This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000104 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
TEL AVIV PLEASE PASS TO CODEL KYL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP PREL MARR PGOV ECON TU IZ
SUBJECT: CODEL KYL SCENESETTER FOR TURKEY 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Your visit to Turkey comes at a bumpy 
period in the bilateral relationship, in large measure 
connected with developments in Iraq.  This message provides a 
brief overview of the state of bilateral relations, 
cooperation in Iraq, Turkey's EU accession process and the 
state of the economy.  End Summary. 
 
The Bilateral Relationship 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Bilateral relations have entered another choppy 
period.  The Turks are freely criticizing U.S. policy in Iraq 
and elsewhere in the Middle East, but do not offer 
constructive alternatives.  A barrage of media disinformation 
about Falluja and U.S. actions in general in Iraq -- fanned 
by statements by PM Erdogan and by Foreign Minister Gul 
alleging excessive use of force and civilian casualties -- is 
creating negative public opinion.  Some observers have 
characterized the general attitude in Turkey toward the U.S. 
and our role in the world as the most negative in memory. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The negative Turkish attitude towards the U.S. 
reverberates in other areas.  During a recent visit by Greek 
Orthodox Americans to discuss religious freedom, Turkey dug 
in its heels, reiterating its resistance to reopening of the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki Seminary and the ecumenical 
nature of the Patriarchate in Istanbul (an ecumenical nature 
recognized in Orthodoxy since the sixth century).  The 
delegation's visit set off a round of accusations that the 
U.S. refused to respect "Turkish sensitivities" and had an 
ulterior motive. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Turkey shares our goals for Iraq: a secure, stable, 
democratic country, united and territorially whole.  To that 
end, Turkey has provided valuable assistance and cooperation. 
 Ankara offered to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq in 
October 2003, approved the use of Incirlik Air Base for 
tankers to refuel aircraft on support missions for both 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF), authorized the transit of US troops from Iraq on 
rotation out, and permitted the transit of supplies for our 
forces and humanitarian goods.  Turkey is also active in 
reconstruction efforts, including providing electricity for 
Iraq and training Iraqi diplomats, and has offered senior 
military leadership training in Turkey as its contribution to 
NATO's Iraq training mission. 
 
¶5. (SBU) This cooperation is provided despite the fact that 
our actions in Iraq are highly unpopular with the Turkish 
public, which is fed on a diet of sensationalist and 
erroneous press reports about US operations and actions in 
Iraq, and which the government rarely corrects.  In response 
the mission has established a regular information-sharing 
program on events in Iraq, which has resulted in fewer public 
misstatements.  Many Turks in and out of government worry 
about the fragility of Iraq's territorial integrity, fearing 
that the Kurds in the north aspire for independence and that 
the tensions between Sunni and Shia Arabs might become 
intractable.  The Turks insist on interpreting U.S. failure 
to date to go directly after the Kurdish PKK terrorist 
organization in northern Iraq, the friendly U.S. attitude 
toward northern Iraqi Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani, 
and the U.S. view that the number of Turkmen in Iraq is 
significantly lower than the figure cited by Turkey as 
"evidence" that the U.S. supports both the PKK and an 
independent Kurdish state.  The future of oil-rich Kirkuk is 
a particular source of concern, as the return of Kurds 
forcibly expelled by Saddam could disrupt an uneasy balance 
between resident Arabs and Turkmen, the latter with whom the 
Turks feel a bond of kinship.  The Turks have urged Sunnis to 
remain engaged and have gone on record supporting the IIG and 
full participation in elections, which they want to see held 
on January 30, as scheduled.  On January 11, the US, Turkey 
and Iraq will hold the first trilateral discussions with the 
aim of developing cooperative measures against the PKK. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The high number of Turkish truckers  killed (70 as 
of 1/1/05) in Iraq has raised concerns among the public and 
Turkish officials.  To address this issue, the first 
trilateral US/GOT/IIG talks on security in Iraq were held on 
November 30.  The Turks and Iraqis met again in late December 
to discuss follow-up measures and trilateral talks will 
continue.  The Dec. 17 murder of five Turkish police officers 
traveling to Iraq to assume duty at the Turkish Embassy 
stunned Turkey.  While press outrage was directed at the US, 
the government noted its appreciation for the swift US 
military response in which several insurgents were killed, 
the wounded were treated and the bodies were repatriated. 
 
