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Viewing cable 05DARESSALAAM151, Zanzibar's Voter Registration on Track after

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05DARESSALAAM151 2005-01-25 13:53 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Dar Es Salaam
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAR ES SALAAM 000151 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: 1/24/15 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM EAID TZ
SUBJECT: Zanzibar's Voter Registration on Track after 
Rocky Start 
 
 
Classified by Pol-Econ Chief Judy Buelow for reason 
1.4(b) 
 
REF: A) Dar es Salaam 57, B) 03 Dar es Salaam 2633, 
C)03 Dar es Salaam 2602, D) 03 Dar es Salaam 2341 
 
1. (C) Summary: Voter registration is now proceeding 
on schedule, after an initial spate of violent 
confrontations that had forced the temporary closure 
of several South Pemba voter registration centers in 
early December.  Teams from the Zanzibar Electoral 
Commission (ZEC) completed their work on Pemba, where 
they registered a high percentage of eligible voters, 
and moved on to the north of Unguja Island on January 
15.  While registration process is now running 
smoothly, partisan tensions persist, and each passing 
week brings a new rumor about plots to manipulate the 
voters' register.  Donor-country diplomats are 
exploring how to support the process, in the light of 
strong governmental signals from President Mkapa, 
Zanzibari President Karume and others, that foreign 
observation is not wanted.  The current consensus 
among the diplomats:  they will observe registration 
in small, inconspicuous groups for now; they will 
maintain dialogue with leaders of both major parties, 
making a special effort to reach out to the CCM; they 
will seek ways to support civic education and domestic 
observation missions.  End Summary 
 
On Schedule and According to Procedure 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Despite the considerable challenges, Zanzibar's 
voter registration process has maintained its 
integrity and its schedule.  Although sporadic 
violence during the first days of registration had 
forced the temporary closure of several registration 
centers (See reftel D), the ZEC's teams finished 
registering voters on the southern half of Pemba 
Island as planned on Dec. 21.  On Jan 14, they 
completed registration in northern Pemba, and moved to 
the Northern region of Ungunja (Zanzibar's "main 
island.")  Next, the teams register voters in Unguja's 
South region, before completing registration in 
Ungunja's Urban West region sometime in April. 
 
3.  To date, the process has generally been credible 
and orderly.  A high percentage of eligible voters, 
whose number have been estimated from 2002 Census 
data, are registering.  TEMCO, a Tanzanian voter 
observation NGO, reports that 83 percent of eligible 
voters registered in South Pemba.  Observers from 
TEMCO and elsewhere nonetheless noted some problems, 
especially the controversial, but completely legal, 
registration of newly-transferred members of 
government militias.  In some districts, the local 
shehas (the generally pro-CCM ward heelers) still 
exercise undue influence in determining which 
individuals meet residency requirements, even though 
the Muafaka reforms limit the shehas to an advisory 
role.  The opposition CUF, for its part, reportedly 
encouraged Pemban voters living on the mainland to 
come home to register, even though many had difficulty 
meeting the three-year residency requirement.  The 
Norwegian academic and longtime observer of the 
Zanzibari scene, Dr. Kjetil Tronvoll, opined that 
while such tactics undoubtedly aggravated partisan 
tension, they were unlikely to affect any electoral 
outcomes in the CUF party's Pemba stronghold.  Dr. 
Tronvoll, TEMCO and other observers believe that the 
ZEC has generally handled these controversies with 
fairness and professionalism. 
 
Flashpoints and the Conspiracy du Jour 
-------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Zanzibar is nonetheless highly partisan, and 
its political tensions will only increase as election 
day approaches.  Already, rumors of plots and 
conspiracies abound.  As registration proceeds, the 
ZEC will be constantly challenged to respond to 
legitimate complaints as well as to quell irrational 
fears about the fairness of the process.  In his 
remarks to a group of donor country diplomats, Dr. 
Tronvoll outlined potential flashpoints for voter 
registration on Zanzibar.  He noted that Ungunja is 
more politically mixed than the solidly pro-CUF Pemba, 
and that registration shenanigans on Ungunja are 
therefore more likely to influence electoral outcomes. 
Competition between the Karume faction of Zanzibar's 
CCM party and the Bilal/Salim Amour faction could yet 
split the CCM, which would have the greatest impact in 
Amour's North Ungunja stronghold.  A CCM split could 
even tilt North Ungunja to the opposition CUF.  Some 
Ungunja shehas may try to rely on the unofficial 
census they conducted in mid 2004 to determine 
eligibility for registration, inevitably sparking 
protests from CUF partisans who consider the sheha 
census illegitimate and skewed to CCM.  Registration 
in Urban West region may pose the biggest risk of 
confrontation, and the one most likely to affect 
international tourism, since Stonetown and its 
environs are the CUF's most important stronghold on 
CCM-leaning Ungunja. 
 
Warning Signs from the Government 
--------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The government and the ruling CCM party, 
meanwhile, may be less than fully supportive of 
Zanzibar's voter registration; at the very least, they 
seem increasingly wary of any kind of foreign 
assistance or observation.  Dr. Tronvoll concluded 
that a faction of Zanzibar's CCM loyalists simply 
wanted to disrupt the voter registration process.  In 
the January 20 discussion, Tronvoll remarked that the 
widely documented efforts to register short-term 
transferees from the government security forces were 
blunt, blatant, and unlikely to influence electoral 
outcomes in any case.  He thought that the only 
logical objective of such tactics was to provoke 
confrontation and provide an excuse to suspend voter 
registration.  A month earlier, CUF Secretary General 
Seif Sharrif Hamad had voice essentially the same 
suspicion. 
 
6. (U) More worrisome have been the recent signals, 
strong, unambiguous and emanating from the highest 
levels of the government, warning non-Africans to keep 
their distance from the upcoming elections.  Zanzibar 
President Karume opened the New Year by inaugurating 
the ZEC's new headquarters and lecturing the assembled 
donors for assuming that an election is only 
democratic if an opposition party wins it (ref A). 
Days later, at his annual sherry party, President 
Mkapa cast his lot with the CCM hardliners with his 
pointed comment that the CCM was strong, and didn't 
need to cheat to win.  On January 12, President Karume 
welcomed Zimbabwean President Mugabe as his official 
guest at Zanzibar Day ceremonies, sending a none-too 
subtle signal that African ruling parties might stand 
in solidarity to support their vision of "democracy." 
(See Septel.)  Karume also reiterated the discredited 
account of the foreign diplomat who had interfered in 
voter registration without the knowledge of Zanzibar's 
government. (In fact, almost a dozen diplomats had 
observed registration December 2 at the invitation of 
the ZEC and the Foreign Ministry, as reported in 
Reftel D.)  This sudden skittishness about the foreign 
presence in Zanzibar extends to the working level: 
Dr. Tronvoll reported that his most recent request for 
an extension of Zanzibari research permit had been 
denied. 
 
Next Steps for Donors and Diplomats 
----------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) A group of donor country diplomats, invited to 
the Norwegian Embassy January 20 to hear Dr. 
Tronvoll's remarks on his Zanzibar research, discussed 
their next steps.  In addition to the Norwegian hosts, 
the group included representatives from the US, UK, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, the EU, and the 
UNDP. The gathering provided an opportunity for the 
USAID Democracy and Governance officer to present the 
first newsletter from the Tanzanian voter observation 
consortium TEMCO, which receives ESF funding through 
the NGO REDET to observe voter registration on 
Zanzibar.   After discussion, the group arrived at the 
following consensus: 
 
-- Donor country diplomats should lower their profile 
for near term.  While it is important that they 
continue to observe voter registration on Zanzibar, 
they should do so in smaller, more inconspicuous 
groups. 
 
-- Diplomats should continue to maintain a dialogue 
with both major parties.  They should make a special 
effort to reach out to an embattled and defensive CCM. 
 
-- The donors should seek additional sources of 
funding and technical support to expand TEMCO 
observation project, as well as to support other 
domestic NGOs involved in observing elections or in 
conducting voter education. 
 
-- The UNDP should convene regular meetings so donor 
country diplomats can monitor the situation as it 
develops, and readjust their strategy as necessary. 
The situation may merit particular attention in late 
March, when the ZEC registration teams prepare to move 
from Ungunja's solidly CCM North and South regions to 
the pro-CUF Urban West. 
 
8. (C) Comment:  Zanzibar's voter registration is 
going well for now, but the situation bears constant 
monitoring.  Renewed disputes and even violence could 
break out at any time.  The informal diplomats' group 
provides a useful tool for building consensus, and for 
supporting voter registration.  The group nonetheless 
recognizes it has a fundamental problem: it is too 
white, too European.  An embattled CCM could easily 
play the anti-colonial card and rally Africa's less 
democratic elements in response to international 
criticism about Zanzibar's conduct of its elections. 
In past discussions, members of this informal group 
have sought to support the Tanzanian NGOs that promote 
democracy and to reach out to African diplomats.  It 
is proving difficult, however, to find many Tanzanian 
democracy NGOs with sufficient capacity, or to 
persuade African diplomats here to take a public stand 
on the democracy issue. End Comment. 
 
STILLMAN