This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS  ROME 004582 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 11) 
 
FROM U.S. MISSION IN ROME 
 
USDA/FAS FOR U/S PENN, MCHAMBLISS AND LREICH 
USAID FOR AA/DCHA WINTER, DAA/DCHA GARVELINK, DCHA/OFDA, 
DCHA/FFP 
STATE FOR A/S IO HOLMES, A/S PRM DEWEY, IO/EDA 
NSC FOR JMELINE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF EAGR PHUM AORC WFP FAO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR TONY P. HALL'S TRIP TO DARFUR 
HIGHLIGHTS ABUSES AND CONTINUED NEEDS 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  Ambassador Tony Hall led a delegation of staff and 
journalists to Sudan's Darfur states on November 18 through 
¶20.  The purpose of the visit was to witness first-hand the 
dire situation and to observe U.N. operations, principally 
those of the World Food Program (WFP) and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO).  Through many interviews, 
meetings and statements with officials and international 
and local press, Ambassador Hall emphasized the significant 
contributions of emergency assistance from the American 
people.  (The visit received extensive press coverage.) He 
visited four camps housing internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), talking with many of the IDPs themselves.  He met 
with U.N. agency staff and NGO implementers, discussing 
their humanitarian operations and prospects for safe return 
of IDPs (and refugees in Chad) to their homes.  The 
delegation visited the recently demolished camp of al-Jeer 
(by the Government of Sudan) in South Darfur, and flew over 
nine razed and burned villages in West Darfur. 
 
¶2.  The visit, which took place at the time of the U.N. 
Security Council's meeting in Nairobi, presented a sobering 
view of a humanitarian crisis that may continue to spiral 
downward.  A lack of security is preventing U.N. agencies 
and NGOs from fully implementing their mandate to serve the 
region's most needy.  A poor harvest, which FAO estimates 
to be 15 to 50 percent of past yields, will lead to more 
farmers requiring food aid, perhaps as soon as March.  At 
that point, WFP is expected to increase its operations from 
1.1 to 1.3 million persons fed  as it is now  to 2.3 
million persons per month.  Insecurity, more importantly, 
prevents IDPs from returning to their homes in time for the 
next planting season in May/June 2005.   Another crop 
failure in 2005 could guarantee the need for several more 
years of feeding and providing for a growing share of the 
region's estimated 6 million population.  WFP's emergency 
feeding program (EMOP) for Darfur alone (not including 
refugees in Chad) is estimated to cost $361 million for 
calendar year 2005. 
 
¶3. Sudanese officials whom Amb. Hall met denied any 
responsibility and pinned the blame on rebels.  All said 
the GOS would honor the commitments contained in the two 
o 
protocols on security and humanitarian operations, which 
were brokered by the African Union.  End summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Site Visits  Day One 
--------------------- 
 
¶4.  Ambassador Tony Hall, USUN/Rome, visited Khartoum and 
all three Darfur states during a three-day visit from 
November 18  20.  The Ambassador was accompanied by two 
staff persons, an agriculture advisor, and four 
journalists.  WP's and FAO's emergency coordinators for 
DQrfur also traveled with the delegation.  After Q brief 
stop in Khartoum, the group traveled t al-Fasher, the 
capital of North Darfur, where it met with U.N. agency 
representatives, the SAID DART, and NGOs.  WFP's head of 
office in al-Fasher explained that more than one-third of 
North Darfur's 1.6 million persons have become displaced as 
a result of the conflict.  One-third of the schools are 
closed, six of eleven hospitals have been destroyed, and 
one-third of the 69 pharmacies have been wiped out.  The 
e 
state has suffered from drought continually over the past 
four years, which has adversely affected livestock and 
crops. 
 
