This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001577 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2014 
TAGS: PREF PGOV PHUM KISL BM NGO
SUBJECT: UNHCR'S THIN BLUE LINE BETWEEN THE SPDC AND 
STATELESS MUSLIMS 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 355 
     ¶B. 03 RANGOON 258 
     ¶C. RANGOON 1524 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶D. RANGOON 1136 
     ¶E. DHAKA 4118 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The UN's refugee agency has essentially 
exhausted its mandate to oversee repatriation operations 
along the Bangladesh border in northern Rakhine State and 
settled into an uneasy but crucial role providing a wide 
umbrella of protection, and coordinating basic relief 
services, for the region's 800,000 stateless and repressed 
Rohingya Muslims.  UNHCR, and several of its dozen 
implementing partners, conclude that the Burmese regime's 
repressive treatment of the Muslim population makes the 
region ripe for Islamic militancy.  It is clear that the 
presence of UNHCR and INGOs helps to limit the appeal of 
extremism and to protect the local population from even 
broader regime abuses.  However, any of the SPDC's harsh 
tools of repression that could fuel extremism are also the 
same means by which the regime will likely thwart such 
activity.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Our December 8-10 trip to northern Rakhine State 
(NRS), organized by UNHCR for over a dozen Rangoon and 
Bangkok diplomats, was our most recent opportunity to visit 
this politically sensitive and remote area.  The GOB 
prohibits tourists, foreign and domestic, from visiting the 
heavily military controlled region and reluctantly grants 
permission to diplomats traveling under the auspices of the 
UNHCR.  According to UNHCR resident representative Rajiv 
Kapur, recent political changes in Burma almost led to the 
cancellation of the December trip until SPDC Senior General 
Than Shwe personally issued a "last-minute" authorization. 
 
You Have the Right to....Just About Nothing 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) As during previous UNHCR trips (refs A and B), we 
witnessed first-hand a stunning and systematic array of 
regime tactics aimed at repressing Rakhine State's nearly 
800,000 Rohingya Muslims, one-third of whom are refugee 
returnees from Bangladesh.  Restrictions and abuses include, 
but are not limited to: denial of Burmese citizenship 
(despite birth in Burma or generations of residency); 
high-level permission required for marriage, movement between 
villages, and employment; widespread forced labor and 
compulsory contributions; a complete lack of due process; a 
prohibition on ownership of land and on state employment; 
limited access to post-secondary education; a moratorium on 
construction or refurbishing of mosques; restrictions on 
public celebrations of holidays; and a requirement that many 
consumables and services be purchased solely through 
state-designated agents. 
 
¶4. (SBU) An additional regime tactic has been the ongoing 
construction of "model villages" for ethnic Burmans 
(Buddhists) relocated from other parts of Burma in exchange 
for housing and arable land.  At least 22 model villages are 
in operation, built with local forced labor.  The 
self-contained enclaves, which include schools and health 
clinics and are strictly off-limits to Muslims, are 
reportedly a pet project of Than Shwe's and are designed to 
"mitigate" the three percent population growth among 
Rohingya.  The model villages, highly resented by locals, are 
a dismal failure as many of the urbanite Burman "pioneers" 
quickly abandon their isolated homesteads.  The GOB has 
countered this attrition by populating the latest model 
villages with ex-convicts and former insurgents, surrounding 
the compounds with barbed wire and armed guards. 
 
"The UN High Commissioner for Refugees....and Human Rights" 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶5. (U) UNHCR's primary objectives in NRS are to facilitate 
the voluntary repatriation of remaining camp residents in 
Bangladesh (about 19,800 Rohingya, the majority of whom have 
indicated no desire to return to Burma) and to ensure the 
sustainable reintegration of vulnerable groups among those 
who have returned (a total of over 236,000 since 1992) and 
among those who did not flee during the 1991-92 exodus 
(roughly 550,000).  As it has for several years (ref A and 
B), the UNHCR supports or collaborates with twelve 
international NGOs and three GOB-affiliated entities in 
providing a wide range of successful reintegration activities 
including health care, community services, language training, 
income generation, agricultural support, and various feeding 
programs. 
 
¶6. (C) UNHCR's role in facilitating voluntary repatriation, 
however, has diminished significantly.  In 2004, less than 
200 refugees have repatriated through official channels, 
leaving UNHCR to focus almost exclusively on protection and 
reintegration issues.  Senior UNHCR staff admit that the 
organization has taken on what is largely a human rights 
function, protecting the repressed Muslim population as well 
as the international NGOs that operate in the region.  NGO 
officials and local community leaders alike expressed concern 
that should UNHCR terminate its presence in the region, no 
other entity could duplicate its protection and coordination 
role, leaving the Rohingya and the NGOs even more vulnerable 
to the excesses of the military regime. 
 
Adding Fuel to the Fire? 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) UNHCR and NGO staff reported that prior to a 
Rangoon-directed purge of former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt's 
military intelligence apparatus (ref C), the MI component of 
the local Border Immigration Headquarters (known as "NaSaKa") 
played a leading role in the bullying and repression of the 
Rohingya population.  In the post-purge era, MI has all but 
"disappeared."  However, initial breathing room appears to be 
short-lived, as regular Army units and Special Branch police 
have replaced MI with, according to UNHCR and NGOs, "even 
more restrictive measures." 
 
¶8. (C) The combination of decades of centrally directed 
repression, a virtual Burmese military "cordon" that 
surrounds the northern Rakhine region, and a porous border 
with neighboring Bangladesh creates what UNHCR and several 
NGOs described as a situation "ripe for Islamic militancy." 
One UNHCR senior official said, "it is clear that a sea of 
idle, unemployed men--denied citizenship and the right to 
marriage, and living in close proximity to well-funded 
organizations in Bangladesh--have nowhere to vent their 
frustrations and are easy pickings for Muslim extremists 
hungry for safe-havens and new adherents." 
 
Comment: Ripe for Extremists But Rotten for Extremism 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶9. (C) Rohingya Muslims, among Burma's most repressed 
populations, face a hopeless and uncertain future and, with 
repatriation slowed to a mere trickle, UNHCR's original 
mandate has been largely fulfilled.  However, UNHCR continues 
to play a crucial protection role and has demonstrated a 
capability to take the regime to task over sensitive issues 
in this region (ref D).  Resident cards issued to all 
returnees, a reduction in forced labor incidents, and a 
softening of restrictions on INGOs are but a few of UNHCR's 
recent achievements.  We are hard-pressed to identify a 
successor organization if/when UNHCR departs.  The ICRC, for 
example, would be unable to provide protection for other 
INGOs; the UNDP would have no capacity to tangle with 
authorities over human rights abuses; and no organization 
would be as likely as UNHCR to provide the international 
community with regular assessments on regime abuses and 
growing discontent among the repressed Muslim population. 
 
¶10. (C) On the issue of extremism in northern Rakhine State, 
we agree with UNHCR that hopeless conditions make the region 
"ripe for militancy" and the presence of UNHCR and INGOs 
helps limit the appeal of extremism.  However, the SPDC's 
harsh tools of repression are the very means by which the 
regime thwarts either extremism or political opposition.  The 
Burmese Army has succeeded in rendering ineffective such 
insurgent movements as the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front and 
the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, groups that are now 
dormant if not extinct.  The SPDC has also banned Muslim 
political parties, including the pro-democracy National 
Democratic Party for Human Rights and its four Rohingya 
elected to Parliament in 1990.  Furthermore, strict 
restrictions on movement and assembly; an imposing military 
presence; and prison terms for the most minor of infractions 
are imposing obstacles to any would-be extremists.  End 
Comment. 
MARTINEZ