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Diana T Fritz  12/06/2006 06:09:38 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

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UNCLAS        DUBAI 00128

SIPDIS
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    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   RSO AMB DCM MEPI P/M ECON

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

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P 101824Z JAN 05
FM AMCONSUL DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0831
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0479
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0019
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCAACC/CINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAHLC/DHS WASHDC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 3591
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
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RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0032

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DUBAI 000128 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IR PREL
SUBJECT: IRAN'S EXPANDING JUDICIARY DRAWS MAJLIS FIRE 
 
 
¶1. (U) Sensitive But Unclassified - Protect Accordingly 
 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: In late December 2004 the Majlis Judicial And 
Legal Committee approved a bill to investigate the Iranian 
Judiciary, forwarding it to the Majlis General Session for 
consideration.  Also in late December 2004 a related ongoing 
dispute between the Judiciary's Counter-Intelligence branch and 
members of the Majlis became public.  The Majlis claimed that 
the Judiciary had interfered with an Experts Assembly 
investigation of the Judiciary, whereas the Judiciary claimed 
that the investigation itself was illegal and that those 
carrying out the Experts Assembly investigating team were 
themselves criminals involved in fraud and other illegal 
activities. 
 
¶3. (SBU) SUMMARY (CONT): This rare Majlis-Judiciary public 
confrontation occurs as the Judiciary is seeking to vastly 
increase its intelligence and security capabilities.  Some 
insiders interpret the Majlis's attempted crackdown on the 
Judiciary as an effort by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
to suppress the Judiciary's drive for greater power and 
independence.  END SUMMARY. 
 
MAJLIS SEEKS TO INVESTIGATE JUDICIARY 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) According to the Majlis news service, on October 31, 2004 
Majlis representative Hassan Kamran, member of National Security 
and Foreign Policy Committee, said that approximately 100 
representatives had signed a bill to investigate the Iranian 
Judiciary.  On December 22 Iranian press reported that the 
Judicial and Legal Committee (dominated by hard-line 
conservatives) had approved the investigation request, with the 
bill subsequently to be voted on by the Majlis as a whole. 
 
¶5. (U) The bill's proposed investigative mandate was extensive, 
with Committee member Mahmoud Dehqani telling press that the 
focus would be on: 
 
- the Judiciary's success in confronting economic corruption; 
 
- reports of judges and judicial authorities taking personal 
advantage of their official position, and the quality of 
supervision on financial and ethical issues for the Justice 
Department's personnel and judges; 
 
- the Judiciary's approach to social disorder; 
 
- subordinate Judiciary organizations, such as the Deeds and 
Properties Registration Organization, the Judiciary Information 
Security (CI) Department, the State General Inspection 
Organization, and the Prisons Organization; 
 
- the Judiciary's performance in respecting those with business 
before it, and the conduct of judges and judicial authorities; 
 
- disbursal of Judicial funds allocated to it under the Third 
Development Plan; 
 
- the quality of executing the leader's orders with regard to 
the Judiciary; 
 
- the function of Articles 49 and 142 of the Constitution, which 
authorize the government to confiscate all illegally acquired 
wealth (49) and which authorize the head of the Judiciary to 
investigate the assets of key government personnel before and 
after their government service, to ensure their wealth "has not 
increased in a fashion contrary to law, (142)." 
 
JUDICIARY SAYS HANDS-OFF 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. (U) In response to the proposed bill, Judiciary spokesman 
Jamal Karimi Rad told press that any broad Majlis investigation 
of the Judiciary would be unconstitutional, since the Majlis was 
by law allowed to investigate only the Judiciary's financial 
matters.  Despite Karimi Rad's contention, one of the most vocal 
proponents of the Majlis investigation, Tabriz Representative 
Eshrat Shayeq (a hard- line conservative), told press that the 
Majlis investigation was consonant with its supervisory mandate, 
and that it was going to investigate the general performance of 
the Judiciary, not any specific decrees or rulings. 
 
