This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 009133 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/25/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM DJ ER ET KE SO SU TZ UG XW XA FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE AND EAST AFRICA 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  France's principal long-term concern in East 
Africa is the management of its relations with Djibouti where 
it maintains a large permanent military presence.  The crisis 
in Darfur has prompted a more active French policy with 
regard to Sudan, but it remains largely a "Chad problem" for 
the GOF.  Elsewhere, France's engagement arises from its 
presence on the UNSC and its interests in addressing the 
crisis in the Great Lakes.  END SUMMARY. 
 
DJIBOUTI 
 
¶2. (C) The 2,873 French troops in Djibouti represents the 
largest permanent deployment of French forces outside French 
territory worldwide (3,267 troops in Kosovo and nearly 5,000 
currently in Cote d'Ivoire are not permanent deployments). 
In addition to maintaining a presence in the region, the 
military benefits from the ability to engage in maneuvers 
using live rounds, practically impossible anywhere in 
metropolitan France.  France welcomes the U.S. military 
presence in Djibouti but is concerned about the increased 
terrorist threat level for the 6,000 French military 
dependents and the burden for its forces charged with 
Djibouti's external security.  France's dominant role in 
Djibouti leads them to expect that the USG inform France (as 
well as Djibouti) on all military operations initiated from 
Djiboutian territory.  Embassy Djibouti reporting notes that 
contact between French and U.S. diplomats and military 
officials on the ground is continual, with close cooperation 
and collaboration. 
 
¶3. (C) The French repeatedly express concern to us that our 
military presence should not provide Djibouti with a pretext 
to play the USG and GOF against each other in a bidding war 
for development assistance.  Whether coincidentally or not, 
following the announcement early in 2003, of a USD 31 million 
assistance package for Djibouti, the GOF announced a 30 
million Euro package roughly equivalent to our own at 
then-prevailing exchange rates. 
 
¶4. (C) As with a number of other African countries, France's 
relations with Djibouti are complicated by a French judicial 
investigation.  The Djibouti case concerns the 1995 death 50 
miles north of the Djiboutian capital of French judge Bernard 
Borrel.  Borrel was in Djibouti investigating the 1990 
bombing of the Cafe de Paris in Djibouti.  The Borrel affair 
became inflamed in April 2004, when an attorney for Borrel's 
widow implicated Djiboutian President Ismael Omar Guelleh 
(IOG) in her husband's death.  In response, Djibouti, which 
claims Borrel's death was the result of suicide, demanded 
that the GOF clear Guelleh, essentially requiring the 
executive branch to intervene in a judicial investigation. 
France refused, but subsequently assured IOG that he would be 
immune from questioning during his August 2004, and 
subsequent, visits to France as head of state. 
 
¶5. (C) Notwithstanding the view of French officials that IOG 
is an occasionally difficult partner, unlikely to use any 
form of assistance for the benefit of the Djiboutian people, 
France is reluctant to challenge Djibouti on human rights 
concerns.  For example despite consideration at senior levels 
of the GOF, the arrest in 2003 of imprisoned journalist Daher 
Ahmed Farah elicited no criticism by France.  Similarly, the 
GOF took no public position regarding the announcement by 
Djibouti in September 2003 of its intent to expel foreigners 
from the country. 
 
ETHIOPIA/ERITREA 
 
¶6. (C) France has no dog in the Ethiopia/Eritrea fight but, 
as a permanent Security Council member, is obliged to remain 
informed, if not engaged.  By way of illustration, we saw and 
heard nothing from the GOF regarding the violence in Gambella 
in December 2003.  Our limited contacts on the border issue 
have revealed a slight tilt in favor of Eritrea, including a 
suggestion that the USG, notwithstanding our strategic 
interests in Ethiopia, make some form of gesture towards 
Asmara.  With the situation currently still at an impasse, 
French officials have indicated a willingness to consider a 
reduction in UNMEE troop levels should the UNSYG so recommend. 
 
SUDAN 
 
¶7. (C) In what may be a post-modern Fashoda scenario, our 
contacts have repeatedly stressed to us that the GOF seeks to 
avoid complicating USG-led efforts to bring peace to Sudan. 
MFA officials have taken care to consult with us before, 
during, and after any travel to Sudan by French officials. 
We are repeatedly told that the GOS would never have taken 
steps towards peace with the SPLA absent the Sudan Peace Act 
and continued high-level USG pressure.  However, the 
emergence of the crisis in Darfur, which for France is a 
problem because of its relationship with Chad, has obliged 
the French to be more active, leading to reports of bad 
feeling between USG and French diplomats in the field. 
France sees ties between Chadian President Deby's ethnic 
Zaghawa kinsmen and the Darfur rebels, and the refugees 
entering Chad from Darfur as potentially leading to the fall 
of Deby's regime. 
 
¶8. (C) Beyond their concerns for the stability of Chad, the 
GOF also fears that too much pressure on the Khartoum regime 
could cause it to fall, leading to either a Turabist faction 
taking control, or to a Somalia scenario in which there is no 
authority with which the international community could engage 
to end the conflict in Darfur.  The GOF is highly skeptical 
about the SLM and JEM rebel movements, asserting variously 
that their demands are unclear or unrealistic.  However, 
former FM de Villepin, during his February 2004 visit to 
Sudan, offered to host a conference to bring together the GOS 
and the rebels.  The GOS refused the offer and, with Villepin 
gone and talks having begun in Abuja, the offer is now almost 
certainly off the table. 
 
SOMALIA 
 
¶9. (C) Following a period of debate within the GOF post 9/11, 
based on the assumption that the USG might undertake military 
activity, French engagement on Somalia has been limited to 
pro-forma messages of support from President Chirac to TNG 
President Abdiqasim Salad Hasan (in March 2002), and to 
Abdallah Yusuf Ahmed (in October 2004) following his 
selection as President of the Federal Republic of Somalia. 
 
KENYA, TANZANIA AND UGANDA 
 
¶10. (C) Despite claims that France has broadened its Africa 
policy to engage with Anglophone states as well as former 
colonies and other French-speaking nations, French engagement 
with Anglophone east African nations is almost solely focused 
on the roles played by those countries in the Great Lakes. 
The French see Uganda as continuing to manipulate events in 
northeastern DRC, and occasionally express concern about 
Tanzanian support for Burundian rebel groups, or moves to 
refoule Burundian refugees.  The French know, and admit, that 
their influence is limited and seek to engage us and the 
British to influence Kampala and Dar on Great Lakes issues. 
 
¶11. (U) KHARTOUM MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
Wolff