This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 009130 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUCOM FOR POLAD SNELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/25/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM AO BC LT MI MZ WA SF WZ ZA ZI ZU XA FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: This is the first of several messages 
reviewing France's relations with Africa.  The southern 
African region currently attracts less French attention than 
any other region of Africa.  With no francophone countries, 
and only one country currently engaged in conflict (Angola, 
at much lower levels than in the past), the region is not 
central to France's political interests and its engagements 
are relatively limited.  The GOF's problems with Angola over 
a judicial investigation into arms trafficking, however, have 
created political difficulties and may have repercussions for 
French petroleum interests.  High-level contacts between 
France and South Africa have increased in recent years and, 
as currently demonstrated in Cote d'Ivoire, Presidents Chirac 
and Mbeki have established a dialogue on crisis resolution. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
ANGOLA 
 
¶2. (C) Since the death of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002, 
France has not had to contend with Angolan complaints about 
French support, particularly from the politicians on the 
right of the political spectrum such as former Defense 
Minister Leotard, for UNITA.  Similarly, we have seen no 
recent public claims by Angola of French support for the FLEC 
(Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda). 
According to the MFA, many FLEC leaders are in Paris, and 
Daniel Antonio Rosa, a member of the Angolan intelligence 
service working from the Angolan Embassy, is charged with 
monitoring their activities, occasionally meeting with them 
to "buy them off." 
 
¶3. (C) However, the judicial investigation into the affairs 
of French businessman Pierre Falcone, allegedly involved in 
supplying arms to Angola in 1993-94 in violation of the 1991 
Bicesse Agreement between the GRA and UNITA, continues to 
complicate Franco/Angolan relations, with press reports of 
Angolan threats to French petroleum interests.  According to 
the MFA, the traffic in arms was not in itself illegal, but 
Falcone and others implicated in the "Angolagate" affair 
failed to comply with a law dating from 1939 (resulting from 
arms trafficking during the Spanish Civil War), requiring 
French nationals to report such activities to the government. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Apparently unreceptive to, or uncomprehending of, 
French explanations of division of powers between Executive 
and Judicial branches, the GRA decided during the summer of 
2003 to name Falcone as an Angolan diplomat accredited to 
UNESCO in Paris.  This appointment followed the efforts of 
then French FM de Villepin to secure the support of Angola 
(then a U.N. Security Council member) to oppose military 
action in Iraq when, according to press reports (denied by 
the MFA), Villepin made some rash promises to the Angolans 
regarding the Falcone affair. 
 
¶5. (C) Angolan President dos Santos apparently regards 
Falcone as someone who came to Angola's aid at a time of 
need.  Dos Santos used the 2001 accreditation ceremony for 
French Ambassador Alain Richard (who had had to wait six 
months to present his credentials) to blast France for 
alleged "defamation campaigns affecting the reputation and 
interests of Angola."  Richard's successor, Guy Azais, was 
subjected to a similar lengthy wait before being able to 
present his credentials just prior to Ambassador Efird, who 
had arrived in country only a few days earlier. 
 
¶6. (C) Presidents Chirac and dos Santos do not have the warm 
relationship Chirac enjoys with many other long-serving 
African heads of state, e.g. Eyadema, Bongo and Sassou. 
Chirac last visited Luanda in July 1998 and, while dos Santos 
spends vacation time in France, he notably failed to appear 
in Paris for the February 2003 France/Africa summit, attended 
by 42 African heads of state or government. 
 
¶7. (C) In an effort to engage with the GRA, French FM Michel 
Barnier sent a long letter to FM Miranda in September, again 
seeking to explain why it was impossible for France to 
intervene in the Falcone investigation.  The GOF hoped to 
arrange a visit to Luanda by Barnier, and, according to the 
MFA, Ambassador Azais has made two requests to fix a date. 
With the Angolans having responded "not now," the MFA says 
they will not ask a third time. 
 
¶8. (C) The MFA is dismissive of the reported threats against 
French petroleum interests, noting that TOTAL works with UK 
and U.S. companies in Angola, never taking a majority 
position.  Thus, according to the MFA, any GRA action on any 
oil concession would not only affect TOTAL, but also British 
Petroleum and Chevron. 
 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
¶9. (C) In 2003, South African President Thabo Mbeki visited 
France on four occasions.  In January, in the presence of 
UNSYG Annan and numerous African heads of state, President 
Chirac invited Mbeki to lead the discussions at the Kleber 
center meeting following the Marcoussis accords for Cote 
d'Ivoire.  Mbeki returned in February for the France/Africa 
summit and was again present in Evian in June when France 
hosted the G8 summit.  Mbeki then made a state visit to 
France in November, in part to mark the tenth anniversary of 
South Africa's transition to democracy. 
 
¶10. (C) Chirac evidently admires Mbeki's leadership on NEPAD 
and his willingness to engage on conflict resolution in the 
DRC, Burundi, the Comoros and, currently, in Cote d'Ivoire. 
According to our MFA contacts, the relationship between 
Chirac and Mbeki has helped to dispel mutual mistrust which 
had existed in the 1970's when black South Africans regarded 
France as being too indulgent with the apartheid regime, and 
France had seen South Africa as a rival for regional 
influence. 
 
¶11. (C) As with Angola, a judicial investigation, this time 
in South Africa, has complicated the relationship.  The 
French were irritated by unorthodox initial steps taken by 
South African justice officials investigating alleged 
corruption by Vice-President Jacob Zuma relating to missile 
sales by the French Thales company, but these difficulties 
were resolved by an agreement on judicial cooperation. 
According to the MFA, the South African investigation on the 
Thales-related matter ended in August 2004. 
 
¶12. (C) The French seem pleased that Foreign Minister 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma made an effort to learn French, 
including by spending three weeks in a total immersion course 
in France.  The polite assessment by MFA officials of her 
proficiency is "she's not bad," but one contact offered that 
Zuma can not do much more than ask for a cup of coffee with 
sugar.  Notwithstanding the language barrier, FMs Barnier and 
Zuma are in almost weekly contact, according to the MFA.  We 
expect the Chirac/Mbeki relationship to continue to deepen, 
with France and South Africa working together on Cote 
d'Ivoire and other crises in Africa.  Beyond Africa, we also 
expect Chirac and Mbeki from time to time to coordinate 
public positions on other issues, such as Iraq, where their 
views coincide. 
 
ZIMBABWE 
 
¶13. (C) French views on Zimbabwe differ sharply from our own. 
 Where we see an erosion of the economy, human rights and the 
rule of law, the GOF compares Zimbabwe with other African 
states and sees the situation as "not so bad."  The elections 
in Rwanda, in French eyes, were less fair than those in 
Zimbabwe; the suppression of the media in Cote d'Ivoire, 
according to the MFA, is worse than in Zimbabwe.  Referring 
to the atrocities committed in Ndebeleland in the 
mid-eighties "condemned by no-one," an MFA contact told us 
that there had never been rule of law in Zimbabwe. 
 
¶14. (C) Our differences over Zimbabwe were highlighted by the 
French invitation to Robert Mugabe to attend the February 
2003 France/Africa summit.  Other than Rwandan President 
Kagame's disavowal of the Chirac-inspired condemnation of 
military action in Iraq, Chirac's handshake with Mugabe (even 
a Frenchman wouldn't kiss the Zimbabwean leader) is perhaps 
the only lasting memory of that affair. 
 
¶15. (C) Our French contacts, occasionally complaining about 
the tone of our demarches the issue, told us that not 
inviting Mugabe would have led to a boycott by other African 
leaders, possibly even to a north/south or white/black 
schism.  The French view the British as largely responsible 
for the current situation in Zimbabwe, asserting that British 
failure to implement the terms of the 1980 Lancaster House 
agreement led inevitably to Mugabe's land seizures from "a 
handful of white farmers." 
 
¶16. (C) The French view the British as obsessed with Mugabe, 
and vice versa.  They see the UK and the U.S. adopting a 
double standard with regard to Zimbabwe.  The French 
expectation is that ZANU-PF will do the bare minimum to meet 
the five SADC criteria for elections.  If the MDC boycotts, 
ZANU-PF will be able to claim legitimate victory.  If not, 
according to the MFA, they will do what is necessary to win, 
but the elections will be no worse than those in neighboring 
Mozambique, or those elsewhere in Africa which have been 
accepted, even praised by western nations.  The MFA envisions 
this scenario leading to SADC blessing of the elections as 
free and fair, making it difficult for the UK or the U.S. to 
condemn them. 
 
¶17. (C) Following MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai's visit to 
France several years ago, MFA contacts described him as 
unimpressive, and we could elicit no condemnation from French 
officials regarding the irregularities and excesses 
orchestrated by the GOZ before, during and after the 2002 
elections.  With no significant political or economic 
interests in Zimbabwe, we assess that the French will 
continue to argue for engagement, rather than isolation of 
Mugabe and his regime.  In particular, the French plan to 
push the EU to take a set-by-step approach to lifting 
sanctions in response to anticipated moves by the GOZ.  The 
French recognize that their approach faces stiff opposition 
from London, particularly in a British election year. 
 
MOZAMBIQUE AND NAMIBIA 
 
¶18. (C) According to the MFA, Presidents Chirac and Chissano 
knew and liked each other well.  Chissano studied in France 
and the GOF courted Chissano when necessary, particularly 
during the Mozambican president's tenure as President of the 
African Union.  While Maputo was on the itinerary for one of 
former FM de Villepin's first (of many) trips to Africa, it 
was selected when scheduling made meetings in South Africa 
impossible.  Mozambique receives more French development 
assistance than any other non-francophone country, but we 
detect no significant French political interest. 
 
¶19. (C) As with Chissano, the French are positive about 
Nujoma's decision to retire, but only quietly so.  With 
friends like Eyadema and Deby, the GOF is hardly wedded to 
the notion of term limits for African presidents.  During 
Nujoma's last visit to France, he sought a meeting with 
Cooperation Minister Darcos, causing concern in the GOF about 
a potentially long wish-list for assistance.  Instead, Nujoma 
told Darcos that he liked French goat cheese, and sought 
French assistance in developing a goat cheese industry in 
Namibia, a project the GOF is now embarking on. 
 
ZAMBIA, MALAWI, BOTSWANA, LESOTHO, AND SWAZILAND 
 
¶20. (C) Notwithstanding that French company Schneider 
Electronics was found guilty in February of bribing the 
former Chief Executive of the Lesotho Highland Development 
Authority in connection with the construction of the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project, the case made no news in France. 
There have been no recent high-level bilateral visits to or 
from any of these five countries and GOF interest is minimal. 
Wolff