This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000296 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ISTANBUL PLS PASS ADANA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ETRD TU IS IZ SY
SUBJECT: TURKISH PM ERDOGAN'S VISIT TO SYRIA 
 
REF: A. 04 ANKARA 226 
 
     ¶B. 04 ANKARA 4196 
     ¶C. 04 ANKARA 6258 
     ¶D. 04 ANKARA 0248 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The Turks, led by PM Erdogan, FonMin Gul, and 
chief foreign policy advisor Davutoglu, are selling improved 
relations with Syria as a major foreign policy success.  GOT 
leaders cast Turkey as a channel of communication for the 
U.S. and Israel with Syria and as a friend that can support 
economic reform.  At the same time our GOT interlocutors view 
Assad's control as too fragile to sustain anything but 
economic reform.  In this context, Erdogan has promoted his 
Dec. 22-23 visit to Damascus and Aleppo as a huge step 
forward.  Erdogan reportedly raised Iraq and Middle East 
peace issues, but apparently received nothing new from Assad. 
 MFA contact spun the signing of a free trade agreement as 
"the highlight" of the visit.  We pushed back that this is 
the wrong approach to take with Syria and will continue to 
urge the GOT not to ratify it.  End summary. 
 
Warming Trend 
------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Under the influence of islam oriented chief foreign 
policy advisor Ahmet Davutoglu, PM Erdogan and FonMin Gul 
have promoted improved relations with Syria as a major 
achievement of the ruling AKP government.  While relations 
have been on an upward trend since hitting bottom in 1998, 
Bashir Assad's Jan. 2004 visit to Turkey (ref A) signaled an 
acceleration.  As part of a broad push to ease tensions with 
its neighbors, Turkey has focused on developing political, 
cultural, economic -- but not military -- ties with Syria 
(ref B).  Syrian PM al-Utri and FonMin al-Shara came to 
Turkey in July.  In October, Turkey helped Syria extinguish a 
serious forest fire near the border (ref C). PM Erdogan 
received Syrian Baath Party Deputy SecGen al-Ahmar in 
November. 
 
"The Syrians Need Friends" 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) MFA Middle East Department Head Bozay, who accompanied 
Erdogan to Damascus, proclaimed the visit a success.  He 
asserted that Syria feels isolated and concerned by the 
prospect of U.S. action against it.  "The Syrians need 
friends," he added.  The Syrians hope Turkey can be a channel 
of communication.  According to Bozay, the Syrians want to 
show they are not supporting terror. 
 
¶4.  (C) (C) Bozay said the Turkish Embassy in Damascus views 
Assad as trying to reform Syria, especially economically, 
against an older generation of Baathists.  The Embassy views 
Assad's control as fragile; too delicate, added Bozay, to 
enable him to engage in political reform.  According to ref 
B, at least some in Turkey's military share this view. 
Bozay asserted that the Syrians are engaging in economic 
reforms and they see Turkey as a potential partner in that 
effort.  Erdogan asked the Syrians to remove obstacles to 
Turkish investors; the Syrians asked the Turks for advice on 
opening a stock exchange. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶5.  (C) On Iraq elections, Erdogan reportedly told Assad that 
Turkey supports Sunni Arab participation and Iranian 
non-interference.  Assad mostly just listened, according to 
Bozay.  Assad expressed concern about Iranian influence and 
the possibility of an "unbalanced" election result favoring 
Shiites. 
 
¶6. (C) Bozay said Erdogan did not "directly" raise with Assad 
the issue of Baath terrorist infiltration of Iraq from Syria, 
but did tell Assad that terror and infiltration should stop; 
Assad replied he was doing the best he could.  Bozay 
speculated that Erdogan may have also raised the issue in his 
one-on-one meeting with Assad, which Bozay did not attend. 
 
Middle East Peace 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Erdogan reportedly raised Palestinian elections, 
telling Assad extremism should not be encouraged at this 
delicate stage, and that elected Palestinian leaders should 
be supported.  Erdogan did not raise the issue of Palestinian 
rejectionist groups' offices in Syria, Bozay said.  Assad 
agreed the elections were important but expressed skepticism 
about whether Israel would allow them to proceed freely or 
would cooperate with the new Palestinian government. 
 
