This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000137 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL AU SU NI
SUBJECT: AF PDAS RANNEBERGER'S MEETING WITH AU CHAIRPERSON 
CONARE ON MARGINS OF AU SUMMIT 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor James Maxstadt for Reasons 1.4 (B an 
d D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  At his 29 January meeting in Abuja with 
African Union (AU) Chairperson Konare, Ambassador Ranneberger 
underscored the priority the U.S. attaches to strengthening 
its relationship with the AU.  He emphasized U.S. support for 
the AU mission in Darfur.  He stressed the need to use the 
momentum and new dynamics generated by Sudan's Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) to resolve Darfur quickly.  He and 
Konare agreed on the importance of close coordination in 
preparing for the next round of talks in Abuja.  He stressed 
the AU must do more publicly to condemn atrocities in Darfur. 
 Konare said that the AU plans to review its mandate in 
mid-February, including focusing on the issue of expanded 
support for  civilian protection.  As regards a tribunal to 
try perpetrators of atrocities in Darfur, he pressed Konare 
to support an alternative to the ICC (i.e. a UN/AU hybrid). 
Konare agreed to consider the idea. (Ranneberger raised this 
issue in other meetings as well; see septels). Ranneberger 
urged caution with respect to deployment of any force to 
Somalia; Konare, however, indicated that the AU is moving 
ahead with plans to deploy a force of up to several thousand. 
 Konare said that the AU will name a commission to study the 
issue of UNSC reform, that will lead to development of an AU 
position by the end of February in time to influence the 
UNSYG's report in March. 
 
¶2. (C) Konare said premature re-hatting in Darfur would be "a 
disaster" for the AU; however, the AU will cooperate "at all 
levels" with the UN force deployed in southern Sudan.  UN 
Special Representative Pronk, he continued, was bringing a 
draft UN-AU MOU to Abuja outlining the scope of cooperation. 
He said that a new government in Khartoum -- and Garang's 
active engagement -- are key to a solution in Darfur.  He 
stressed that that AU troops should be "troops of 
protection."  Konare said that the AU will hold a donors 
conference in February in Addis, and welcomed the possibility 
of further U.S. support for AU capacity and institution 
building.  Concluding, he said the July AU Summit may occur 
in Sirte, Libya, but he expects the current summit to extend 
President Obasanjo's tenure until the January 2006 summit. 
End Summary. 
 
Darfur and the AU Mission 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador Ranneberger expressed appreciation for the 
vital role the AU is playing in Darfur.  It is important to 
the AU's future that it achieve a credible measure of success 
in Darfur.  UN plans for immediate cooperation with the AU 
mission will pave the way for eventual re-hatting 
Ranneberger acknowledged that the AU missions has become 
increasingly more effective.  He urged AU to speak out more 
frequently and more forcefully when atrocities and ceasefire 
violations occur as a means of deterring further such 
incidents.  It should more aggressively execute its expanded 
mandate, which includes a component for protection of 
civilians in imminent danger.  He explained the U.S. view 
that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) must be used to 
press forward rapidly on a resolution to Darfur.  Garang 
should use his influence with the rebels, and the U.S. has 
told him this.  Pressure must be maintained on both sides; 
that is why the U.S. is pushing in New York for targeted 
sanctions on perpetrators of violence and atrocities in 
Darfur. 
 
¶4. (C) Konare congratulated the U.S. on its achievement in 
Naivasha, strongly concurring that it was central to 
resolving Darfur.  The nature of the government in Khartoum 
must change, he said, and the AU has already pressed Garang 
to bring his influence with the rebels to bear.  The AU is 
now seeing very troubling developments in Darfur.  Hardliners 
in Khartoum may be behind unraveling security conditions in 
order to impede implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement and weaken Garang, or even to create conditions for 
the overthrow of Bashir.  Konare said AU President Obasanjo 
would deliver a stern message to the Sudanese delegation at 
the Summit. (During his public speech opening the summit, 
Obasanjo specifically condemned the recent aerial bombardment 
in Darfur and blamed the GOS for this.  We were later told by 
an AU official who was in the room that the heads of state in 
their private meeting pressed the GOS hard on the need to 
stop the violence.  Our source said it was the toughest 
discussion he had ever witnessed at such private sessions.) 
 
