This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 006658 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2009 
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG GZ IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: SNAPSHOT OF A BORDER CROSSING AND HOPES THAT ABU 
MAZEN WILL BRING IMPROVEMENT 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Gaza-based NYT stringer Taghreed el-Khodary 
told the Ambassador December 22 that Gazans are even more 
interested in having Abu Mazen elected than are West Bank 
Palestinians -- not from any great love of Abu Mazen, but 
rather from the positive experience they remember from his 
brief tenure in 2003.  Hamas, according to el-Khodary, will 
hold out for a mutual cease-fire with Israel and for 
positions in any post-election PA as its price for halting 
attacks.  Other militant groups would be inclined to cease 
attacks if the PA offers them jobs, most likely in the 
security structures.  If not brought in to the governing 
structures in a manner it considers sufficient, Hamas members 
with whom el-Khodary has spoken told her they "will turn (the 
situation) into hell."  El-Khodary said she believes that if 
Hamas is actually brought into the government, however, "they 
will behave."  After an almost seven-hour ordeal at Erez as 
she tried to cross into Israel, el-Khodary said that she had 
witnessed firsthand the anger of average Palestinians -- the 
citizenry and the PA security personnel -- at both the 
treatment they receive at the hands of the Israeli soldiers 
and what she termed the arrogance demonstrated by PA 
officials who "breeze through" the checkpoints ahead of sick 
people who wait hours to cross into Israel for medical 
treatment.  End Summary. 
 
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Erez Crossing 
------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In a meeting December 23, Gaza-based NYT stringer 
Taghreed el-Khodary gave the Ambassador a snapshot of views 
gathered during a time-consuming journey into Israel from 
Gaza City via the Erez Crossing.  El-Khodary's journey 
through the Erez Crossing took a total of seven hours, 
despite the Embassy's assistance and receipt of clearances in 
advance from the IDF and the Office for Coordination and 
General Administration in the Territories (COGAT). 
El-Khodary characterized her trip as a learning experience, 
where she experienced firsthand what the average Palestinian 
-- of the few who are fortunate enough to receive a permit -- 
goes through in order to exit the Gaza Strip.  The day began 
at 0700 hours when el-Khodary received word that her permit 
was approved; she was told to be at the crossing at 1000 
hours to collect it and enter Israel.  The permit was 
eventually ready only at 1300 hours, after numerous phone 
calls from the Embassy to spur issuance.  In the interim, 
el-Khodary cooled her heels at the Palestinian checkpoint 
several hundred meters from the crossing area.  She 
eventually received her corrected permit -- the first one 
authorized her travel to the wrong city on the wrong day -- 
at approximately 1630 hours. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Why Should I Protect Them When They Treat Me Like This? 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) El-Khodary said that as she waited, she chatted 
with, among others, a PA security officer, who confessed to 
being angry and humiliated with how the IDF soldiers that he 
worked with daily treated him.  Why should I protect them, he 
said, when they show me no respect?  One of these days, I 
probably won't, he concluded.  El-Khodary watched as PA 
officials "breezed through" the crossing, leaving average 
Palestinians -- some of whom were ill and had permits to 
enter Israel that day for medical treatment -- languishing on 
the Gaza side.  The resentment was palpable, el-Khodary said, 
particularly when only five of the 25 medical cases were 
eventually allowed to cross, and then only near the end of 
the day.  The rest were told to go home and reapply to cross 
another day.  Both the GOI and the PA need to realize, she 
commented, that they do themselves no favors in the eyes of 
the population by giving PA officials preferential treatment. 
 The behavior of IDF soldiers is "turning moderates into 
extremists," in el-Khodary's opinion. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Ambassador said that the GOI has plans to 
transfer control over checkpoints to civilian companies after 
disengagement, in order to address the current situation, 
which he agreed is bad for both the soldiers and the 
Palestinians.  Progress on this and a host of other 
disengagement-related issues will be easier after the 
elections January 9 when, by all indications, the GOI and the 
PA will be better able to work together directly rather than 
in parallel through the World Bank. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
High Expectations from an Abu Mazen Government 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Gazans, el-Khodary said, want Abu Mazen in power 
even more than do West Bankers.  Not that they like him all 
that much, she added, but people in Gaza wistfully recalled 
the "100 days" of Abu Mazen's 2003 premiership during which 
there was a cease-fire and free passage through the Abu 
Khouli checkpoint that divides Gaza in half just north of 
Khan Yunis.  Gazans want Abu Mazen to get more workers into 
Israel or otherwise ensure jobs; that is concern number one, 
according to el-Khodary.  The Ambassador said that the United 
States is ready and willing to work with Abu Mazen, but that 
the USG should not be put in the position of acting as a 
substitute for him.  The fact that Abu Mazen has said openly 
that Palestinians should turn away from guns is very good, 
but he needs to take visible steps.  No one is asking him to 
go after militants right away, but it is imperative that the 
immediate need for law and order be addressed.  The 
Ambassador noted that if Abu Mazen begins to address 
security, even incrementally, Israeli officials have said 
that they will refrain from assassinations of militant 
leaders and hot pursuit attacks, with the exception of 
freedom to go after so-called ticking bombs. 
 
¶6.  (C) The Ambassador said that United States has also 
developed a package of proposals that it can rapidly deliver 
to help the expected Abu Mazen government show results to the 
Palestinian people in the first 90 days following the 
election.  These proposals are in addition to the larger 
projects and budgetary support offered to the PA at the AHLC 
meeting in Oslo earlier in December.  While it will be 
difficult to coax the GOI to commit to once again allow 
Palestinian workers into Israel, the U.S. has pressed Israel 
to keep an open mind on the subject, leaving open the 
possibility of a more positive GOI position should some of 
Abu Mazen's plans bear fruit. 
 
--------------------- 
And What About Hamas? 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) El-Khodary, who has wide-ranging contacts among many 
of the factions, said that Hamas wants to stop the attacks, 
but is holding out for a mutual cease-fire with Israel as 
well as positions (a "large piece of the cake," as el-Khodary 
put it) in any post-election PA.  Other militant groups, in 
el-Khodary's opinion, would be inclined to cease attacks if 
the PA would offer them jobs, most likely in the security 
structures.  Contacts in Hamas, el-Khodary said, have told 
her that the organization, if not brought into the governing 
structures in a manner it considers sufficient, "will turn 
(the situation) into hell."  El-Khodary conjectured that, if 
Hamas is actually brought into the government, either through 
elections or through appointments to ministries, "they will 
behave." 
 
----------------------- 
International Observers 
----------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) El-Khodary questioned whether the international 
community would send observers into Gaza post-disengagement, 
either to deter conflicts or to investigate them afterwards. 
The Ambassador cautioned that such efforts, although 
well-intentioned, could easily go awry if, for example, the 
observers were used by militants as cover from which to 
launch attacks.  Another problem, the Ambassador continued, 
is that observers, by definition, do not have much authority 
to take action beyond filing a report -- something that 
experience in south Lebanon has shown loses its punch over 
time. 
 
 
 
 
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KURTZER