EXPERTS ASSEMBLY INVESTIGATION? 
------------------------------- 
¶7. (U) Judiciary-Majlis relations took a new twist in late 
December 2004, when Iranian press broke a story that Iran's 
Experts Assembly (EA -the 70 member clerical body charged with 
selecting and overseeing the Supreme Leader) was investigating 
the Judiciary, in accordance with its constitutional authority 
to investigate the Leadership and its subordinate organizations. 
 On December 22, a conservative Iranian news site reported that 
the EA had authorized its representative from East Azerbaijan, 
Ayatollah Orumiyan, to investigate the Judiciary.  According to 
these initial reports, Orumiyan had formed a three-person 
investigating group led by his office head, Hossein Madhi (aka 
Mr. Hosseini, Haj Reza Hosseini).  The two other members of this 
EA investigating group were (the abovementioned) Majlis Tabriz 
representative Eshrat Shayeq and another individual belonging to 
Orumiyan's office, referred to as 'Sepehr.' 
¶8. (U) According to initial press accounts, this EA 
investigating group focused on the Judiciary's "Information 
Security department" ("Hefezat-e Ettela'at," i.e. the 
Judiciary's Counter-Intelligence branch - CI).  According to 
initial press reports there were rumors that this EA 
investigating team exceeded its legal mandate, and armed with 
weapons, attempted to detain some of the Judicial CI officials. 
The resultant clash between this EA group and the Judiciary's CI 
led to "Sepehr's" death and Hossein Madhi's hospitalisation. 
 
JUDICIARY DENIES IT... 
---------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) In response to these initial reports, on December 29, 
Iranian press relayed the comments of both Judiciary spokesman 
Jamal Karimi Rad and Head of the Judiciary's Information 
Security (CI) Department Elyas Mahmoudi.  Both denied there was 
any EA investigation of the Judiciary, and also denied the death 
and injury of the putative investigating committee's members. 
Rather, Mahmoudi told press that the "EA investigating 
committee" was instead a band of criminals using "forged 
decrees" to commit illegal acts.  He claimed that the EA 
leadership had denied the authenticity of all decrees presented 
by this "EA investigating group," saying that the group in no 
way represented it.  Mahmoudi said that Majlis representative 
Eshrat Shayeq seemed to have been in league with this illegal 
group.  He said she had abused her position as a member of the 
Majlis Article 90 Commission (charged with investigating 
citizens' complaints) to issue Majlis decrees in support of this 
criminal group, these decrees also having been subsequently 
repudiated by the Article 90 Commission. 
 
...MAJLIS DENIES DENIAL 
----------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) Later on December 29 Iranian press carried the comments 
of Majlis representative Teymur Ali 'Asgari, Deputy Head of the 
Article 90 Commission, who denied Judiciary CI department 
Mahmoudi's denials.  'Asgari claimed that an EA member 
(Ayatollah Orumiyan) had in fact authorized this three-person 
group to investigate the Judiciary, focusing on "parallel 
intelligence structures" within the Judiciary.  'Asgari said the 
Judiciary's CI department had prevented this group's activities 
and detained two group members.  He confirmed that Tabriz 
representative Shayeq had been a group member, and denied 
Mahmoudi's charges of her involvement in illegal activities. 
'Asgari said that the Article 90 Commission had formed a 
committee to investigate what had happened between the 
Judiciary's CI department and the EA investigating group.  More 
generally, he added that most complaints received by the Article 
90 Commission involved the Judiciary. 
 
...JUDICIARY PROVIDES DETAILS 
 ---------------------------- 
 
¶11. (U) The next development came on January 1, 2005, when a 
Deputy in the Judiciary's CI department, Judge Vahed Sharifi, 
gave a press conference about the "EA Investigating Group" case. 
 Sharifi, who was the case's examining magistrate, said that a 
case against this group had been opened based on complaints from 
numerous entities and individuals.  All of the plaintiffs had 
claimed that the group's head "Hosseini" had presented himself 
as the "Office Head and Supreme Security and Political Advisor" 
to EA member Ayatollah Orumiyan.  According to Sharifi, Hosseini 
had abused his position within Ayatollah Orumiyan's office to 
intervene in open judicial cases on behalf of one of the 
parties.  He also said numerous private plaintiffs had claimed 
that Hosseini's group had forced them to sign contracts ceding 
valuable lands in Tabriz and elsewhere.  Two plaintiffs, the 
Kish Island Free Trade Organization and the Kish Island Free 
Trade Zone Law Enforcement Forces Commander, alleged that 
Hosseini's group had sought to intercede in an open legal case 
on behalf of a former leaseholder of the Shayan Hotel, even 
flying down an armed delegation to Kish Island to force evacuate 
the hotel in favor of this former leaseholder. 
 