Counter-Terrorism/Non-Proliferation 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Turks have been an active partner on other 
fronts in the global war on terrorism and international 
security:  Our militaries coordinate assistance to Georgia 
and Azerbaijan, improving their abilities to protect 
important energy transportation routes.  Turkey subscribes to 
every arms control arrangement it is eligible to join, 
including the Proliferation Security Initiative, through 
which it is considering hosting an exercise in 2006.  Ankara 
has been publicly supportive of international efforts to 
press Iran to meet its commitments to the IAEA.  The Turkish 
military's Partnership for Peace Training Center provides 
counterterrorism and other training to personnel from PfP 
partner countries.  The military has recently established a 
NATO Center of Excellence for the Combat Against Terrorism 
that will provide more specialized training opportunities for 
both NATO partner nations and alliance members.  And Turkey 
will again assume the command of ISAF in Afghanistan in 
February for a six-month period during which they will send 
up to 1,600 troops. 
 
EU Accession 
------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) The European Union at the December 17 Summit agreed 
to open accession talks with Turkey in October, marking a 
major step forward in anchoring Turkey,s future and in our 
strategic vision for Turkey and the region.  However, the 
next steps in the process could be rocky.  Before talks 
begin, the EU expects Turkey to sign a protocol extending the 
EU Association agreement to the 10 new EU members, including 
the Republic of Cyprus.  Several days after the Summit, the 
GOT sent a letter to the EU stating Turkey,s objections to 
the fact that the EU Summit conclusions state that 
&derogations8 may be included in the framework for 
negotiations.  The EU plans to apply a &screening process8 
before opening formal talks on each chapter of the EU acquis. 
 The Turks say they can accept this, as long as the screening 
begins in early 2005 and the formal talks start later in the 
year.  It is not yet clear how the EU will carry out the 
process.  The GOT, meanwhile, has yet to name a chief EU 
negotiator and to assign the hundreds of officials needed to 
work on the process of harmonizing Turkish legislation with 
the acquis. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Many in Turkey see the U.S. and EU relationships as 
a zero-sum choice.  They believe they can improve relations 
with the EU by distancing Turkey from the U.S.  Others also 
look for a third alternative based on partnership with Russia 
) which was a theme of the recent Putin visit. 
 
Economy 
------- 
 
¶10. (U) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from the 
financial crisis of 2000-2001 and is growing at an annual 
pace of around 8-9 percent.  However, the recovery remains 
vulnerable due to a large current account deficit (about 5 
percent of GDP) and a large debt with a short maturity 
structure.  Unemployment and poverty remain high, and 
ordinary people have not felt much benefit from the overall 
macroeconomic improvement.  Macroeconomic success has also 
bred a sense of complacency about the need to persist with 
difficult reforms, such as privatization, and reform of the 
banking, social security and tax systems, all of which are 
being addressed in a new three-year IMF standby program. 
 
¶11. (U) Due to historic economic/political volatility and 
opaque regulatory/judicial systems, Turkey has long received 
less foreign direct investment than other countries of 
similar size and potential.  Many in the Turkish elite are 
convinced that there will be a flood of foreign investment if 
the Turks get a date for EU accession negotiations later this 
month.  However, this is unlikely to materialize unless more 
is done in the area of structural reform.  In addition, there 
appears to be a lack of appreciation for the enormous 
challenges Turkey will shoulder in the accession 
negotiations, for the fact that EU accession will affect 
nearly aspect of their lives, and that it may in the end be 
quite costly for Turkey to comply with EU directives in 
environmental protection and other areas. 
EDELMAN