¶5.  A lack of a secure environment has hampered 
humanitarian operations.  The WFP representative explained 
 
 
that only recently were major roads leading into and out of 
al-Fasher declared safe by the GOS.  This allowed 
humanitarian operations to start in previously unserved 
areas.  For example, in Kutum, a town northwest of al- 
Fasher, humanitarian workers witnessed more than 100,000 
IDPs, most of whom were taking shelter under trees.  The 
environment is in constant flux with towns and IDP camps 
being classified "permissive" or "non-permissive" on a 
daily basis.  (Note:  This was proved again 72 hours after 
the delegation left, when further attacks closed all of 
North Darfur outside of al-Fasher to UN and NGO personnel. 
End note.) 
 
¶6.  WFP and implementing partners were preparing to make 
food deliveries for Malha, a town northeast of al-Fasher 
and under government control, which would have marked the 
first distribution of food in eight weeks.  Trucks left on 
November 20th on their way to Malha while the delegation was 
in West Darfur, but they were turned back because of 
skirmishes between government and rebel forces.  In the 
north alone, WFP estimates that it is not reaching more 
than 100,000 targeted persons. 
¶7.  Ambassador Hall visited two IDP camps, abu-Shouk and 
Zam Zam.  Abu-Shouk, the larger of the two with a 
population estimated at greater than 40,000, is a well-run 
camp.  One of the humanitarian workers who met Ambassador 
Hall referred to it as "the Hilton of camps" because of 
food availability, good organization, and extensive 
services, including supplementary and therapeutic feeding 
units, health care services, etc.  Supplementary feeding 
targets the most vulnerable, mainly pregnant and lactating 
mothers, and children under five, and is reaching an 
estimated 2,000 persons a week.  IRC runs five health 
clinics in and around al-Fasher, including a health clinic 
within abu-Shouk.  It employs local doctors who in addition 
to working at IRC clinics must continue to provide services 
at state health clinics or hospitals.  Since many of the 
hospitals and clinics suffered damage, some of the doctors 
are working exclusively at IRC clinics, whose services are 
open to IDPs and the general population alike.  (Note: IRC 
said the EU is rebuilding several of the damaged clinics 
and hospitals.) 
¶8.  In contrast to abu-Shouk, the Zam Zam camp is less 
organized and grew out of a spontaneous gathering of IDPs. 
It is smaller in size  perhaps 15,000 persons  and lacks 
some of the services of abu-Shouk.  It is less sanitary as 
well, with livestock living among the human population. 
 
¶9.  The Ambassador spoke with women who had been abused and 
raped by Jenjaweed forces and GOS police.  Some were afraid 
to speak, fearing retaliation.  (It is widely reported that 
GOS security personnel frequently roam the camps to collect 
information and to intimidate victims from reporting any 
crimes against them.  Several alleged security persons were 
pointed out to the delegation.) 
 
¶10.  The first day ended with the Ambassador's courtesy 
call on the governor (Wali), Osman Kobor.  The governor 
started off with a relaxed discussion of the need to 
broaden 
 beneficiaries of WFP feeding programs to include 
people affected by the drought.  As he went on, he became 
noticeably upset while bringing up the labeling of the 
problems in Darfur as genocide by the USG.  At that point 
he blamed the rebels for everything from armed fighting to 
the drought.  (WFP's country director Ramiro da Silvo had 
briefed Ambassador Hall back in October on what the 
governor would likely say.  Kobor followed it as if he were 
reading from a script.)  He concluded by saying it is not a 
fight among ethnic groups or tribes, it is conflict over 
limited resources, including land. 
 
 
South and West Darfur 
--------------------- 
 
¶11.  On the second day in Nyala, South Darfur's capital, 
the OCHA representative chaired a session with U.N. 
agencies and NGOs.  The meeting lacked energy, as most 
attendees declined to speak.  (This was likely due to two 
factors: the presence of international journalists and 
exhaustion.)  He explained that humanitarian operations got 
into full swing only in August, when staffing among all 
agencies and NGOs reached minimally acceptable levels. 
However, this was soon followed by a steadily worsening 
security situation, which limits the reach of humanitarian 
groups.  In the last 30 days, approximately 80,000 persons 
from Jabel Marreh (the fertile mountains and hills where 
the three Darfur states converge) have become displaced. 
With an ever-increasing population of IDPs, the system set 
up to provide marginal support is becoming overstressed. 
The GOS insists that people are returning to their homes, 
often citing the figure 77,000, but no outside group has 
been able to corroborate that number.  Instead there is 
widespread fear and mistrust of the government by the 
communities. 
 