¶12. (U) In one bizarre case cited by Sharifi, at one point 
Hosseini had been hospitalized in Tehran's Mehr Hospital and had 
became enamored of an attending nurse.  Despite having four 
wives already, he proposed to her.  When she repeatedly refused, 
he used threats to press his case, and upon release got a court 
warrant for her detention after having submitted false 
information about her.  Armed with this warrant, he and some 
others went to the hospital, "put a sack over her head," and 
took her to an illegal detention center in Tehran, where, 
according to charges, he harassed and molested her.  According 
to Sharifi, Majlis representative Eshrat Shayeq was present 
during the whole of this nurse's illegal incarceration and 
interrogation. 
 
¶13. (U) Sharifi also charged that Shayeq had written letters on 
official Majlis stationary empowering Hosseini on behalf of the 
Article 90 Commission and appointing him "Supreme Security and 
Political Advisor" for the Commission, which he subsequently 
used for his illegal activities.  Sharifi also said that over 
400 decrees signed by Ayatollah Orumiyan were seized when 
Hosseini was arrested, many of these decrees seeking to 
influence the courts on behalf of one of the involved parties. 
Also seized was a letter issued by Orumiyan authorizing Hossein 
to carry spray gas, handcuffs and walkie-talkie, and a revolver. 
 
¶14. (U) Sharifi told press that based on Judiciary and 
Intelligence Ministry investigations, ten members of the 
Hosseini gang had been arrested.  Charges against them include 
"impersonating a government official, fraud, involvement in 
illegal detention, illegal sales of government property, and 
interference in judicial affairs."  Sharifi added that according 
to the Intelligence Ministry, Hosseini had a criminal record and 
had previously been detained for misrepresenting himself as a 
government official.  Sharifi said all the defendants had been 
freed on bail.  Concerning Majlis representative Shayeq and EA 
member Ayatollah Orumiyan, Sharifi said the former's 
Parliamentary Immunity had prevented her from being arrested 
heretofore, and that the file on Orumiyan would be sent to the 
Special Clerical Court. 
 
¶15. (U) According to another January 1, 2005 press account, 
Ayatollah Orumiyan was a member of the EA's standing 
Investigative Commission, and as such had opened an 
investigation of the Judiciary in approximately June 2003, 
creating this three-member investigating team.  In August 2004, 
when some of the team's findings came to the attention of 
officials in the Judiciary and the EA, it encountered increased 
opposition from the Judiciary's CI.  On August 22, 2004, the 
Judiciary's CI arrested 17 people related to this EA 
investigating team, to include team leader Hosseini.  According 
to this account Hosseini was detained for 47 days "in harsh 
conditions", and released on bail on October 7, 2004.  He 
subsequently complained to the Article 90 commission.  This 
article said that EA investigating team member "Sepehr," who was 
originally reported to have died in Judiciary detention, had in 
fact died of a heart attack upon hearing of his imminent arrest 
on August 25.  This news account relayed the rumor that 
"Hosseini" was one of those purged in 1998 from the Intelligence 
Ministry due to the "Serial Killings," controversy, after which 
he started working in Orumiyan's office. 
 
AE'S AYATOLLAH ORUMIYAN - "MISTAKES WERE MADE" 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶16. (U) On January 1, 2005, Iranian press carried a letter from 
EA member Ayatollah Orumiyan to the Judiciary CI head Alyas 
Mahmoudi.  Saying that both he and Mahmoudi were "working to 
defend the Revolution, protect the martyrs' blood and carry out 
our duties to the exalted Leader," he chastised Judiciary 
investigating magistrate Sharifi for commenting publicly on an 
investigation in progress.  In this letter and in a separate 
statement released to press, Orumiyan said his office staff 
included official representatives of Iran's intelligence and 
security organizations, to include the Judiciary's CI 
department, and that these representatives were involved in and 
fully apprised of the office's activities, as was Judiciary CI 
head Mahmoudi himself.  Due to their official positions, 
Orumiyan had fully trusted these security and intelligence 
individuals within his office.  He said that he had in fact 
authorized an investigation into the Judiciary, but claimed to 
have been unaware of any violations by his office director, whom 
he fired as soon as he became aware of alleged violations. 
¶17. (U) On January 5, 2005, Iranian press printed a letter from 
Majlis representative Eshrat Shayeq to Judiciary Head Ayatollah 
Shahroudi, denying the charges against her and asking for him to 
investigate Judiciary investigating magistrate Sharifi for 
commenting so extensively to press on an open case.  She also 
told Iranian press that she knew that she would be 'targeted' by 
the Judiciary once she began calls for its investigation, and 
that the subsequent actions against her by the Judiciary had 
confirmed her previous concerns.  She also cited her calling for 
an enquiry into the death in detention of Iran-Iraq water 
veteran Rajabi Sani, who was allegedly tortured and killed at 
the hands of judiciary officials, as another reason for judicial 
animus against her. 
 
