This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6406
NSC WASHDC
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L  HANOI 000247 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR MICHAEL GREEN, DOD FOR OSD/ISA/AP 
LEW STERN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020 
TAGS: PREL ETRD ENRG VM CVR
SUBJECT: (C) CHINESE MISSTEPS IN VIETNAM ARE A U.S. 
OPPORTUNITY 
 
REF: A. IIR 6 950 0016 05 
     ¶B. BEIJING 1504 
     ¶C. 04 HANOI 2745 
     ¶D. 04 HANOI 2857 
     ¶E. HANOI 0042 
     ¶F. 04 HANOIQ42 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael W. Marine, reason 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: A series of low-grade conflicts in the Gulf 
of Tonkin and the Spratly Islands since the summer of 2004 
that have received significant media attention in Vietnam has 
corroded Vietnam-China relations.  In all of these incidents, 
Vietnamese press reports have depicted China as a "bullying 
older brother."  The China-Vietnam relationship has 
historically had its ups and downs, and, the October 2004 
visit of Premier Wen Jiabao notwithstanding, we are currently 
in a "down" period.  The upcoming visit of NSC Sr. Director 
for Asian Affairs Green is well-timed to remind the GVN 
leadership of the benefits of a healthy relationship with the 
United States and of the utility of a continued strong U.S. 
presence in Southeast Asia.  End Summary. 
 
ARMED CLASH WITH CHINESE SEA POLICE KILLS NINE FISHERMEN 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶2. (C) The most recent problematic incident between China and 
Vietnam occurred January 8 just south of an island roughly 
halfway between Hainan Island and the Vietnamese port city of 
Haiphong.  While the precipitating factors of the incident 
are in dispute, the outcome is not: Chinese Maritime Police 
fired on Vietnamese vessels, killing nine Vietnamese 
fishermen, wounding "many" and arresting eight others.  The 
Chinese claim the Vietnamese were pirates, and, in 
conversations with DAO, cited "multiple" previous incidents 
where the Vietnamese boats robbed Chinese fishermen in the 
vicinity (ref A).  The Chinese military attache also said 
that the Vietnamese "fishermen" were carrying automatic 
weapons and were trained in how to use them.  Other 
Vietnamese interlocutors have told us that rammings and other 
incidents between Chinese and Vietnamese are a frequent 
occurrence in that section of the Gulf of Tonkin, which was 
only recently opened up to joint fishing as a result of the 
signing of a demarcation agreement in June 2004.  However, 
the January 8 incident was unique in its level of violence. 
 
¶3. (U) Following the incident, the Chinese and Vietnamese 
exchanged diplomatic notes protesting the other side,s 
actions in the clash.  The GVN used unusually harsh language 
to criticize the Chinese side, saying in a public statement 
that "Chinese on-duty vessels opened fire, killing and 
injuring many Vietnamese fishermen in the western side of the 
delimitation line of Tonkin Gulf in the common fishing area, 
violating the Tonkin Gulf Delimitation Agreement and the 
Vietnam-China Fishery Cooperation Agreement."  An MFA 
spokesman raised the temperature further in a press event 
January 16, saying "those Vietnamese attacked, killed, 
injured and captured by the Chinese naval patrol police are 
honest fishermen, who were fishing in the western side of the 
Tonkin Gulf delimitation line in the common fishing area. . . 
The use of weapons by Chinese naval patrol police to kill 
innocent Vietnamese is a serious violation of international 
laws, the Agreement on the Delimitation of the Tonkin Gulf, 
the Vietnam-China Fishery Cooperation Agreement and 
agreements by high-level leaders of the two countries, 
hurting the friendship between peoples of the two countries." 
 
¶4. (C) The spokesman went on to demand an investigation of 
the incident, punishment for the guilty, compensation for the 
families of those killed and the immediate release of the 
detained fishermen, followed by a meeting of the Joint 
Commission on Fishery Cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf to 
discuss measures to stabilize the situation.  According to 
the MFA,s China Desk, as of January 27, neither party had 
been able to "coordinate scheduling" and so a meeting of the 
Commission has not yet been set.  Embassy contacts in the 
press and in the GVN characterized the Chinese actions (and 
subsequent response) as "bullying" behavior, though the 
Vietnamese and Chinese governments have been careful to say 
that the incident will not affect relations (ref B). 
 
CHINA HUMILIATES VIETNAM WITH DEPLOYMENT OF DRILLING RIG 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶4. (C) The fishing incident came on the heels of another 
diplomatic confrontation November 19 between China and 
Vietnam over the Chinese deployment of the Kantan 3 oil 
drilling platform in the same area.  The GVN claims that the 
platform was located at Latitude 17 degrees 26 minutes 42 
seconds North and Longitude 108 degrees 19 minutes 05 seconds 
 
 
East, which would put it 63 miles from the Vietnamese coast 
and 67 miles from the Hainan coast, on the Vietnamese side of 
the Gulf of Tonkin demarcation line.  The GVN publicly called 
on China to desist, stating "this area lies entirely within 
the Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf of Vietnam. 
That China puts its oil drilling rig into operation in this 
area is a serious violation against the sovereign rights and 
national jurisdiction of Vietnam."  According to the China 
Studies Institute, a think tank in Hanoi, the Chinese 
withdrew the Kantan 3 to the Chinese side of the Gulf "only 
after it had finished its work." 
 