¶12.  To make matters worse, the OCHA representative briefly 
discussed a potentially explosive issue over property 
rights  an issue the Ambassador later raised with the 
Sudanese State Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs (see 
para. 18, below).  According to a 1982 land law, any land 
left idle for one year or more can legally be taken over by 
squatters.  OCHA and other U.N. agency representatives 
speculated that perhaps there was a more sinister purpose 
to keeping people off their lands: comprehensive land 
redistribution.  For many IDPs, the one-year mark will be 
reached in April 2005. 
 
¶13.  At Kalma, just south of Nyala, the camp is a massive 
sprawl stretching for seven kilometers, and resembling a 
small (and very poor) city.  WFP estimates the rolls at 
more than 113,000 persons, a number which on average is 
growing by 1,000 a day.  The delegation witnessed "ghost 
settlements" within the camp, which are essentially shells 
of shelter used only when food distributions take place. 
The real number of "full-time" residents is estimated 
around 70,000.  One of the nurses told horrific accounts of 
women brutalized and raped by Jenjaweed.  She recounted the 
story of one woman brought to the clinic who had been gang- 
raped by eight men.  One pregnant woman, who left camp in 
search of firewood, was not only raped but at the end of 
the ordeal had a stick inserted in her, which caused an 
abortion.  This was the most gruesome of the stories the 
delegation heard.  Whether or not the discussions were 
monitored by government authorities it is not certain. 
Perhaps it was coincidence, but shortly after the visit the 
GOS issued a decree preventing residents of Kalma from 
gathering firewood.  (Firewood is the only cooking fuel.) 
 
¶14.  By helicopter the delegation flew into Zalingei in 
West Darfur to observe the first food distribution in seven 
weeks.  Despite this the CARE-run program was well 
organized and orderly.  Women and children waited patiently 
in long lines while local CARE staff measured out rations. 
Signs were posted everywhere in Arabic and English.  (The 
English version of the "exit" sign read "Exist"  an 
appropriate imperative.)  No one was visibly angry over 
having missed rations for the previous month; they were 
just thankful for the food they got that day and for the 
help from the U.S.  When some of the women heard that the 
delegation was from the United States, they were extremely 
grateful and thanked the Ambassador often. 
 
-------------------- 
Meeting with Humanitarian Affairs Minister 
-------------------- 
 
 
¶15.  Back in Khartoum at the end of the visit, the 
Ambassador gave a blunt account of what he witnessed to 
State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, Mohamed Yousif. 
The Ambassador used the meeting to raise four issues: 1) 
local taxes being assessed on WFP's locally procured food; 
2) GOS cancellation of FAO/WFP joint crop assessment; 3) 
access from Chad or Libya for food distribution; and 4) the 
1982 land tenure law.  After blaming the international 
community for the problems in Sudan, the State Minister 
briefly addressed each of the Ambassador's issues.  On 
local taxation of food, he explained that a reimbursement 
system is in place; WFP simply has to apply for any taxes 
it has paid. 
 
¶16.  Earlier in the year, a joint FAO-WFP team concluded a 
food and crop assessment of southern Sudan.  At the end of 
November the team was going to conduct an assessment of 
northern Sudan, which includes Darfur.  Earlier, we had 
been told by FAO that the assessment was canceled.   Yousif 
clarified the GOS position: they had not canceled the 
assessment but were negotiating with FAO-WFP the process 
through which the study would be reviewed.  The GOS is 
arguing for government clearance through the Ministry of 
Agriculture before the report is released.  He said he saw 
no reason for the assessment to be canceled. 
 
¶17.  On using an overland corridor from Chad or Libya into 
Darfur, Yousif said the GOS would not allow unlimited or 
unencumbered access of food into Darfur, but might allow 
shipments on a case-by-case basis.  This issue, he said, 
would be raised with the foreign ministry.  He also 
mentioned that their decision would be influenced by 
economic factors, a reference to the cheaper route from 
Port Sudan and desire for the business to stay within 
Sudan. 
 