¶18. (U) The most recent development in this case occurred on 
January 7, 2005, when Iranian press carried a statement by the 
main defendant "Hosseini," in which he claimed that he didn't 
have four wives, had never violated the law nor been found 
guilty of any crime, and had not fired from his job (rather, he 
quit).  He claimed that whatever he had done was legal, and in 
accordance with the responsibilities entrusted to him.  He 
concluded by saying he was a war veteran with 37 pieces of 
shrapnel in his body, who each day has to take more than 50 
pills, seven sprays, and three syrups. 
 
 IRGC TRYING TO SLAP DOWN JUDICIARY? 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶19. (U) These problems for the Judiciary come amidst its efforts 
to vastly increase its investigative and prosecutorial powers. 
In December 2004 Iranian press also reported on the Judiciary's 
creation of provincial civil defense militia entitled "Units for 
Protecting Society ("Sazeman-e Hefazat-e Ejtema'i").  These 
units, first proposed by Judiciary Head Ayatollah Shahroudi in 
January 2004, were to be entrusted with " crime-fighting, 
intelligence-gathering and providing religious guidance," in 
accordance with the Article 8 of the Constitution and the 
Islamic precept of "enjoining the good and forbidding the evil 
("Amr be Ma'ruf va nahi az monkar"). 
 
¶20. (U) Many Majlis members have spoken up against these 
provincial units, some of which have already been stood up. 
They note that their mission replicates that of the Basij, and 
that these units have been created without any authorizing 
Majlis legislation.  Basij Commander Brigader General Seyed 
Mohammd Hejazi was quoted in press as saying that this "rival 
militia" would cause many problems, and that "this scheme lacks 
expertise and professional groundwork." 
 
¶21. (U) Iranian Press in December also reported the Judiciary's 
plans to create its own "Judicial Police Organization" 
("Sazeman-e Zabetayn-e Qohveh-e Qaza"), responsible for 
uncovering and investigating crime, a function currently largely 
carried out by the Basij, Intelligence Ministry and Law 
Enforcement Forces.  Analysts of the Iranian scene cite these 
two new proposed forces as further evidence of the 
transformation over recent years of Iran's Judiciary's into one 
of the main intelligence-security organs within Iran, operating 
independently of the Intelligence Ministry. 
 
¶22. (SBU) In early January 2005 Poloff met with "Reza," one of 
Iran's leading private sector businessmen, with extensive 
connections among Iran's leadership. "Reza" told Poloff that the 
Majlis investigation into the Judiciary was being executed at 
the behest of the IRGC, who had great power within the Majlis 
due to the number of IRGC-sponsored and affiliated 
representatives.  The IRGC was using this influence to curtail 
and control the Judiciary's growing power, which it saw as a 
threat to itself and the Basji.  "Reza" also affirmed that EA's 
Ayatollah Orumiyan and his office head Hosseini had abused their 
positions and had been involved in extensive illegal activities 
for commercial gain, something he said "happened all the time" 
at this level. 
 
¶23. (SBU) COMMENT:  It is unclear as to what actually happened 
between the Judiciary's CI department and the team authorized by 
the Assembly of Expert's Ayatollah Orumiyan to investigate it, 
and their respective culpabilities.  Regardless, the case is 
interesting insomuch as the internecine struggles within 
conservative ranks rarely break so openly into the press.  Some 
Iranian press analysts predict that any Majlis investigation on 
the Judiciary will be put off until after the June 2005 
Presidential elections, when the political situation is clearer. 
 Whatever the result, these reports of groups armed with both 
weapons and senior clerical authorization committing massive 
fraud, extortion and intervening in the judicial process give a 
rare detailed glimpse of the endemic high-level corruption 
within the Iranian government.