This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

271639Z Dec 04

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 009137 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/WE-JLEVIN, EB/TRA-ARADETSKY, DS-JHAWLEY 
DHS FOR TSA-INTL AFFAIRS-DTIEDGE, CHINN AND AVIATION OPS 
ICE FOR FOREIGN OPS DIVISION 
CBP FOR OIA-KTHOMSEN 
FBI HQ WASHINGTON FOR COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION-SSA 
KVONKLEINSMID AND INTL OPERATIONS-SAC TFUENTES 
FBI NY FOR SAC CFRAHM AND CSSA NDONOVAN 
BRUSSELS FOR TSA AND USEU-SCRISTINA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2014 
TAGS: EAIR PTER FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE:  UPDATE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY 
AMENDMENTS; ACTION REQUEST RE IPSI FOR AIR FRANCE 
 
REF: A. STATE 170673 
 
     ¶B. PARIS 4556 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ALEX WOLFF, EMBASSY PARIS 
FOR REASONS 1.4B AND D. 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: Following considerable 
Embassy effort to bring about GOF coordination, the French 
Government finally has issued a directive requiring air 
carrier compliance with the No Fly and Selectee Emergency 
Amendments (EAs).  The directive effectively gives Air France 
(AF) the long-sought green light to implement security 
procedures described in the EAs issued by the U.S. 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), as modified by 
mutual agreement (reftels).  With French compliance on the No 
Fly and Selectee lists now in implementation,  Embassy 
requests that TSA reassign the procedural notification and 
air carrier contact function in cases where a French carrier 
has boarded a suspected no-fly passenger on a flight for the 
U.S., from the International Principal Security Inspector 
(IPSI) in Brussels to the TSA Attache in Paris.  Post,s 
experience with No-Fly cases in the month of November showed 
that the existing IPSI arrangement risks confusing lines of 
communication painstakingly worked out with the GOF regarding 
implementation of the EAs and GOF/French airline notification 
to the Embassy in No Fly cases.   END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) Colonel Henri Schlienger, Aviation Security, General 
Secretariat for National Defense (SGDN) informed the Embassy 
 
SIPDIS 
Paris TSA attach on December 13 that Prime Minister Raffarin 
had signed a directive to the French Border Police (PAF) and 
the Ministry of Transport to require French airlines, 
immediate compliance with outstanding Emergency Amendments on 
the use of No Fly and Selectee Lists.   The Directorate 
General for Civil Aviation (DGAC) issued a directive on 
December 10 to all French air carriers with flights to the 
U.S. to comply with the No-Fly and Selectee procedures. 
Economic Minister-Counselor confirmed with Air France 
officials on December 14 that they had received the 
directive. 
 
¶3.  (C) The issuance of the two directives by the Prime 
Minister and DGAC follows extensive Embassy efforts with the 
Foreign Minister, SGDN, the Interior Ministry, DGAC and Air 
France in recent weeks to bring about effective GOF 
coordination and the drafting of written procedures, insisted 
upon by Air France.  Embassy will monitor closely GOF and Air 
France implementation of the Emergency Amendments.  A 
follow-up meeting between Legatt, TSA, Econoffs and the 
Border Police (PAF) took place on  December 20.  Since then, 
AF and PAF have been huddling daily with TSA and Legatt to 
solve technical impediments. 
 
¶4.  (C) With full Air France implementation of the Emergency 
Amendments, Embassy sees the need to change the designation 
of the IPSI for Air France in cases where it is determined 
that a French carrier has boarded a no-fly passenger and 
French authorities must be notified.  The role of notifier in 
such cases is currently TSA Brussels.  However, post 
discovered during the three November No-Fly incidents 
involving Air France that the current arrangement risks 
confusing the lines of communication carefully worked out 
between Embassy Paris, the GOF and Air France for the 
handling of suspected No Fly and Selectee cases. 
 
¶5.  (C) Current TSA procedures have TSA Washington notifying 
the IPSI for a designated airline when that airline is 
suspected to have boarded a passenger whose name appears on 
the No Fly list.  In the two No Fly cases involving Air 
France on November 20, TSA Washington notification was made 
to the IPSI at TSA Brussels.  TSA Paris was only notified 
subsequently.  Our arrangement with the GOF and Air France, 
developed in conjunction with TSA Washington, relies heavily 
on communication between the Embassy (TSA, Legatt DCM), GOF 
(SGDN and PAF) and Air France.  The GOF has insisted that 
there be a strong GOF-Embassy connection in the 
implementation of the Emergency Amendments.  Unless Embassy 
Paris (via the TSA Paris attache) is notified immediately and 
directly by Washington of suspected No Fly violations, we put 
at risk effective coordination and cooperation with the GOF. 
 
¶6.  (C) ACTION REQUEST.  Embassy requests Department 
assistance in working with TSA Washington to reassign the 
procedural notification and the air carrier contact function 
of the International Principal Security Inspector (IPSI) in 
Brussels to the TSA attach in Paris, in cases where a 
suspected no-fly passenger has boarded a French carrier bound 
for the United States.  It is understood that this unique 
transfer of duties would give the TSA attach the sole 
responsibility of contacting the designated air carrier and 
resolving any issues concerning suspected no-fly and selectee 
passengers thus streamlining communication between the USG, 
GOF and Air France. 
Wolff