CHINA-RP OIL DEAL IN SPRATLYS ANGERS VIETNAM 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Two months prior to the Kantan 3 incident, Vietnam 
reacted angrily to the announcement by the Chinese and 
Philippine governments that they had signed an agreement to 
do joint research on oil exploration in the Spratly Islands. 
China invited Vietnam to participate in the research, but 
Vietnam refused, saying that to participate would violate the 
Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea.  Vice Foreign 
Minister Nguyen Phu Binh told the Ambassador that Vietnam did 
not want to be seen "making side deals" on the Spratly 
Islands when all parties were supposed to be committed to a 
solution that involved all claimants.  The issue came up in 
the October 2004 meeting between Vietnamese PM Phan Van Khai 
and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on the margins of the ASEM 5 
summit in Hanoi (ref D).  Khai asked Wen to commit to China's 
not implementing the project.  Wen refused with the bland 
reply that that China's joint exploration agreement with the 
Philippines does not contravene the Declaration of Conduct 
and "does not affect the national interests of Vietnam." 
 
WEN VISIT: CHINA EXTRACTS WTO PROMISES, GIVES NONE IN RETURN 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Among Vietnam,s most pressing priorities at the 
moment is its accession to the WTO, and this was at the top 
of the agenda during Wen,s October visit (refs C and D). 
China limited its endorsement of this initiative, saying only 
that China "supported" Vietnam's WTO bid.  Even this tepid 
statement was expensive for the Vietnamese: they had to agree 
to a side protocol with China, promising not to exercise WTO 
provisions regarding anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and 
safeguards on textile imports from China, according to the 
Chinese Embassy in Hanoi.  The Vietnamese had hoped that the 
Wen visit would be the catalyst for China to set a target 
deadline for the conclusion of WTO talks, but were 
disappointed.  The GVN also failed to extract a commitment 
from China to eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade at the 
provincial level, barriers that the GVN believes block 
Vietnamese agricultural exports and exacerbate Vietnam,s 
trade deficit with China, the China Institute said.  In 
addition to advancing its trade priorities, Vietnam had hoped 
to schedule a visit to Vietnam of new Chinese President Hu 
Jintao, but Premier Wen did not promise a Hu visit, much less 
commit to a date. 
 
VIETNAM RELUCTANT TO CHALLENGE DIRECTLY 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Despite what Vietnam feels is China,s "bullying" 
attitude and the series of bilateral setbacks, Vietnam 
remains unwilling to challenge Chinese interests directly. 
The issue of the East Asia Summit makes this clear.  Vietnam 
does not support the East Asia Summit (EAS) or the East Asia 
Community at this time, believing that it is an effort by 
China to remold the ASEAN 3 mechanism without the solidarity 
of ASEAN (refs E and F).  According to the Singapore Embassy 
here, the Vietnamese had intended to join Indonesia in 
recommending "further study" for the EAS concept when it came 
up for discussion at the November 2004 ASEAN summit in 
Vientiane, in effect killing it for at least another year. 
When the Indonesians unexpectedly changed their position, 
Vietnam also dropped its opposition.  "Vientiane is friendly 
territory for the Chinese," the Singaporeans said, "and 
Vietnam remains afraid of China,s reaction if it were to 
lead an effort to thwart one of China,s diplomatic 
priorities."  According to Vice Foreign Minister Le Van Bang, 
in a recent conversation with American scholars, "it only 
took the Chinese one day" to change the Indonesians' 
position. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) We hear regularly from senior MFA officials that the 
United States should do more to "counter" China,s efforts to 
"dominate" Southeast Asia (they are particularly agitated 
 
 
over U.S. actions against Burma, which they feel is giving 
China a free pass into ASEAN), but it is not clear to what 
degree the MFA view is shared among the members of the 
Politburo and in the Prime Minister,s office.  Some, 
including Communist Party General Secretary Nong Duc Manh, 
believe that the interests of Vietnam and the Party are 
better served by staying close to China at the United 
States, expense.  Ultimately, of course, Vietnam values its 
independence and freedom of action more than any linkage or 
alliance.  For this reason, the recent string of incidents, 
combined with the arrogant and dismissive Chinese responses, 
creates a window in which the GVN (and possibly the 
leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam) will be more 
receptive than usual to our suggestions that, strategically, 
it is in Vietnam,s interest to support a continuing, dynamic 
role for the United States in Southeast Asia.  As we begin 
preparing the groundwork for the possible visit of Prime 
Minister Phan Van Khai to Washington in mid-2005, including 
the related trip by NSC Senior Director for Asian Affairs 
Green next week to meet with Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan 
and senior officials from the Office of the Government and 
the External Relations Commission of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party (as well as the MFA), we will be in a 
position to push this agenda item. 
Marine 
 
 
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