¶5. (C) Konare thanked the U.S. for support of the AU's Darfur 
mission.  "Should the AU mission fail in Darfur," he said, 
"it would be a disaster."  If the mission were handed "to the 
UN today, then it would be a failure for us, and the 
(African) people will see this clearly."  Yes, there have 
been capacity problems, he admitted, but the AU has 
undertaken a ground-breaking mission in Darfur.  The U.S. 
must help ensure it is a success.  The UN can also help, and 
the AU will closely collaborate "at all levels" with the UN 
force to be deployed to southern Sudan.  "But the AU should 
remain at the forefront," he stressed, adding that  UN 
Special Representative Pronk was bringing a draft MOU to the 
Summit outlining the possible scope of AU-UN cooperation. 
Ranneberger asked that the AU share this document with us as 
soon as possible.  Konare agreed to do so. 
 
¶6. (C) Turning to the AU mandate, Konare strongly agreed AU 
troops should be prepared to protect civilians.  "Our troops 
are troops of protection," he said, adding he was trying to 
reinforce this view with AU Coordinator Kingibe.  It would be 
much easier to protect the rebels if they would agree to 
cantonment, Konare said, and their continuing attacks are 
playing into the hands of the GOS.  Konare said that the AU 
would position forces with the rebels if they would agree to 
cantonment.  Ranneberger noted that Kingibe and Ambassador 
Djinnit (the head of the AU's Peace and Security Council) 
have indicated the AU wants to "pre-cook" tentative agreement 
between the parties before actually inviting them to Abuja. 
Too often the AU has convened talks then waited days for the 
parties, particularly the rebels, to trickle into Abuja. 
Ranneberger emphasized the need to move head urgently to 
achieve a political settlement, within the Naivasha 
framework.  Konare agreed and stressed his desire to 
coordinate closely with the U.S. to maintain pressure on both 
sides. 
 
Darfur Accountability 
 
¶7. (C)  Ranneberger then raised accountability for atrocities 
in Darfur, pressing Konare to support an alternative to the 
International Criminal Court.  He noted that as early as next 
week the UN's International Commission of Inquiry's report 
will be released publicly, with the report possibly calling 
for referral to the ICC.  The U.S. opposes such a move, and 
believes a separate tribunal should be established with UNSC 
support.  He urged the AU to work with the UNSC to set up a 
court for the Darfur atrocities.  He pointed out that the 
court could sit in Arusha drawing on the infrastructure 
already in place for the Rwanda tribunal.  He indicated the 
U.S. is confident that there will be sufficient funding for 
such a tribunal.  Such a court would highlight African 
efforts to ensure accountability and would reinforce AU 
cooperation with the UN.  Konare asked for time to consider 
the idea.  Ranneberger urged him to provide a quick response 
in view of the fact that the UNSC will be asked to take 
action once the Commission of Inquiry report is presented. 
 
¶9. (C) Turning to the issue of AU succession, Ranneberger 
said the U.S. understands the Sudanese are no longer in the 
running.  He cited speculation that Libyan leader Qadhafi 
might be named to head the AU, and made clear that this 
possibility gravely concerned the U.S.  Konare said that the 
July summit would probably take place in Sirte, to give 
Qadhafi something, but he would not be made head of the AU. 
Konare said he expected the current summit to extend Obasanjo 
for six months (until January 2006).  It was not yet clear 
who would succeed Obasanjo, but it would not be Qadhafi. 
(Note: Obasanjo had stopped in Tripoli the day before the 
summit en route back to Nigeria from Davos, and presumably 
talked this through with Qadhafi.  Qadhafi was expected to 
attend the summit, but did not.  We subsequently confirmed 
that this course of action has been adopted by the AU summit, 
with one variation.  The January 2006 summit may take place 
in Khartoum, with the possibility that the Sudanese could 
take the presidency of the AU, but heads of state have 
reportedly made clear this will only happen if the peace 
process is on track and violence has ended in Darfur.  End 
Note.)  The heads of state have agreed that, following 
Khartoum, all future summits will take place in Addis Ababa 
as a way of avoiding the automatic, rotating linkage of 
giving the country where the summit is held the presidency of 
the AU. 
 