¶8.  (C) Bozay said Erdogan raised the case of return of the 
remains of Eli Cohen (executed as an Israeli spy by the 
Syrians in 1965) but none of the other cases of Israelis 
missing in Lebanon about whom the Syrians presumably have 
information.  Assad reportedly replied he would look into the 
Cohen case and that this is solvable in the context of an 
overall settlement between Israel and Syria.  Israeli DCM 
Nahshon told us subsequently that Israel asked Erdogan to 
raise the Cohen case as a way to test the Turks.  Nahshon 
said the Israelis see the contradiction between Bashir 
Assad's non-answer (which, given the centrality of the Cohen 
case to Hafez al-Assad's justification for his regime, Israel 
interprets as a continuing "no") and the Turks' -- 
principally Davutoglu's -- assertion that the Syrians have 
not closed the door as a reflection of the Turks' lack of 
capacity to play a meaningful role. 
 
¶9.  (C) Bozay was unsure whether Erdogan raised Syrian 
occupation of Lebanon.  The MFA's prepared talking points 
included Lebanon, but Erdogan did not raise the subject in 
the expanded meeting with Assad.  Bozay again speculated 
Erdogan may have done so in the one-on-one meeting. 
 
Free Trade Agreement 
-------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Bozay painted the signing of the Turkey/Syria free 
trade agreement as "the highlight" of the visit.  We told 
Bozay that the U.S. sees the agreement as unhelpful in view 
of Syria's harboring of Iraqi former regime elements and 
terrorists; harboring Palestinian rejectionists; and 
occupying Lebanon.  Bozay averred the agreement is designed 
both to encourage Syrian economic reform, which in turn, he 
asserted, will lead to political reform, and to keep Turkey 
engaged with Syria. DCM also raised the FTA with DG for 
Middle East, Oguz Cellikkol, underlining our view that 
improved dialogue and trade benefits should be contingent on 
positive responses from Syria on core issues such as support 
for terrorists, in both the Iraq and MEPP contexts. 
Cellikkol agreed it was essential to give the Syrians a clear 
roadmap of requirements, but he also insisted that Turkey's 
warming relationship could have a positive impact in moving 
Assad forward on more difficult issues. 
 
¶11.  (C) We told Bozay that the U.S. thinks this is the wrong 
way to approach Syria.  Concrete messages to stop these 
activities are more effective in changing Syrian behavior. 
We reminded Bozay that when Syria was harboring PKK leader 
Ocalan, Turkey delivered a clear message in late 1998 to 
Syria to expel Ocalan and backed it with a promise of 
military action.  This approach worked:  Syria expelled 
Ocalan. 
 
¶12.  (C) Bozay denied press reports that the FTA includes 
Syrian acknowledgment that the disputed Turkish province of 
Hatay (called Alexandretta by the Syrians) belongs to Turkey. 
 Both sides pointedly refused to comment on the topic during 
the visit.  Bozay said agreements like the FTA and a 
transboundary water agreement on the Orontes (Asi) reached 
during the visit (ref D) would eventually amount to "de 
facto" resolution of the dispute. 
 
¶13.  (C) Bozay told us the agreement still must be ratified 
by the Turkish parliament.  We will continue to reiterate our 
opposition to the FTA and urge no ratification until Syria 
changes its behavior on Iraq, Palestinian rejectionists, 
Lebanon, and other issues of concern to the U.S. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14. (C) The GOT's mixing wishful thinking and a form of 
neo-Ottoman nostalgia in and approval to Syria (in this 
regard, several contacts, including "Sabah" Ankara bureau 
chief Asli Aydintasbas, have contrasted Erdogan's relaxed, 
at-home behavior in Damascus and Aleppo with his competitive 
body language in Western European capitals).  This Turkish 
love-fest with Bashir Assad and Syria (which has a reflection 
on the law-enforcement and counter-terror areas) will soon 
conflict with Turkey's attempts to repair the public side of 
its relations with Israel (septel).  It remains to be seen 
what concretely is produced following the rhetoric.  End 
comment. 
 
¶15.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN