This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1583
INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
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HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L  GABORONE 000056 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF/S DIFFILY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM BC
SUBJECT: PORTRAIT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT AS AN AUTOCRAT: 
CRITICS QUESTION KHAMA'S DEMOCRATIC CREDENTIALS 
 
REF: A. (A) GABORONE 1873 
 
     ¶B. (B) GABORONE 1950 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH HUGGINS FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  As next in line to inherit the presidency, 
Botswana,s Vice President Ian Khama remains an enigma.  Many 
participants in Botswana's public life such as academics, 
journalists, and NGO leaders, express ambiguity and 
skepticism regarding the Vice President's credentials as a 
politician and worry about his views on issues such as human 
rights and press freedom.  Khama is perceived, and frequently 
portrayed in local newspapers, as an autocrat: 
intolerant of criticism and eager to bring opponents to heel. 
The broad powers Botswana's constitution accords to the 
presidency and a tradition of strong centralization 
administered by a ruling elite that fully exploits these 
powers suggest that Khama,s ascendancy will not shock the 
political system.  While Khama's assumption of the presidency 
might not facilitate the further development of democratic 
institutions and practices in Botswana, it is unlikely to 
significantly reverse the progress democracy has made here. 
Nonetheless, in the wake of the October 2004 election, the 
Botswana atmospherics are full of 
speculation as to what an Ian Khama presidency would bring. 
End Summary. 
 
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STRAINED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MEDIA 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (U)  A major theme in the public discussion is that the 
Vice President has done little to cultivate a favorable image 
with the press.  Journalists generally depict Khama as their 
antagonist.  His alleged distrust of the media is reflected 
in his infrequent interviews or comments to the press.  While 
the low professional standards that dominate  Botswana's 
media sector would make any public figure wary of speaking 
out, his reticence arguably intensifies his 
misrepresentation in the media. Journalists defend their 
reporting of hearsay about Khama as fact due to the dearth of 
reliable information and his inaccessibility to the press. 
Consequently, apart from photo-ops, coverage of the Vice 
President tends to be one-sided, with journalists frequently 
attributing the worst motives to his actions and not 
articulating his side of a story. In response, Khama has 
accused the media of bias against the ruling Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP).  The Office of the President has 
pitched in, issuing statements designed to clarify incidents 
involving the Vice President partially reported in the 
private media, and pointedly questioning the intentions and 
integrity of the concerned publications.  But, in short, the 
Vice President has a public relations problem, which is not 
being effectively addressed. 
 
¶3. (C)  Multiple contacts described the Vice President as 
opposed to an independent, critical media.  They attribute 
the change of stance by former Minister of Communications, 
Science and Technology, Boyce Sebetela, toward the media as 
due to the Vice President,s influence.  When Sebetela took 
office in 2002, they said he demonstrated a willingness to 
listen to and accommodate journalists' concerns.  Almost 
overnight he reversed course, allegedly after being reined in 
by the Office of the President, with Vice President Khama as 
the driving force.  Sebetela has attempted to disassociate 
himself with some controversial decisions, asserting that he 
simply implemented the will of the 
cabinet.  Nor did our interlocutors expect a change of 
direction with the appointment of the new minister, Ms. 
Pelonomi Venson. They expect that free press skeptics in the 
cabinet, led by the Vice President, will align her against 
the media as well. 
 
¶4. (C) Past attempts by the Government to manipulate the 
press have contributed to Khama's unfavorable media image. 
In 2001, the Office of the President instructed all 
government departments and parastatals to discontinue the 
purchase of advertising space in the privately-owned Botswana 
Guardian and Midweek Sun newspapers.  Vice President Khama 
reportedly inspired this decision, which was prompted by the 
papers' criticisms of the Government.  (The 
High Court later overruled the prohibition.)  That same year, 
he was also reported to have intervened to prevent Botswana 
Television from airing a documentary on a murderer executed 
in Botswana.  These incidents suggest a 
willingness to employ heavy-handed measures to silence voices 
of dissent in the media. 
 
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A SOLDIER, NOT A HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  Vice President Khama's views on human rights are 
unclear.  When asked their perception of his attitude toward 
these issues, three interlocutors at University of Botswana's 
Department of Government and Public Administration were left 
bemused.  The reaction of the leader of Botswana's main human 
rights organization was that Khama just "is not a human 
rights person."  While he has 
never dismissed the importance of human rights, and while he 
is patron of a number of charitable organizations, the Vice 
President thus far has not come out as a strong proponent. 
It may be too much to expect him to speak out about human 
rights abuses taking place in neighboring Zimbabwe, specially 
in view of the GOB,s almost total silence with regard to 
this issue.  As a former Botswana Defense Force commander, 
Khama is known to have strong sympathies with 
his Zimbabwean army counterparts, which may inhibit him from 
facing up to the wretched realities across the border. 
 
