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Diana T Fritz  12/05/2006 11:42:17 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
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S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 00326

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   AMB USLO POL P/M DCM

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MSISON
DRAFTED: FCS:MO'BRIEN
CLEARED: A/DCM:OJOHN, CG:JDAVIS, ICE:WWALLRAPP

VZCZCADI015
OO RUEHC RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #0326/01 0231106
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 231106Z JAN 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7810
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 4755

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000326 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
FOR T - U/S BOLTON FROM AMBASSADOR SISON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2015 
TAGS: PARM ETTC KNNP KOMC KSTC IZ IR TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT TO THE UAE 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reason 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) I look forward to welcoming you back to the United 
Arab Emirates January 30-February 1.  Your visit will provide 
a timely opportunity to discuss our common concerns about the 
Iranian nuclear program with the UAEG as well as to review 
progress on the UAEG,s export controls program.  The UAE has 
been working on an export controls list for more than 18 
months and a new export control law awaits promulgation.  In 
Abu Dhabi, we have requested meetings with Crown Prince 
Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ) and Deputy PM/MinState 
Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed (HbZ).  In Dubai, we 
have requested a meeting with Dubai Crown Prince and titular 
UAE Defense Minister General Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al 
Maktoum (we will ask Dubai Ports Chairman Sultan bin Sulayem, 
our principal interlocutor on export controls, to join MbR). 
 
------- 
¶A. IRAN 
------- 
 
¶2. (S) Sheikh Hamdan has told us repeatedly that the UAE is 
deeply concerned about what Iran represents, the threat of 
proliferation and terrorism emanating from Iran, and Iran,s 
nuclear program.  Relations between the UAE and Iran remain 
strained (the territorial dispute of the Abu Musa and Tunb 
Islands remains unresolved).  The Emiratis are deeply 
suspicious of Iran,s territorial/military ambitions in the 
Gulf, particularly with respect to Tehran,s nuclear and WMD 
acquisition policy, and have consistently supported a tough 
approach by the IAEA.  The Emiratis are also worried about 
Iranian designs in Iraq. 
 
¶3. (S) The UAE has acknowledged that it needs to do a better 
job on Iranian front companies located in the UAE (mainly 
Dubai), but will likely focus only on potential shipments 
related to nuclear or other WMD technologies, not on 
sanctions-busting, since Iran is the UAE,s largest non-oil 
trading partner. Shipments to Iran from Dubai include 
everything from cosmetics to plumbing equipment to computer 
parts.  Dubai serves as the main entrepot of the Arabian 
Gulf.  (As much as 50 percent of all of Dubai,s imports are 
re-exported.  In 2002, Iran accounted for $1.1 billion )- 
almost 10% -- of these re-exports.) The UAEG has bristled at 
Dubai,s labeling in the U.S. press as &Nukes R Us,8 
referring to the New York Times, characterization of Dubai 
as &the key transfer point in (A.Q.) Khan,s atomic 
bazaar.8  However, UAEG sensitivity about its reputation has 
done much to encourage greater cooperation on stopping, 
seizing, or turning around suspect shipments. 
 
------- 
¶B. MTCR 
------- 
 
¶4. (S) The UAE has expressed strong interest in joining the 
Missile Technology Control Regime and you are likely to be 
asked about MTCR membership protocols.  We have passed the 
MFA information on the regime, urged the UAE to adhere 
unilaterally to MTCR guidelines, and encouraged the UAE to 
pass an export control law.  The MFA followed the 2004 MTCR 
Seoul Plenary very carefully and expressed concern about 
possible negative mention of UAE transshipment challenges. 
 
----------------------- 
¶C. SCUDS AND PREDATOR B 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) The UAE forwarded a request three years ago to procure 
unarmed Predator B UAVs.  The Emiratis believe this system 
will provide the UAE with much-needed capability to survey 
and defend its long, porous coasts, islands, and inland 
borders.  Given our inability to meet this request due to 
MTCR considerations, MbZ has told us that he intends to 
pursue a foreign co-production offer.  We are aware that 
South Africa, Jordan, Russia, France, and China have entered 
into discussions with the UAE on this proposal.  The Predator 
issue now appears to be having an impact on the release of 
the UAE,s SCUDs to the USG.  We were told by an MbZ aide in 
January that MbZ,s new position is that &the UAE government 
will look favorably on releasing the 38 SCUDs it now owns to 
the USG, when the USG looks favorably on releasing to the UAE 
the Predator B system.8  MbZ,s office explained that the 
transfer of the SCUDs was originally tied to the UAE,s 
acquisition of ATACMS.  However, the &non-competitive8 
price of the ATACMS no longer makes it a &viable option8 
for the UAE, he said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
¶D. COOPERATION ON DIVERSIONS OF EXPORT-CONTROLLED ITEMS 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶6. (S) The UAE,s draft export control law is still being 
reviewed in the interagency process.  You should urge speedy 
adoption in your conversations with UAEG interlocutors. 
Nonetheless, we are encouraged by the UAE,s continuing 
cooperation in individual cases, e.g., their recent quick 
action in taking into custody Osman Saeed for the diversion 
of licensed items through the UAE to  Pakistan,s missile 
program.   UAE authorities have acted on a number of 
suspected shipments of WMD-related goods to Pakistan and Iran 
when advised that the shipments were going to transit the 
UAE. 
 
¶7. (C) The DHS/ICE and USDOC BIS attaches have experienced a 
drastic increase in the number of investigations involving 
transshipment through the UAE.  Pre-license and post-shipment 
verifications done on U.S. exports destined for the UAE has 
resulted in a 25-30% unfavorable rate, meaning the items were 
likely to be diverted or had already been diverted. 
 