AU Stretched Too Thin 
 
¶10. (C) Ambassador Ranneberger asked if the AU had plans for 
a presence in Somalia. Given AU involvement in Darfur and 
other areas he expressed U.S. concern that the AU was 
extending itself beyond its capacity.  Konare agreed that 
this is a serious concern, but said the AU needs to support 
the Somali transitional government with  both military and 
political presence in Somalia.  Konare said the AU will draw 
on only one or two countries, mainly Uganda, for up to 2000 
troops to serve principally to protect the institutions of 
the transitional government once it moves to Mogadishu.  The 
AU mission would not engage in police enforcement or identify 
with one clan over another.  The AU mission would also be 
designed to support political dialogue in Somalia, including 
talks with Somaliland.  Ranneberger reviewed the continuing 
U.S. skepticism about the transitional government, but made 
clear that the U.S. continues to support the IGAD-led 
process.  He urged the AU to proceed with caution, 
emphasizing that the transitional government must do much 
more to establish its legitimacy.  The AU would have to be 
careful to avoid having the transitional government use the 
AU to try to impose legitimacy. 
 
11, (C) (Note: As discussed separately with Djinnit, the AU 
is consulting with South Africa regarding the deployment of a 
small force to eastern Congo for a limited period of time. 
This would be "SADC force," although nominally under the 
auspices of the AU.  End Note.) 
 
U.S.-AU Relationship 
 
¶12. (C) Ranneberger told Konare that the U.S. wants to make 
support for the AU a major priority of U.S. policy on Africa. 
 In that context, the U.S. welcomes the AU intention to open 
an office in Washington.  Konare said the AU wants to have a 
strong office and hopes to have one in place by March. 
Ranneberger expressed the hope that Konare could come to 
Washington for the opening and for meetings with senior U.S. 
officials. Ranneberger said that the U.S. is working to 
identify increased funding for capacity building and 
institutional strengthening.  Konare confirmed that the AU 
will hold a donors meeting in Addis some time in February to 
present AU's programs and funding needs, with subsequent 
follow-up meetings with individual donors.  Konare warmly 
welcomed U.S. interest in strengthening its relationship with 
the AU.  Konare emphasized the need for donor support to 
enhance AU managerial capacity, to establish effective 
accountability mechanisms, and to train additional African 
forces for peacekeeping operations, among other needs. 
 
On the AU Summit Agenda 
 
¶13. (U) Ranneberger emphasized the need to avoid surprises, 
and asked Konare what areas would be covered in the final AU 
communique.  Konare said he expected no reference to Iraq and 
stock AU language on the Middle East.  Beyond this, the AU 
summit leaders would discuss UN reform, ask members for 
greater financial support, adopt a non-aggression and common 
defense pact, and formally create an Africa intelligence 
coordination unit at AU headquarters.  The Nigerians will 
lead AU intelligence coordination. 
 
UN Reform 
 
¶14. (C) Konare said that Harare Declaration from the late 90s 
remains the basis for the AU position favoring two permanent 
seats for Africa on the UNSC.  He said that South Africa, 
Nigeria, and Egypt are pushing the AU to support UN reform 
along the lines of "Model A."  The AU will name a commission 
to study the issue, which will meet in Swaziland in 
mid-February.  Its deliberations will form the basis for 
development of a definitive AU position in time to influence 
the UNSYG's expected report on UN reform in March. 
CAMPBELL