¶6. (C)  The Vice President has made several clumsy remarks 
concerning women, which at least raise questions regarding 
his commitment or sensitivity to gender equality -- and of 
the capabilities of his public relations staff.  On at least 
three separate occasions during the 2004 electoral campaign, 
Khama made speeches in which he dismissed or denigrated women 
and their role in politics. Dr. Gloria Somolekae, a former 
professor of politics, who now heads Botswana,s Vision 2016 
Commission and who is well connected within the ruling elite, 
characterized these as lapses of judgment in which Khama used 
humor appropriate for private settings in public fora.  She 
did not believe, however, that these incidents necessarily 
boded ill for the role of women in a Khama administration. 
The head of Botswana Women's NGO Coalition was similarly 
ambiguous, telling PolOff that Khama had not made it clear 
what priority he assigns to women's rights. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
BROUGHT IN TO UNIFY THE BDP: LOW TOLERANCE FOR DISSENT 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶7. (C)  Vice President Khama apparently has little patience 
for dissent or criticism.  One interlocutor reported to 
PolOff a conversation with Minister of Communications, 
Science and Technology Pelonomi Venson in which she remarked 
that no one in the cabinet dared voice disagreement with the 
Vice President except for President Mogae himself.  Members 
of the BDP -- primarily from the Kedikilwe faction -- have 
echoed this sentiment, suggesting that party members already 
fear crossing the Vice President and doubt whether they will 
retain the ability to speak freely in a post-Mogae scenario. 
This may well be due to the fact that the Vice President was 
brought into BDP politics from the military in 1998 with the 
specific dual mandate of lending the Khama luster to the 
party and of being the enforcer: ensuring that ministries got 
their deliverables out in time.  Khama,s career experience 
can be described as long on commanding; 
short on the give-and-take of political accommodation. 
 
¶8. (C)  Dr. Somolekae, a sympathetic observer, confirmed 
Khama's dual mandate. She opined that Khama has had 
difficulty transitioning from a military to a political mode. 
She saw him as focused on delivering desired outcomes more 
than on building and maintaining consensus.  While this 
approach could increase productivity in Botswana's lethargic 
bureaucracy, it could also short-circuit constructive 
dialogue and undermine checks on government power. 
 
--------------------------- 
RIVALS SIDELINED -- FOR NOW 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C)  The 2004 general election process confirmed to many 
observers Khama's intolerance of dissent in any form.  The 
BDP's primary election process was troubled, and in several 
constituencies re-runs resulted in an altered outcome.  Dr. 
Somolekae's close ties to President Mogae and other BDP 
leaders notwithstanding, she described the primaries as "Moi 
elections," blatantly stolen, in her opinion, by members of 
the Mogae/Khama faction.  News reports alleging that ballots 
were only cast a second time in constituencies where a 
candidate from the Khama faction had lost, confirm that this 
impression -- of sham primaries -- is commonly shared. 
 
¶10. (U)  After the October 30 2004 general election, members 
of the rival faction led by MP Ponatshego Kedikilwe were 
almost entirely excluded from cabinet and council 
nominations, despite the group's considerable numbers in 
parliament (Ref A).  Despite gaining 48 percent of the 
popular vote, opposition parties accounted for only 3 of 101 
 
 
nominated seats in local councils, which are appointed by the 
central government.  The independent press interpreted the 
appointment of three novice politicians with military 
backgrounds to the cabinet as an indication that Khama places 
a premium on obedience and loyalty over experience and 
talent.  It should be noted that the three new cabinet 
officials come to their jobs with considerable private sector 
experience. Reports that the Vice President is looking into 
abolishing the long-standing caucus of BDP backbench MPs, 
which have been among his most outspoken critics of late, 
reinforced perceptions that Khama's top priority is a BDP 
that speaks with one voice, and, thus, silences dissent. 
 
------------------------------------ 
ARBITRARY PRIVILEGES: ABOVE THE LAW? 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (U)  Critics accuse Vice President Khama of acting as 
though he were above the law.  The incident that rankles most 
is the GOB aircraft saga.  In April 2001, the Ombudsman 
advised President Mogae that Vice President Khama should not 
pilot Botswana Defense Force (BDF) aircraft because, as a 
civilian, the BDF could not hold him accountable for loss or 
damage.  Instead, Mogae praised Khama's skills as an airman 
and the Vice President continued to fly himself around the 
country, including  campaign events in BDF aircraft. As much 
to the point was that Khama,s airborne mobility gave him an 
instant advantage over opposition parties, campaigning.  GOB 
personnel continued to accompany him to political party 
events despite complaints about that practice as well. 
 
¶12. (U)  In the press, the continuing controversy regarding 
the location of the prospective second university is 
unfolding as a commentary on the governing style of the Vice 
President (Ref B).  On December 10, MPs from the Mogae/Khama 
faction of the BDP rallied to defeat a motion to investigate 
the determination to locate the institution in 
Serowe-Palapye, arguing that the legislature had no right to 
revisit the executive's decision. (The commission appointed 
to recommend the location of the second university had 
selected the town of Selebi-Phikwe, but was overruled by 
cabinet).  Members of the rival BDP faction led by Ponatshego 
Kedikilwe, along with the opposition sponsor of the motion, 
walked out in protest.  In subsequent press reports, 
Kedikilwe and MP Daniel Kwelagobe articulated apprehension at 
the implications for a balance of power 
between the executive and legislature.  One BDP member 
asserted in frustration that the dominant Mogae/Khama faction 
was "killing democracy." 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶13. (C) None of the speculations about Khama,s inflexibility 
should be interpreted as a threat to Botswana,s democratic 
institutions.  Indeed, the current, very public, discussion 
about the Vice President's nature, talents, and inclinations, 
is testimony to the vibrancy of Botswana,s democracy -- and 
of the country's talent for planning ahead.  As son of the 
first president of the country, Vice President Khama is 
heaped to the point of overload with expectations, and is 
bound in consequence to disappoint at least a part of 
the public.  The contitution provides for a powerful chief 
executiveand the country's political culture has tolerated 
decisive, not to say autocratic, tendencies in it 
presidents.  Botswana prides itself on the stablity of its 
democratic institutions, but most of hem are dominated by a 
small elite.  If Khama is perceived as more autocratic than 
his predecessors, the difference is one of degree, not of 
substance.  Consequently, it is most unlikely that Khama's 
ascendance will derail democracy in Botswana.  It may well 
enhance it, as Botswana's political parties, parliament, and 
other institutions will have to reassess their role and 
define themselves against a more assertive personality. 
 
HUGGINS 
 
 
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