This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 006285 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KWBG IS SY GOI INTERNAL GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: PERES: SUCCESS OF LIKUD-LABOR COALITION 
NEGOTIATIONS COULD BOIL DOWN TO PORTFOLIOS 
 
REF: TEL AVIV 6007 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 
(b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Prior to the Likud Central Committee's 
positive vote on December 9 to  open coalition negotiations 
with the Labor Party, United Torah Judaism, and Shas (see 
septel), an obviously exhausted Labor Party leader Shimon 
Peres stressed to the Ambassador the depth of his own 
problems in convincing the Labor Party to join the 
coalition.  Peres repeatedly emphasized the "limits in my 
capacity" to bring Labor into a coalition without an offer 
from Prime Minister Sharon of at least one, and more 
reasonably, two major ministerial portfolios.  Peres also 
underlined his desire to see disengagement proceed and said 
elections in 2005 would be a "waste of five-to-six months" 
during which time disengagement could have been 
implemented.  In a separate meeting with the Ambassador 
December 9, Labor Party Whip Isaac Herzog echoed Peres' 
worries, and laid out a likely Labor Party timetable for 
approving a Sharon offer to join the coalition and possible 
ministerial assignments. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary cont'd:  In response to the Ambassador's 
query on the prospects of GOI negotiations with Syria, 
Peres stressed that it would not be feasible for the GOI to 
achieve settlement withdrawals both from Gaza and the Golan 
at the same time.  End summary. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Unity Prospects Hinge on Portfolio Divisions 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Labor Party leader Shimon Peres stressed to the 
Ambassador December 9 that if Prime Minister Sharon offers 
"meaningless portfolios" to Labor for joining the 
coalition, there are "limits" in his capacity to bring his 
party into the coalition.  Peres agreed with the Ambassador 
that this could present an immediate impasse in Labor's 
coalition negotiations with Likud.  Noting that Labor would 
constitute one-third of a unity coalition, Peres underlined 
that Sharon should understand that Labor should receive one 
or two major ministerial portfolios.  Sharon should 
understand that Labor can not be satisfied with 
"secondary" portfolios just to help Sharon pacify Likud 
opponents to a unity government, Peres emphasized. 
 
¶4.  (C) Peres explained that if Likud votes in favor of 
opening coalition negotiations with Labor -- as it did 
later December 9 with a 62 percent majority -- and Sharon 
immediately invites Peres to the negotiating table, Peres 
must first bring the issue before the Labor Party Bureau's 
240 members, which requires 48 hours notice before holding 
a meeting.  Obtaining the Bureau's approval will be a 
"tough fight," Peres said, since it includes many 
ministerial portfolio contenders.  If the Bureau approves 
negotiating with Likud, Peres continued, the matter must 
then be taken before the party's Central Committee for a 
vote.  He did not specify when such a vote could occur. 
 
¶5.  (C) Labor Party Whip Isaac Herzog subsequently told 
Ambassador Kurtzer separately December 9, however, that 
Peres could bring the matter to the Party Bureau for a vote 
as early as December 11, and then to the Central Committee 
during its previously scheduled meeting December 12 when 
the party is supposed to decide on a date for party 
primaries.  (Note: During the meeting with the Ambassador, 
Herzog received a call from Labor faction Chair Dalia Itzik 
to inform him that Ehud Barak and Peres had agreed on a 
compromise date for party primaries for June or July 2005, 
thereby avoiding a party showdown.  See reftel.  End 
note.) 
 
¶6.  (C) According to Herzog, Sharon intends to offer Peres 
eight ministerial portfolios, including what amounts to two 
ministerial portfolios in return for forgoing the foreign 
ministry.  In total, Sharon would offer 11 portfolios to 
Labor, UTJ and Shas, Herzog noted.  He said that Sharon 
would likely first bring Labor and the UTJ into the 
coalition and may even "find a way later" to return Shinui 
to the coalition.  Herzog opined that the main "stumbling 
block" in the portfolio negotiations will be that Sharon 
will not give Peres the portfolio of alternate prime 
minister, a post currently held by Likud MK and strong 
Sharon ally Ehud Olmert.  He said that Peres will likely be 
offered a role relating to implementing disengagement. 
Labor may ask for the ministries of Interior, 
Transportation, and Education, but Herzog quickly added, "I 
don't think we'll get them."  He opined that Sharon may 
offer instead the Internal Security and Labor and Welfare 
portfolios to Labor.  Herzog said that he believes Justice 
will remain with Likud MK Tzipi Livni. 
 
¶7.  (C) Herzog said that once a coalition agreement is 
reached with Likud, perhaps as early as December 16, Labor 
would then decide on its candidates for ministerial 
portfolios, most likely shortly after that decision.  He 
then shot off a list of Labor contenders for ministerial 
slots in order of importance, including Binyamin 
Ben-Eliezer, Ephraim Sneh, Matan Vilna'i, Dalia Itzik, 
himself, Ofir Pines-Paz, and Shalom Simhon.  Herzog noted 
several times in the meeting that he was showing up as 
"very popular" within the Labor Party.  These candidates 
would likely be voted as ministerial candidates through 
either separate internal party votes or by a single vote on 
a "coalition list" that Peres would propose.  Herzog opined 
that Chaim Ramon may not be popular enough within Labor to 
receive a portfolio.  In response to the Ambassador's 
query, Herzog said that Barak would not seek a portfolio. 
 
--------------------- 
Window of Opportunity 
--------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Peres noted said that while Sharon could create a 
majority government without Labor, such a coalition would 
not support disengagement.  Elections would likely be the 
result if a unity government with Labor can not be formed, 
Peres noted.  "I don't want this government to fall," Peres 
stressed, since elections would "waste five-to-six months" 
of 2005 and postpone implementation of the disengagement 
plan.  Reflecting his desire to join with Sharon now, Peres 
said that: "I feel if I don't put my strength into 
[advancing disengagement], it will not work.... I am 
fighting for a cause."  Peres noted that while he does not 
like the disengagement plan, it represents the best hope to 
move the peace process forward. 
 
¶9.  (C) Herzog also commented on the need to move 
disengagement forward speedily, but from the perspective 
that Peres himself is waning in strength and focus.  "Peres 
has the chance to help Sharon," Herzog stressed.  He noted, 
however, that there is only a small window of opportunity 
since Peres "is not the same...is weak and not focused." 
On Labor support for disengagement, Herzog explained that 
the three main constituencies in Labor -- the "good" 
settlement movement consisting of Kibbutzim and moshavs, 
the Israeli-Arab sector, and the veterans and elderly -- 
reluctantly support disengagement for varying reasons.  He 
stressed that to gain the support of the elderly, Labor 
would have to bring some economic benefits for that group 
to the coalition table with Likud.  "There will be a big 
debate on economic issues with Likud," Herzog stressed. 
"[Finance Minister Netanyahu] Bibi hates us and we hate 
Bibi," Herzog said. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Negotiations on the Golan, Not Now Feasible 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Asked by the Ambassador how he viewed opening 
negotiations with Syria, Peres noted that there is an 
"open" or public GOI position on this issue and a "private 
one."   Peres explained that the GOI's public position is 
that it cannot agree to negotiations with Syria while that 
country continues to host terrorist organizations. 
According to Peres, the GOI's realistic and private 
position is that Israel cannot -- for domestic reasons -- 
feasibly negotiate with Syria on settlement withdrawals 
from the Golan at the same time it moves forward with 
settlement withdrawal from Gaza.  Peres also noted it would 
be problematic for Israel to negotiate with President 
Assad, who represents only a minority in Syria and whose 
actions are based on his desire to improve his world image. 
 
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