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Viewing cable 05HANOI136, C) DETAILS ON NORTH KOREAN ASYLUM-SEEKERS'

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05HANOI136 2005-01-18 10:02 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

181002Z Jan 05

ACTION EAP-00   

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AF-00    AID-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   C-00     
      DODE-00  DOEE-00  PERC-00  DS-00    EUR-00   FBIE-00  VC-00    
      H-00     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01   L-00     CAC-00   
      VCE-00   M-00     AC-00    NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OCS-00   OES-00   
      OIC-00   OIG-00   OMB-00   PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   
      P-00     SCT-00   FMPC-00  SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    
      TRSE-00  T-00     BBG-00   R-00     IIP-00   PMB-00   DSCC-00  
      PRM-00   DRL-00   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00     /001W
                  ------------------A55C32  181113Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6247
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AMCONSUL SHENYANG 
USMISSION GENEVA
C O N F I D E N T I A L HANOI 000136 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREF SU VM FR KN HUMANR DPRK
SUBJECT: (C) DETAILS ON NORTH KOREAN ASYLUM-SEEKERS' 
DEPARTURE FROM HANOI 
 
REF: A. HANOI 3365 
 
     B. HANOI 3389 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael W. Marine.  Reason:  1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Six North Korean asylum-seekers, four in the 
French Embassy and two in the Swedish Embassy, departed 
Vietnam January 7 for Singapore and, soon after, the ROK. 
Throughout the affair, the GVN's generally helpful and 
forthcoming attitude was in contrast to that of the ROK 
Embassy, according to the Swedish Embassy.  In arranging the 
departure of the North Koreans, both the GVN and the ROK 
Embassy insisted, out of deference to the DPRK, that the six 
depart Vietnam on French and Swedish travel documents.  In 
the end, the GVN reportedly insisted to the Swedes that the 
Swedish Embassy would have to turn over to Vietnamese 
authorities any future asylum-seekers, who would then be sent 
back to China.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Swedish Embassy DCM Helena Sangeland briefed us 
January 18 on the details surrounding the January 7 departure 
from Hanoi of the two North Korean asylum-seekers in the 
Swedish Embassy and the four in the French Embassy (reftels). 
 From the beginning, the GVN officials with whom the Swedish 
Embassy dealt were generally "very helpful" and 
"forthcoming," Sangeland said.  The GVN seemed eager to both 
keep the affair under wraps and quickly find a solution. 
Contacts with officials from the ROK Embassy were less 
productive, however.  According to Sangeland, South Korean 
Embassy officials initially seemed reluctant to involve 
themselves, eventually requiring the intervention of the ROK 
Ambassador to "get things moving."  Sangeland guessed that 
the ROK Embassy's hesitancy was designed to send the message 
that "getting to Seoul via Hanoi is neither smooth nor easy." 
 
3. (C) Once engaged, the ROK Embassy declared that 
establishing that the six North Koreans' "true intent" was to 
"travel to Seoul" was the sine qua non.  To that end, a South 
Korean EmbOff interviewed the Swedish Embassy's two 
asylum-seekers in Sangeland's presence.  Their exchange 
seemed "comfortable," the DCM said.  Following the interview, 
the ROK EmbOff told the Swedes that the North Koreans had 
said that, after arriving in Hanoi, they made their way to a 
Korean restaurant, at which they were pointed in the 
direction of the Swedish Embassy and "other embassies." 
(Note:  The North Koreans had initially asserted that they 
had no help at all in finding their way to the Swedish 
Embassy.  End note.) 
 
4. (C) Initially, all sides concerned, including the GVN and 
ROK Embassy, had settled on Bangkok as the best transfer 
point.  However, the tsunami disaster and the increased 
demands that it put on both the Thai Government and the 
Swedish Embassy in Bangkok led to the decision to switch to 
Singapore. 
 
5. (C) According to the Swedish DCM, both the ROKG and the 
GVN had insisted, out of deference to the DPRK, that the 
French and Swedish Governments issue to the asylum-seekers 
"laissez-passer" documents, in which the GVN subsequently 
affixed visas and stamped entry franks.   The six North 
Koreans departed Hanoi's Noi Bai International Airport 
January 7 via a Singapore Air flight to Singapore and were 
accompanied by DCM Sangeland and a vice consul from the 
French Embassy.  The group was met in Singapore by 
Singaporean and ROK officials, who took charge of the six, 
presented them with documents for travel to South Korea and 
escorted them to an ROK-bound flight.  The handover in 
Singapore seemed "very routinized," Sangeland observed. 
 
6. (C) As helpful as the GVN had been, however, the Swedes' 
main interlocutor, a Deputy Director General in the MFA's 
Consular Department, had in the end underlined that this 
would be the "first and last time."  In the future, the 
Swedish Embassy would have to hand over to the GVN any DPRK 
asylum-seekers who ca