This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 OTTAWA 003303 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR ADMIRAL KEATING, COMMANDER NORAD, COMMANDER USNORTHCOM 
 
TAGS: DOD
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR VISIT TO CANADA, 12-14 DEC 2004 
(U) 
 
¶1. (C) CANADA-U.S. POL-MIL RELATIONS.  PRIME MINISTER MARTIN 
LEADS A MINORITY GOVERNMENT, WHICH MUST MOVE FORWARD 
CAUTIOUSLY ON POLICY ISSUES AND TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE 
VIEWS OF THE OPPOSITION BEFORE PROCEEDING. PM MARTIN HAS 
GIVEN STRONG SIGNALS HE UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF AND 
WISHES TO IMPROVE CANUS RELATIONS. SHORTLY AFTER TAKING 
OFFICE LAST DECEMBER, PM MARTIN ESTABLISHED A NEW CABINET 
COMMITTEE ON U.S.-CANADA RELATIONS WHICH HE CHAIRS, 
ESTABLISHED A DHS-LIKE HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT (DEPT OF 
PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA) HEADED BY 
THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, DEVOTED MORE RESOURCES FOR BORDER 
AND MARITIME SECURITY, AND TIGHTER IMMIGRATION SCREENING.  IN 
APRIL, 2004 HE PUBLISHED CANADA'S FIRST-EVER NATIONAL 
SECURITY POLICY WHICH FOCUSES ON: 
 
¶A. (U) PROTECTING CANADA AND CANADIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD; 
¶B. (U) ENSURING CANADA IS NOT A BASE FOR THREATS TO OUR 
ALLIES; 
¶C. (U) CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
 
MARTIN ALSO PUSHED THROUGH THE AMENDMENT TO THE NORAD 
AGREEMENT, ALLOWING NORAD TO PERFORM THREAT WARNING 
(INTEGRATED TACTICAL WARNING/ATTACK ASSESSMENT) FOR THE 
MISSILE DEFENSE MISSION.  STILL, WHEN POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT 
DURING THE SPRING 2004 ELECTION SEASON, HIS CAMPAIGN RHETORIC 
FOCUSED ON DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN CANADA AND THE U.S. IN 
ORDER TO BUILD ROOM BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE CONSERVATIVES WHO 
SUPPORT MUCH STRONGER TIES TO THE U.S. AND A MORE PROGRESSIVE 
DEFENSE AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. 
 
¶2. (U) PRO-U.S. DEFENSE MINISTER DAVID ((PRATT)) LOST HIS 
PARLIAMENT SEAT IN THE JUNE 2004 ELECTION AND WAS REPLACED BY 
THE HONOURABLE WILLIAM ((GRAHAM)), THE OUTGOING FOREIGN 
MINISTER. GRAHAM MOVED TO DEFENSE WITH A GOOD UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND SECURITY ISSUES FACING CANADA. 
ONE OF GRAHAM'S STRENGTHS IS THAT HE IS WELL KNOWN IN NATO 
CIRCLES 
AND IS VERY COMFORTABLE IN MINISTERIALS AND DEALING WITH NATO 
ISSUES. HE HAS SPENT THE LAST SIX MONTHS LEARNING THE DEFENSE 
BUREAUCRACY AND LEADING A DEFENSE REVIEW.  HE ALSO SHOWED 
GOOD JUDGMENT WHEN HE CHOSE SEASONED CANADIAN BUREAUCRAT WARD 
ELCOCK AS HIS DEPUTY MINISTER (ELCOCK WAS FORMERLY HEAD OF 
CSIS - CANADIAN CIA EQUIVALENT).  GRAHAM HAS BEEN OUTSPOKEN 
ON THE NEED FOR CANADA TO PARTICIPATE IN MISSILE DEFENSE. 
 
¶3. (U) CANADIAN DEFENSE SPENDING.  DUE TO PRESSURE FROM 
DEFENSE INTEREST GROUPS AND ECHOING CALLS BY U.S. AMBASSADOR 
PAUL CELLUCCI DURING THE LAST FOUR YEARS, A GENERAL 
RECOGNITION IS SETTLING INTO THE CANADIAN BODY POLITIC THAT 
DEFENSE HAS BEEN UNDERFUNDED FOR TOO LONG AND MAJOR 
REINVESTMENTS ARE NEEDED. 
INCREASED DEFENSE FUNDING HAS EMERGED AS AN OFTEN-DISCUSSED 
POLITICAL AND EDITORIAL ISSUE.  WHILE PM MARTIN HAS ANNOUNCED 
NEW DEDICATED FUNDING FOR MISSIONS ABROAD AND FUNDED SOME NEW 
ACQUISITION PROGRAMS, THE CANADIAN DEFENSE BUDGET IS STILL 
WOEFULLY UNDERFUNDED AND NEAR THE BOTTOM OF NATO MEMBERS IN 
DEFENSE SPENDING (1.1% GDP). 
 
¶4. (C) CANADIAN FORCES BACKGROUND.  A 20-YEAR LEGACY OF 
UNDERFUNDING AND REPEATED DEPLOYMENTS ON PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS HAVE GENERALLY GUTTED THE CANADIAN FORCES. 
CAPITAL ACQUISITION ACCOUNTS ARE RAIDED ANNUALLY IN ORDER TO 
SUSTAIN O&M REQUIREMENTS.  BOTH EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL ARE 
STRETCHED.  A STRENGTH OF 82,000 IN 1990 HAS ATROPHIED TO 
SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 50,000, OF WHICH ROUGHLY 19,000 IS 
DEPLOYABLE.  THE RESERVES CANNOT DEPLOY AS UNITS, EVEN DOWN 
TO THE COMPANY LEVEL, AND ARE PRIMARILY USED AS A LABOR POOL 
AUGMENTING REGULAR FORCES ON BOTH DOMESTIC AND OVERSEAS 
OPERATIONS.  NEVERTHELESS, THE QUALITY OF CANADIAN FORCES 
LEADERSHIP AND PERSONNEL AT ALL RANKS KEEPS THE FORCES GOING. 
 PM MARTIN ANNOUNCED CANADA WOULD ADD 5,000 ACTIVE SOLDIERS 
AND 3,000 RESERVISTS; HOWEVER, THESE SOLDIERS WOULD BASICALLY 
JUST ROUND OUT THREE UNDER-MANNED BRIGADES AND THEY WILL TAKE 
UP TO SIX YEARS TO BE RECRUITED, TRAINED, AND FIELDED. 
 
¶5. (C) CURRENT AND PROJECTED FORCE DEPLOYMENTS.  THE CANADIAN 
FORCES ARE JUST ENDING A SERIES OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITMENTS THAT LEAVES THE FORCES WITH LITTLE CURRENT 
DEPLOYABLE COMBAT CAPABILITY. MAJOR DEPLOYMENT REDUCTIONS 
(FROM ISAF IV - V LEADERSHIP IN AFGHANISTAN AND HAITI) TOOK 
PLACE IN AUGUST 2004, AS THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE ENTERED INTO 
A ONE YEAR 'OPERATIONAL PAUSE' TO RECONSTITUTE THEIR FORCES. 
(AUGUST 2004 FORECAST IN PARENS; *AIR FORCE DEPLOYMENT): 
 
AFGHANISTAN - 2300 (700) 
SFOR - 650 (80) 
HAITI - 500 (100 CIVILIAN RCMP POLICE VICE SOLDIERS) 
GOLAN HEIGHTS (UN OBSERVERS/LOGISTICIAN) - 225 (225) 
AFRICA - 20 (20) 
ARABIAN GULF/OEF-DEPLOYED WITH GW CSG - 225 (0) 
*ARABIAN GULF C-130 TRANSPORT DETACHMENT - 240 (200) 
 
¶6. (C/NF) CANADIAN MILITARY FORCES CAPABILITIES:  WHAT LIES 
AHEAD.  ALL SERVICES OF THE CANADIAN FORCES ARE STRETCHED AND 
OVER-TASKED, SURVIVING PRIMARILY ON THE QUALITY OF THEIR 
PEOPLE.  INSIDERS INVOLVED WITH DEFENSE ISSUES BELIEVE THAT 
CANADA IS STILL UNABLE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE KINDS OF 
CHOICES IT MUST MAKE IN ORDER TO PREVENT ITS MILITARY FROM 
BECOMING IRRELEVANT.  WHILE SMALL NUMBERS OF HIGHLY CAPABLE 
FORCES EXIST, SUCH AS JTF-2 
TIER-1 SOF COUNTER-TERRORISM FORCES (LESS THAN 300 SOLDIERS 
OF WHICH ABOUT 150 ARE TRIGGER-PULLERS), CANADA IS UNWILLING 
TO MOVE INTO THE NICHE AREAS WHICH THE BUDGET CAN SUPPORT. 
FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, CANADIAN FORCES WILL REMAIN 
AROUND 50,000 - CERTAINLY NOT EXCEEDING 60,000.  EVEN WITH A 
DOUBLING OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET CANADA COULD NOT RECAPITALIZE 
ITS EXISTING FORCE STRUCTURE FOR PERHAPS 15 YEARS, AND NO ONE 
PREDICTS THOSE SORT OF FUNDING LEVELS (UNLESS PERHAPS IN THE 
UNFORTUNATE EVENT CANADA WERE TO EXPERIENCE A MAJOR 9-11 TYPE 
ATTACK).  GIVING UP ON MAJOR MISSION AREAS, SUCH AS AN 
OPERATIONAL BLUE WATER NAVY (AND MOVING TO SUPPORT/TRANSPORT 
AND 200 MILE SECURITY MISSIONS), IS THE ONLY WAY CANADA CAN 
FULLY FUND AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS WITH EXISTING (OR FORECAST) 
BUDGETS.  THE CURRENT DND LEADERSHIP IS VERY NAVY-HEAVY, SO 
THIS IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY. CANADA SEEMS DESTINED TO HOBBLE 
ALONG WITH ONE OF THE SMALLEST MILITARIES IN THE WORLD TO 
FIELD A COMPLETE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE.  THE FACT OF THE 
MAT 
TER IS CANADIAN FORCES AND THE DEFENSE BUDGET HAVE BEEN 
NEGLECTED SO LONG THERE IS NO WAY WITHIN THE CURRENT CANADIAN 
POLITICAL CONTEXT AND WITH COMPETING BUDGETARY PRESSURES FOR 
THEM TO RETURN TO PREVIOUS CAPABILITIES. 
 
¶7. (U) CURRENT MILITARY RELATED ISSUES: 
 
¶A. (U) HOMELAND DEFENSE.  IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS INAUGURATION, 
THE PM CREATED A NEW MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY 
PREPAREDNESS CANADA (PSEPC), AN INSTITUTION ANALOGOUS TO THE 
U.S. DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.  THE AGENCY'S GOAL IS TO 
PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY AND COORDINATE EMERGENCY 
RESPONSES. ALTHOUGH THE LINES OF AUTHORITY OF THIS MINISTRY 
ARE STILL BEING DRAWN AND THEY ARE MORE FOCUSED ON INTERNAL 
ORGANIZATION THAN STANDING UP A WORKING ORGANIZATION, IT 
ALREADY HAS ESTABLISHED LINES OF COMMUNICATION WITH 
COUNTERPART USG AGENCIES, ALBEIT WITHOUT THE SAME SENSE OF 
URGENCY. 
 
¶B.  (U) MARITIME SECURITY.  ALTHOUGH THIS IS SLOWLY CHANGING, 
CANADA'S MARITIME SECURITY STRUCTURE HAS BEEN ADMINISTERED IN 
AN UNCOORDINATED FASHION BETWEEN A PLETHORA OF GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES. IN TERMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY AND 
RESPONSIBILITY, THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE (RCMP) IS 
THE ONLY NATIONAL AGENCY WITH A DAY-TO-DAY, LEGISLATED 
MANDATE TO POLICE ALL TERRITORIAL CANADIAN WATERS.  IN SOME 
CIRCUMSTANCES, CANADIAN MARITIME FORCES (NAVY) CAN AND HAVE 
BEEN GIVEN LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS AND BECOME INVOLVED IN 
MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS IF SPECIAL AUTHORITY IS GRANTED 
BY GOVERNMENT. THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD, ON THE OTHER HAND, 
IS A SUB-AGENCY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND 
OCEANS (DFO), IS TASKED WITH A COLLECTION OF MARINE PROGRAMS 
AND SERVICE MISSIONS, AND DOES NOT FULFILL A LAW ENFORCEMENT 
FUNCTION.  BOTH THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD AND NAVY USUALLY 
PROVIDE THE PLATFORMS FOR RCMP AGENTS TO CONDUCT LAW 
ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS OFF THE CANADIAN COAST. SINCE THE 
INCEPTION OF CANADA'S FIRST EVER NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IN 
APRIL 2004, COLLECTIVELY THE NAVY, COAST GUARD, RCMP AND 
OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES HAVE BEEN WORKING OUT THE DETAILS 
OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO MEET THE SPECTRUM OF 
OPERATIONS THAT ARE REQUIRED TO ENSURE MARITIME SURVEILLANCE 
AND SECURITY OF CANADIAN WATERS.  CANADA WITH THE WORLDS 
LONGEST COASTLINE MEASURING ALMOST 150 MILLION MILES IS 
WOEFULLY UNDER RESOURCED WHEN IT COMES TO NUMBERS OF MARITIME 
VESSELS AND APPROPRIATING OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE BUDGET 
DOLLARS. THE FIELDING (AND EVEN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS) OF 
FOUR USED SUBMARINES RECENTLY PURCHASED FROM THE UK IS BEING 
CALLED INTO QUESTION IN THE WAKE OF AN ACCIDENT (FIRE AT SEA) 
DURING THE MAIDEN VOYAGE TRANSIT TO CANADA OF ONE OF THE SUBS 
THAT CLAIMED THE LIFE OF A CANADIAN NAVAL OFFICER. A RECENT 
STUDY BY CANADA'S SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
DEFENSE CONCLUDED, "THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT THE 
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO END THE 
FRAGMENTED AND LARGELY AD HOC DEFENSE OF CANADA'S COASTLINE". 
 
¶C. (C/NF) MISSILE DEFENSE.  ON 5 AUG 04, CANADA ANNOUNCED 
THAT IT HAD AGREED TO AMEND THE NORAD AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE 
THE MISSILE DEFENSE THREAT WARNING AND ATTACK ASSESSMENT 
MISSION WITHIN NORAD.  THE MARTIN GOVERNMENT HAS TRIED TO 
KEEP THIS DECISION SEPARATE FROM MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM, A 
CONTENTIOUS ISSUE IN CANADA, WHERE SOME OPPOSITION PARTIES 
EQUATE MISSILE DEFENSE WITH WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE. 
 
¶D. (C/RELCAN) NORAD RENEWAL/TRANSFORMATION.  NEGOTIATIONS 
HAVE BEGUN FOR THE 2006 RENEWAL OF THE NORAD AGREEMENT. THERE 
IS AN APPETITE AMONG SOME, NORAD/NORTHCOM IN PARTICULAR ON 
BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER TO TRANSFORM NORAD INTO A 
MULTI-DOMAIN COMMAND, IN LIEU OF ITS CURRENT AEROSPACE 
CHARTER.  MANY ENVISION NORTH AMERICAN DEFENSE COMMAND WITH 
USNORTHCOM AS ITS U.S. COMPONENT.  THE BINATIONAL PLANNING 
GROUP HAS BEEN STUDYING NEW MISSION AREAS INCLUDING MARITIME 
SURVEILLANCE/DOMAIN AWARENESS, CROSS-BORDER MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (MACA), CROSS-BORDER 
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT, AND THE ADDITION OF THE MISSILE 
DEFENSE MISSION.  WHILE U.S. AND NORAD STAFFS ARE 
READY TO PROCEED WITH INCORPORATION OF THESE MISSIONS/TASKS. 
THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT GIVEN THE MANDATE TO 
NEGOTIATING ENTITIES.  HOW FAR AND HOW FAST NORAD TRANSFORMS 
WILL BE DETERMINED DURING NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE COMING 
MONTHS, BUT FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES TO NORAD ARE CERTAINLY NOT 
ASSURED, GIVEN THE 
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN OTTAWA. 
 
¶E. (C) NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.  IN APRIL OF THIS YEAR, THE 
CANADIAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED A NEW NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
THAT - WHEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED - WOULD INTEGRATE DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES TO ENHANCE AND ENSURE SAFETY AND 
SECURITY OF CANADIANS AND THEIR ALLIES AND CONTRIBUTE TO 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.   THE PROPOSED 690 MILLION CANADIAN 
DOLLARS (520 MILLION USD) INITIATIVE WILL FOCUS IN SIX KEY 
AREAS - INTELLIGENCE, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH, 
TRANSPORTATION, BORDER SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. 
PREVENTING ATTACKS UPON ALLIES (READ U.S.) FROM CANADIAN SOIL 
AND ENHANCING MARITIME SECURITY ARE TWO PRIMARY OBJECTIVES. 
 
¶F. (C) DEFENSE REVIEW.   CANADA IS CONDUCTING BOTH 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE REVIEWS BEFORE THE END OF 
CY2004.  DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE HAS NOT BEEN A FORMAL 
DEFENSE REVIEW SINCE THE 1994 WHITE PAPER, GRAHAM HAS NIXED A 
FORMAL REVIEW IN FAVOR OF INTERNALLY-STAFFED ONE. SOME 
BELIEVE THIS DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW IS SHAPING UP TO BE A 
WATERED DOWN DOCUMENT WITHOUT MAJOR CHANGES OR NEW 
INVESTMENTS FOR THE FY05 BUDGET (APRIL 2005).  EXPECTED 
CHANGES INCLUDE:  MORE ROBUST MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AND 
SECURITY CAPABILITIES; IMPROVED C4ISR; STRATEGIC SEA AND 
AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS; MORE SPECIAL FORCES; SOLDIER C3, 
MOBILITY EQUIPMENT, AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS MORE INTEROPERABLE 
WITH U.S. 
FORCES; AND A DRAMATIC DOWN-SIZING OF TANKS AND HEAVY 
ARTILLERY PLATFORMS. THE NEW CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY 
POLICY IS AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW/PCO-BCP.GC.CA.  SEARCH ON 
'NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY'. 
 
¶8. (U) RECOMMENDED THEMES AND TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR TALKS 
WITH DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICIALS: 
 
¶A. (U) WE NEED TO BRING MORE DOMAINS CRITICAL TO HOMELAND 
DEFENSE INTO A NORAD-LIKE STRUCTURE.  IT IS TIME TO 
INSTITUTIONALIZE THE FINE WORK OF THE BINATIONAL PLANNING 
GROUP (BPG) IN COLORADO SPRINGS.  I THINK WE ALL AGREE THAT 
WE NEED TO ENHANCE OUR COOPERATION ON MARITIME DOMAIN 
AWARENESS AND MARITIME SECURITY. 
 
¶B. (U) WHAT OTHER DOMAINS DOES CANADA ENVISION AS APPROPRIATE 
FOR A TRANSFORMED NORAD? CYBER SECURITY?  MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES?  CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT? 
 
¶C. (U) THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE HAS A KEY ROLE IN 
OUR STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.  HAPPY TO SEE CANADA HAS A NEW 
AND ACTIVE CHAIR (JUDI LONGFIELD).  WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE 
RESULTS OF THE PJBD MEETING IN MARCH 2005. 
 
¶D. (U) AS PSEPC MOVES FORWARD IN ITS INTERAGENCY 
RELATIONSHIPS PLEASE CONSIDER ASD-HD AVAILABLE TO ASSIST IN 
BENCHMARKING ALONG OTHER U.S. AGENCIES SUCH AS DHS.  WE ARE 
ALL IN THE PROCESS OF LEARNING HOW TO FUSE THE RIGHT 
CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT THE HOMELAND DEFENSE MISSION.  ONE 
PLACE PSEPC LEADERS SHOULD DEFINITELY VISIT IS NORTHCOM AND 
THEIR INTERAGENCY COORDINATING GROUP.  ANOTHER IS JTF-CIVIL 
SUPPORT WHERE THEIR PLANNERS ARE DOING GREAT WORK IN 
DOCUMENTING BOTH CRITICAL AND SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE IN 
CASE OF A CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT EVENT. 
¶9. (U) POC FOR THIS MESSAGE IS CAPT JOHN K MCCLAIN, NAVAL 
ATTACHE, USDAO OTTAWA. UNCLAS 613-688-5380. SIPRNET: 
DIMCCJK(AT)NOTES.DAWN.DIA.SMIL.MIL. 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: COL DAVID BRACKETT, DATT, USDAO OTTAWA 
REASON: 1.5(C,D) 
DECL: X1