This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 002996 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2014 
TAGS: PREL PTER ETTC SU IZ YM DEMARCHE
SUBJECT: DEMARCHES DELIVERED: SUPPORT FOR IRAQ ELECTIONS, 
WEAPONS OUT OF SUDAN 
 
REF: A. STATE 254809 
     ¶B. STATE 254293 
 
Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  DCM delivered ref A and B demarches on 
keeping weapons out of Sudan (ref A) and encouraging support 
for full participation in Iraqi elections to Deputy Foreign 
Minister Noman on December 1.  Pointing to President Saleh's 
on-again, off-again support for Coalition and IIG efforts, 
DCM pressed for a more consistent, positive ROYG support for 
the IIG and political process.  In response, Noman suggested 
that a phone call from Iraqi PM Allawi to President Saleh 
might break the ice between the two leaders.  On Sudan, Noman 
assured DCM that the ROYG has no plans to for a weapons deal 
with Khartoum.  End Summary. 
 
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ROYG does not intend to sell weapons to Khartoum 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2. (C) DCM shared USG concerns over the flow of weapons to 
Sudan, particularly at a time when progress in Darfur is 
fragile and the Africa Union mission to stabilize western 
Sudan ongoing, (ref B).  Noman replied that in an effort to 
ease the crisis Yemen has frequent diplomatic contacts with 
Khartoum, but that the ROYG does not intend to supply weapons 
to any party in the conflict. 
 
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Saleh runs hot and cold on IIG... 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Pointing to President Saleh's recent and contradictory 
statements concerning the IIG and coalition efforts in Iraq, 
DCM said it was critical that the ROYG join its neighbors and 
G8 partners by showing consistent support for the political 
process and for January 30 elections, (ref A).  (Note: During 
his recent European tour, Saleh harshly criticized the 
assault on Fallujah calling it a "massacre" and a "big 
mistake," and said the U.S. commitment to democracy is "in 
word only."  In an interview only days later, however, the 
President touted Yemen's partnership in the GWOT.  On Iraq, 
Saleh stated his support for coalition efforts and even 
offered to help in keeping the election process on time.  End 
Note). 
 
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...And all Politics is Personal 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Noman affirmed that the ROYG supported a peaceful 
transition.  DCM reflected that FM Zubari's visit to Sanaa 
took considerable groundwork but in the end was worthwhile. 
Noman suggested that an Allawi visit would be premature but 
that a phone call from the Iraqi PM reaching out to President 
Saleh might improve the President's tone.  "Saleh has a 
personal dislike for the man," confided the DFM,  "and 
everything for the President is personal."  DCM promised to 
share the idea with Washington and the IIG through their 
Embassy in Sanaa, adding that, personal feelings aside, it in 
the interest of all Iraqis, including Sunnis, and all 
regional players, including Yemen, to encourage the political 
process and timely elections in Iraq. 
KRAJESKI