¶8. (S/NF) The UAE leadership has pledged cooperation and 
acted to shut down A.Q. Khan network activities and front 
companies; Sheikh Hamdan and MbR heard directly from former 
U/S Ken Juster and former A/S John Wolf on specific concerns 
in 2004.  There remains an outstanding USG request to the 
Dubai Attorney General outlining the type of access the US 
desires.  Ambassador has pressed the MFA several times on 
this (most recently on January 17); this issue should again 
be raised during your visit. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶E. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The UAE recognizes the need to tighten security at 
airports, ports and borders through the enactment of laws and 
regulations, and welcomes the assistance of the United States 
in this matter.  Sheikh Hamdan has told us the UAE is anxious 
to address diversion and proliferation issues because the UAE 
faces a direct threat from Iran and other countries.  The USG 
has been training the UAEG on export 
controls/nonproliferation with the goal of attaining 
unilateral UAE adherence to all the nonproliferation export 
control regimes.  Through the EXBS program, export 
control-related training has been particularly active within 
the past 18 months.  State and Commerce, in conjunction with 
the UK conducted a Control List workshop.  UAE officials 
attended a Global Transshipment Conference in Malta, where 
they had the opportunity to hear export control presentations 
from other countries that also have high-volume ports. 
USDOC/BIS, which has an export control attach at post, 
conducted a second legal and regulatory workshop with UAE 
export control officers in October 2004.  In 2004, U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection conducted a Seaport 
Interdiction Training Program. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
¶F. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) We have briefed the MFA and senior military on PSI 
and our desire for a shipboarding agreement several times. 
The UAE Armed Forces GHQ and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
have been reviewing PSI since July 2004 and have been 
reminded several times of our strong interest.  At the 
January 11-12 Joint Military Commission in Abu Dhabi, we 
urged the UAE to endorse the principles of PSI and to 
consider participation in future PSI activities.  The UAE is 
a natural participant given its geography and strategic 
security concerns.  We continue to emphasize that PSI 
activities are voluntary and do not infringe on a country,s 
sovereignty.  We have also noted that such an agreement 
provides an important way for nations to cooperate on 
stopping WMD shipments and transfers. 
 
-------------------------------- 
¶G. CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (U) On December 13, 2004, Commissioner Robert Bonner from 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection and Sultan bin Sulayam, 
Chairman of Dubai Ports Athority, signed the Container 
Security Initiative.  CSI is expected to become operational 
in February 2005 with four DHS staff stationed at Port 
Rashid.  While CSI is largely a border 
security/counterterrorism program, the processes and 
procedures to ensure container security that will be 
instituted by the Dubai ports would facilitate UAE efforts to 
detect and interdict WMD and related shipments transiting 
their ports. 
 
----------------- 
¶H. MIL-MIL ISSUES 
----------------- 
 
Iraq and Afghanistan: 
-------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Senior UAEG officials have been supportive of our 
broader regional objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan.  UAE 
assistance to Iraq, both pledged and delivered, has been 
significant.  The UAE has been working with Germany to 
provide police and military training to the Iraqis in the 
UAE, as well as 100 trucks for the Iraqi armed forces.  The 
UAE contributed over 8 million dollars toward the transfer of 
M-113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) from Jordan to Iraq. 
Recently the UAE donated four light reconnaissance aircraft 
to Iraq (and trained Iraqi pilots to fly the planes), as well 
as 45 French-built Panhard APCs, with a pledge of 80 
additional M-113 APCs purchased from Switzerland.  The UAE 
directorate of military intelligence sent officers to 
coalition headquarters in Baghdad and Bagram in May 2004 to 
perform duties as joint operations and joint intelligence 
officers. 
 
Access to UAE Bases: 
------------------- 
 
¶13. (S) Al Dhafra air base remains a key component of our 
relationship with UAE and is vital to the ability of CENTCOM 
and CENTAF to project combat power in the Gulf.  Al Dhafra 
currently hosts the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing, with more 
than 1200 CentAF personnel operating 14 KC-135 and 4 KC-10 
air-refueling tankers, as well as 6 U-2 surveillance aircraft 
and a Global Hawk remotely piloted vehicle.  The ports at 
Jebel Ali on the Arabian Gulf and Fujairah on the Gulf of 
Oman are crucial to CENTCOM access and power projection in 
the region.  The ports host more than 500 U.S. Navy port of 
call visits per year. 
 
¶14. (S) Despite our excellent cooperation and the UAE,s 
accommodation of our military presence on their soil, the 
Emiratis have recently insisted on negotiations formalizing 
our joint use of UAE military bases, infrastructure and 
associated services.  In December 2004, CENTCOM personnel 
developed a draft Base Operating Arrangement (BOA).  The 
draft BOA addresses the current constraints at Al Minhad and 
Al Dhafra air bases, without crossing potential &red lines8 
of the existing Defense Cooperation Agreement.  The BOA has 
been under review by OSD/P since January 5. 
 
Gulf Air Warfare Center: 
----------------------- 
 
¶15. (S) The success of the Gulf Air Warfare Center is one of 
the highlights of the bilateral relationship.  The inaugural 
class, comprised of participants from the U.S., UAE, and UK, 
successfully completed the program in February 2004 and a 
second class graduated in May 2004.  The third class, which 
graduated this past December, expanded participation to 
French, Saudi and Qatari pilots and crews.  Future classes 
will include participants from other Gulf countries, as well 
as Italy. 
 
SISON