This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 003106 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS TO TTIC WASHINGTON DC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC KCRM EFIN KHLS KPAO YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: YEMEN: ADDENDUM TO THE 2004 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: A. STATE 245841 
     ¶B. SANAA 2328 
     ¶C. SANAA 2021 
     ¶D. SANAA 2535 
 
¶1. Below is the text of Post's addendum to the 2004 Yemen 
submission to the annual terrorism report.  The text of the 
report and the addendum have also been forwarded to CT POCs 
via e-mail.  Report sent septel. 
 
The M/V Limburg Trial 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. For more detailed information on the M/V Limburg trial see 
refs B and C.  Details of convictions as follows: 
 
-- Omer Sa'id Jarallah, Fawzi al-Hababi, Mohammed al-Ammari, 
Fawzi al-Wajid Yasser Ali al-Madani were sentence to ten 
years in prison for their role in the 2002 attack on the 
French tanker the M/V Limburg. 
 
-- Fawza al-Rabi'ea and Abu Bakr al-Rabi'ea were sentence to 
ten years in prison for plotting to attack the Civil Aviation 
and Meteorology Authority. 
 
-- Ibrahim al-Howeid, Aref Saleh Mujalli, Mohammed Ali 
al-Daylami, Qassem al-Rayni, and Abdul-Ghani Dhayfan were 
sentenced to five years in prison for plotting to attack 
foreign embassies in Sanaa and to kill the U.S. Ambassador to 
Yemen. 
 
-- Salim al-Dulaymi and Khalid al-Juloab were sentence to 
three years in prison for forging documents for the purpose 
of carrying out terrorist attacks. 
 
-- Hizam Mujallad was sentence to death for the killing of a 
Ministry of Interior police officer while fleeing the attack 
on a Hunt Oil helicopter. 
 
The USS Cole Trial 
------------------ 
 
¶3. For more detailed information on the USS Cole trial see 
ref D.  The FBI provided the Attorney General's office with 
extensive case and DNA evidence to assure that the ROYG has 
all information required for prosecution, and assisted with 
courtroom security.  Details of convictions as follows: 
 
-- Ring leaders Jamal Badawi and Abd al-Rahim Nashiri (in 
absentia) received death sentences. 
 
-- Fahd al-Quso was sentence to ten years in prison for 
involvement in planning the attack. 
 
-- Ali Muhammed al-Murrakkab and Murad al-Surouri received 
were sentence to five years in prison for indirect 
involvement in planning the attack. 
 
-- Mamoun al-Mussawah was sentence to 8 years in prison for 
planning the attack. 
 
Jabber al-Banna 
--------------- 
 
¶4. Al-Banna is a dual U.S. - Yemeni national.  Despite 
Post,s continued calls for his extradition to the U.S., the 
ROYG maintains that it is constitutionally precluded from 
allowing it.  Post continues to work for his extradition. 
 
Response of Judicial System to Terrorism 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. The judicial system is slow and prosecution of terrorism 
cases is conducted on an ad-hoc basis.  The judicial system 
is subject to frequent interference by the Executive Branch. 
There is no term for terrorism under Yemeni law and CT 
related cases are prosecuted in the same manner as all 
criminal cases, with the exception that they are tried in a 
special penal court for "public danger.8  There are reports 
that the Ministry of Interior is authoring a new Terrorism 
Law, but it has yet to be considered by Parliament. 
 
Major Impediments to Prosecution 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6. On paper the Attorney General's Office (AG) is the primary 
investigative body.  In practice, the Ministry of Interior's 
(MOI) Political Security Organization (PSO)  conducts a 
"mirror process" and like the AG's office, the PSO has its 
own detention and investigation procedures.  PSO holds 
suspects indefinitely, whereas the AG must make a case 
against an individual or release him within 180 days. There 
is little or no cooperation between the PSO and the AG and 
often the cases of terror suspects are passed to the AG from 
the PSO to make a determination on prosecution without the 
sharing of any case evident. 
 
Extradition and assistance to U.S, requests 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. It is extremely difficult to extradite a suspect with 
Yemeni citizenship.  The Yemeni Constitution specifically 
prohibits extradition.  Negotiations are currently under way 
between the ROYG and USG redress the situation. 
 
Use of intelligence in investigation 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. It appears that the Cole and Limburg trials were conducted 
without the use of intelligence, although the suspects were 
in PSO custody prior to trial.  There are no restrictions on 
wiretapping and interception of communication. 
 
ROYG efforts to investigate terrorism 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. A new unit was created in the Ministry of Interior to 
investigate terrorism in November of this year.  Post does 
not know yet if this unit will be effective.  LEGATT has 
requested to establish a cooperative relationship with the 
new unit. 
 
Insurgency not related to GWOT 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. From June until early September, the ROYG Military and 
the Central Security Forces (CSF) were engaged in an 
increasingly bloody effort to put down an uprising in the 
Northern region of Sa'ada.  The insurgency was led by 
anti-American Shi'ite cleric Hussein Badr al Dein al-Houthi. 
Several hundred died on each side before the conflict ended 
September 10 with the fatal shooting of al-Houthi by Yemeni 
forces CSF attempting to capture him. 
KRAJESKI