
Preparing for the Tough Slog Ahead 
 
¶5. (sbu) Even as Ankara puts together its negotiating team, 
several Istanbul universities and NGOs are planning 
conferences and public awareness campaigns to prepare Turkish 
public opinion for the negotiation process.  Former Finance 
Minister and Turkey-Europe Foundation President Ziya 
Muezzinoglu admitted to poloff that the negotiations will be 
difficult and that several groups in Turkey will suffer as a 
result.  While Muezzinoglu and others have argued to us that 
Turkey has a head-start given its participation in the EU 
Customs Union, most admit that Turkey will have difficulty in 
negotiations on several chapters, especially agriculture, 
finance, environment, and free movement of people.  Cigdem 
Nas remarked that the EU is also likely to become a scapegoat 
on a range of subjects, even though many of the reforms would 
have been necessary in any case.  Nationalists and other 
groups opposed to EU membership have already indicated to us 
that they will take advantage of this difficult transitional 
period to push for a "Eurasian" or Middle East alternative. 
Yusuf Cevahir, VP of the MUSIAD business association and 
Chairman of the Cevahir Group, for example, lamented to 
poloff the economic opportunities that Turkey would forego by 
choosing the EU over expanded ties with the Middle East. 
 
Are We Worthy? 
 
¶6. (u) Oddly, even as Turks here take pride in finally 
getting a negotiation date, there is a strong sense among 
some Istanbul Turks of all social classes that Turkey does 
not actually "deserve" to be in the EU.  Few would admit it 
openly to foreigners, but amongst themselves many Turks here 
strongly doubt whether their country will ever develop to the 
level of EU norms.  They constantly cite excessive traffic, 
the poor state of roads, petty corruption, sub-standard 
public services, even bad manners and a penchant for doing 
things at the last minute as examples of how Turkey is not 
ready to join the EU.  "How are we ever going to be in Europe 
with this?" has become a common refrain for frustrated Turks 
throughout Istanbul.  We overheard a taxi driver remark 
recently, "Look at this (traffic)!  If they let us in, we'll 
just screw up the whole EU." 
 
¶7. (sbu) Comment: As the initial euphoria wears off, there is 
a growing sense here that December 17 was not the finish 
line, but merely another (albeit large) obstacle on the long 
road to EU membership.  Cyprus still looms large as a 
potential deal-breaker if a comprehensive, or at least 
face-saving solution, can't be found by next October.  Many 
here continue to suspect, moreover, that the EU will forever 
dangle membership as an unattainable "carrot" to motivate 
Turkish good behavior.  Nevertheless, Turks here have now 
begun to focus on the difficult negotiations ahead and the 
equally difficult task of managing the Turkish public's 
expectations during the process. 
ARNETT