¶18.  On the land tenure law of 1982, Yousif sought to allay 
everyone's fears by stating the law does not apply to 
Darfur.  The intent of the law was meant to prevent fertile 
agriculture land from being kept idle.   In Darfur, the 
situation is different.  He said in Abuja the agreement was 
people would be allowed to return to their land  the GOS 
will honor that commitment. 
 
¶19.  Following a meeting with representatives of the U.N. 
country team, Ambassador Hall held a press conference in 
Khartoum (the first since the end of Ramadan).  His trip 
and statement generated considerable coverage, ranging from 
local Sudanese papers to Middle East Broadcasting (MBC) and 
Knight Ridder newspapers throughout the U.S. 
 
------------- 
Observations 
------------- 
 
¶20.  Insecurity is the overriding issue.  The people will 
not, nor should they, return to their homes without some 
reasonable assurance of safety.  That assurance does not 
now exist, and it is not likely to come in the near term. 
Keeping people in camps jeopardizes next year's harvest, 
which will worsen the livelihoods of people in Darfur and 
add even more people to the dole.  Trust in government is 
necessary, but what is also needed in the short term are 
ways of resurrecting traditional means of resolving tribal 
conflict.  One Sheikh from the Arab Zayy!diyah tribe of 
North Darfur told us of Qadhdhai's Tripoli initiative of 
bringing tribal leaers together to begin a dialog of 
reconciliatQon.  The delegation discussed this initiative 
with the U.S. Mission in Tripoli. 
 
¶21.  Humanitarian agencies seem to be understaffed.  (####) 
 
petent staff.  With WF(##) 
than double its feedihe buildup of 
internatiw.  One critique of so 
E 
 
 
the NGOs is that the staff was often not familiar with 
complex humanitarian emergencies involving conflict.  This 
may contribute to exaggerated numbers of registered IDPs. 
 
¶22.  Apparitions appear in camps just in time for food 
distributions.  Registered beneficiaries far exceed actual 
camp residents -- WFP estimates as much as 30 percent. 
There is little doubt that even those who do not live in 
camps are in great need of food, but they are likely less 
at risk than those who have been displaced (in camps or 
otherwise).  Now that the infrastructure is in place for 
feeding people, more attention needs to be given to proper 
registration. 
 
¶23.  Insecurity causes unpredictable gaps in food 
deliveries.  Some 300,000 or more people are not being fed 
because they are not safely reachable.  Airdrops may be one 
means of assuring delivery. 
 
---------------------- 
Ambassador's Comments 
---------------------- 
 
¶24.  The suffering of the people of Darfur is overwhelming. 
I listened to stories of women raped, men beaten, tortured, 
and murdered, villages burned, and saw people barely 
hanging on to life.  Insecurity prevents us from reaching 
more than 300,000 persons who somehow continue to survive. 
It also means that continual and reliable food distribution 
is not assured from week to week.  If the displaced are 
unable to return home shortly, another, more serious crop 
failure looms.  The situation is desperate, but based on 
what I saw and heard it will likely get worse. 
 
¶25.  On a less pessimistic note, the thousands of people we 
saw in camps seemed to be hopeful and thankful for the 
hundreds of million dollars in U.S. emergency assistance. 
Attendance at press conferences and general media interest 
were high.  Using what we saw and learned, my Mission's 
priority in the coming months will be to keep Darfur at the 
top of the list of donor countries in Rome.  With the UN 
consolidated appeal (work plan) for all Sudan reaching $1.5 
billion for the coming year, donors must be prepared to 
make early and very generous contributions. 
 
¶26.  The commitment and personal sacrifice of the thousand 
or more humanitarian workers is astounding.  The USAID 
DART, WFP, and FAO have all posted excellent teams who 
persevere in extreme conditions.  My gratitude and prayers 
go out to them. 
 
¶27.  Minimize considered.  HALL 
 
 
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 2004ROME04582 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED