This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 007675 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IN UN GOI
SUBJECT: FOR INDIA UN PANEL REPORT IS ONLY A START 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 4391 
     ¶B. NEW DELHI 6787 
     ¶C. NEW DELHI 5201 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr.  Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  The report of the High-Level Panel on UN 
Reform represents the beginning of a long-term process in 
which India has significant stakes, MEA Joint Secretary (UN 
Political) BS Prakash told PolCouns on December 3. 
Downplaying FM Natwar Singh's apparent rejection of a 
permanent Security Council seat without a veto during 
December 2 remarks before Parliament, Prakash took a more 
nuanced view, saying India would deliberate carefully over 
the range of issues addressed in the report before reaching 
any conclusions.  While a permanent seat is broadly supported 
by all facets of the Indian political establishment, 
Opposition parties could use a veto-less Security Council 
seat as a means of attacking the UPA-government.  The 
Congress-led government will also likely have to contend with 
public concerns about "second-class status" should a 
permanent seat without a veto become an option.  Still, given 
the symbolic importance India attaches to a Security Council 
seat, New Delhi would probably in the end be content with 
permanent membership with or without veto authority. End 
Summary. 
 
Panel Report Just the Beginning 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The report of the High-Level Panel on UN Reform 
represents the beginning of a long-term process in which 
India has significant stakes, MEA Joint Secretary (UN 
Political) BS Prakash told PolCouns on December 3.  Prakash 
downplayed FM Natwar Singh's December 2 comments before 
Parliament in which he said that a Security Council Seat 
without a veto "would not be acceptable to the country," 
emphasizing that the GOI plans to take a deliberative 
approach to the report and UN reform.  Despite some initial 
press reports and political criticism of what is being 
described as the "second-class status" of veto-less permanent 
membership, Prakash noted that Security Council reform is 
only one aspect of the report, and noted that the panel's 
mandate included a review of the entire UN system. 
 
¶3.  (C) Prakash said that India would probably release a 
statement on the overall work of the panel within the next 
few days, but did not feel obliged to respond collaboratively 
with the G-4 (Brazil, Germany, Indian, and Japan) on specific 
panel recommendations.  The G-4 did release a very general 
coordinated statement on December 3 urging the international 
community "to embrace this opportunity wholeheartedly to 
bring about the needed change" in the UN, and reiterating the 
need for Security Council expansion.  MEA Director (UN 
Political) Pankaj Sharma underlined to Poloff New Delhi's 
commitment to solidarity with the other candidate countries, 
saying that India would reject any outcome that excludes 
Brazil, Germany, or Japan from permanent membership. 
 
"By Any Objective Measure, India Deserves a Seat" 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4.  (C) Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, speaking before the 
release of the report, noted that "in terms of demography, 
contributions to peacekeeping or abilities at furtherance of 
the objectives of the UN, India more than fulfills the 
criterion" for permanent membership on the UN Security 
Council.  MEA Director (UN Political) Pankaj Sharma echoed 
this view, stating that while the GOI views UN Security 
Council (UNSC) reform as one component of UN reform, and "not 
an end in itself," New Delhi clearly believes that the time 
has come for India to join the ranks of the Security Council 
as a permanent member.  India has the will and capacity to 
contribute to the UN, he said, describing the current 
Security Council configuration as lacking the ability to 
respond to the realities of today's post Cold War world.  The 
Council is "frozen in time," Sharma complained, emphasizing 
that the UN must evolve in order to retain its relevance and 
effectiveness. 
What India Wants 
---------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Despite GOI insistence on Security Council reform, 
India has yet to elaborate on the details behind its vision 
for permanent membership in the Security Council, or on UN 
reform more generally.  New Delhi has clearly stated its 
support for greater representation of the developing world, 
and its opposition to rotational or semi-permanent seats, 
arguing instead for the addition of both permanent and 
non-permanent members.  The MEA's Sharma claimed that the 
idea of a rotational seat for regional groupings like the EU 
"would not translate in South Asia," as neither SAARC nor 
ASEAN qualify as a "union."  He argued that Security Council 
members should have a global focus, taking into consideration 
"the interests of the entire world," and observed that a 
regional seat does not "pass this test."  Beyond this, 
however, the GOI position is vague. 
 
Mixed Messages on the Veto 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Responding to questions in Parliament on December 2, 
FM Natwar Singh stated that a Security Council Seat without a 
veto "would not be acceptable to the country," but tempered 
his comments by observing that Security Council expansion was 
an "extremely complicated issue with wide ramifications." 
According to J/S Prakash, Natwar's comments came in response 
to questions unrelated to the predetermined topic (PM 
Manmohan Singh's September trip to the US) for which the 
Foreign Minister had been prepared.  The Foreign Minister's 
comments were not the last word on India's view of the Panel 
report, he emphasized. 
 
¶7.  (C) Other MEA officials and GOI foreign policy advisors 
expressed surprise at Natwar's comments, and offered a more 
pragmatic approach to the veto.  Ambassador KV Rajan, former 
Additional Secretary (East), described a general Indian 
consensus that there is "not a snowball's chance in hell" 
that India will gain a veto in addition to permanent 
membership.   He commented that most GOI officials believe 
that permanent membership would be "fantastic, even without 
the veto."  MEA Director (UN Political) Pankaj Sharma 
(protect) echoed this view, asserting (before Natwar's 
comments in Parliament) that India would not make veto power 
"a point in our case for membership," given the "ticklish" 
nature of the subject.  He emphasized that New Delhi has no 
official position on whether veto authority should be 
extended beyond the P-5, but added, "When the time comes, 
India will be prepared to discuss this." 
 
The Campaign 
------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Illustrating the importance the GOI places on UN 
reform, particularly Security Council membership, the 
Congress-led UPA government has undertaken a systematic and 
largely successful campaign to garner international support 
for a permanent seat.  As part of this campaign, New Delhi 
spearheaded a coordinated effort among the G-4 contenders, 
and lobbied aggressively at the bilateral level. (refs A-C) 
With the notable exception of the US, India has requested 
support for its Security Council bid during nearly every 
high-level bilateral interaction, with countries ranging from 
Nigeria to Burma, Vietnam to China.  The GOI has also sought 
support from regional organizations, such as the EU.  The 
campaign has been largely successful, with dozens of 
countries expressing support for an Indian seat.  During a 
joint press conference with PM Manmohan Singh during a 
December 3 visit to New Delhi, however, Russian President 
Vladimir Putin stated that veto power should not be expanded 
beyond the P-5.  "We believe it would be absolutely 
unacceptable to erode such tools of the UN," he said. 
¶9.  (C) To solidify its claims to the Security Council, the 
GOI has also begun to assert itself more visibly within the 
UN, particularly after suffering a humiliating defeat in the 
October 1996 election for a rotating UNSC membership. 
Viewing election to ECOSOC as a pre-cursor to Security 
Council membership, New Delhi lobbied hard for an ECOSOC 
seat.  GOI officials, including Natwar Singh, have 
interpreted India's wide margin of victory there (174 votes 
-- "the highest number earned by any country") as recognition 
of New Delhi's ability to mobilize a majority of UN members. 
 
Approaching the US 
------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) According to Ambassador Rajan, the GOI remains 
unsure about the US position on Security Council reform, 
viewing Washington as uninterested in genuine reform.  For 
this reason, India has so far been hesitant to push the issue 
of UNSC expansion in a US-India context.  He said that some 
sectors of the GOI view US support for a Security Council 
seat as "a litmus test of the strategic partnership," though 
most recognize the complex issues surrounding Security 
Council reform.  Former Indian Ambassador to the US Lalit 
Mansingh acknowledged that US support for India will be "the 
deciding factor," observing that without US support an Indian 
seat will not become reality. 
 
¶11.  (C) In discussions with Poloff, MEA's Sharma sought to 
downplay the sometimes marked differences between the US and 
India at the UN, particularly on human rights issues, 
commenting that New Delhi and Washington agree on the need 
for an effective, credible, and efficient council.  India 
does not work in contradiction with US values, he emphasized, 
adding that New Delhi had often served as a moderating voice 
among the NAM and G-77 countries on resolutions targeting 
Israel. 
 
What About Pakistan? 
-------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Asked whether the GOI worried about Pakistani 
opposition to permanent Indian membership on the Security 
Council, Sharma stated bluntly that "India is not worried 
about opposition, by Pakistan or any other country," adding 
that each of the G-4 candidates have some opposition.  He 
offered no strategy for overcoming opposition that could come 
from Pakistan, or from other Islamic countries, but said 
India was confident of receiving the two-thirds vote 
necessary to join the Security Council. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13.  (C) For India, permanent UN Security Council membership 
has come to symbolize India's arrival as a global power, and 
for this reason has become a high-profile issue for the 
government and foreign policy elite.  Debate among the wider 
public is just beginning, and in this context Natwar's 
comments to Parliament further complicated the already vague 
Indian position on a desirable outcome for UNSC reform. 
However, it is probable that Natwar's remarks were made 
off-the-cuff and do not represent the official GOI stand.  As 
one of our contacts put it, "By now we should all know that 
Natwar does not have the last word."  The Indian Government 
is likely to be satisfied with a permanent Security Council 
seat sans veto, but whether the public and Opposition parties 
will accept this outcome remains another matter. 
MULFORD