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C O N F I D E N T I A L  JAKARTA 012662 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2014 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL ID
SUBJECT: KALLA WINS CHAIR OF GOLKAR, EMERGES AS POWERFUL 
POLITICAL FORCE 
 
REF: A. JAKARTA 12317 (UPCOMING GOLKAR CONGRESS) 
     ¶B. JAKARTA 11289 (MOVEMENT ON DEADLOCK) 
     ¶C. JAKARTA 5280 (ISLAMISTS AROUND SBY) 
 
Classified By: Political Officer David R. Greenberg, reason: 1.4 (b) an 
d (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Vice President Jusuf Kalla won the chairmanship of 
Golkar, Indonesia's largest political party, during a 
December 16-19 Party Congress, which we observed first-hand. 
Kalla's team paid enormous bribes to secure votes from party 
branches, but Golkar's draw toward executive branch power 
represented another important factor.  Kalla has dramatically 
increased his degree of influence in political life, and many 
politicians expect him to try to upstage President Yudhoyono 
and pave the way for his own presidential bid in 2009.  Many 
around Yudhoyono are nervous about Kalla's ascendancy. 
Yudhoyono should reap an immediate dividend, however: the 
relegation of the formal opposition "National Coalition" to 
minority status in the parliament.  Kalla's rise in Golkar 
will severely diminish the influence of former President 
Megawati, who had joined with Golkar in the National 
Coalition.  Kalla's victory also leaves retired General 
Wiranto with no apparent vehicle for his presidential 
ambitions.  Although former Chairman Akbar Tandjung's corrupt 
reputation will no longer burder the party, Golkar's new 
Central Board includes disreputable businessmen and retired 
General Prabowo Subianto, credibly implicated in Suharto-era 
human rights violations.  End Summary. 
 
AKBAR LOYALISTS WARN US ABOUT KALLA 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In the days leading up to the Congress, our contacts 
described increased momentum behind Jusuf Kalla's bid for the 
Golkar chairmanship (ref A).  Kalla cemented his position as 
incumbent Chairman Akbar Tandjung's lead rival late on 
December 15, when he held a joint press conference with House 
of Representatives (DPR) Chairman Agung Laksono and media 
mogul Surya Paloh -- two figures who had publicly declared 
their interest in the Golkar chairmanship.  At the press 
conference, Agung and Surya Paloh demonstrated their support 
for Kalla's candidacy.  Kalla announced that he had the 
support of 28 of Golkar's 33 provincial branches.  (Note: 
Since Golkar's provincial branches controlled 33 of the 36 
votes under the original rules of procedure, this claim 
indicated Kalla was on track to replace Akbar.  Our contacts 
told us Kalla's claim was exaggerated, but that Akbar had 
solid support from only six or seven provincial branches. 
End Note.) 
 
¶3. (C) Prior to the Golkar Congress opening ceremonies, 
Golkar Deputy Secretary General Bomer Pasaribu -- one of 
Akbar's closest allies -- warned us about Kalla's candidacy. 
Bomer expressed a common concern that Kalla was too close to 
radical Islamists (ref C).  He also warned that Kalla's 
control over Golkar would provide the Vice President with too 
much power, placing him on a par with President Yudhoyono. 
(Comment: We recognize irony in a Golkar official telling us 
that the Golkar Chairman should not be too powerful.  Bomer's 
warning was clearly based on his and Akbar's sense of 
self-interest.  End Comment.) 
 
¶4. (C) Contacts told us that retired military figures in 
Golkar had privately expressed concern about Kalla, 
reflecting a wariness of Islamist sentiment that appears 
common among older generation Indonesian soldiers.  Akbar 
himself reportedly privately referred to Kalla as a 
"Taleban."  Subtle differences between the Congress' opening 
ceremony and elements of other Golkar functions we have 
attended indicated Akbar Tandjung's desire to remind Golkar 
delegates of the party's secular orientation.  The woman who 
led participants in the Golkar pledge of allegiance shunned 
the Muslim headscarf she normally wears.  Figures 
representing all five Indonesia's official religions stood 
together during the opening prayer -- previously, only the 
Muslim leading the prayer took to the stage.  Former 
President Megawati Soekarnoputri -- one of Indonesia's 
leading symbols of nationalist sentiment -- attended the 
opening ceremony. 
 
AKBAR'S APPEAL 
-------------- 
 
¶5. (U) In his opening speech, as well as in subsequent 
remarks from the podium, Akbar Tandjung reminded delegates 
that he had led Golkar through a difficult adjustment period. 
 He cited the party's reorientation in accordance with the 
reform movement that energized Indonesia in the late 1990's. 
He recalled fighting for Golkar when President Wahid called 
for the party's dissolution, and when party offices were 
burned in acts of political violence.  He highlighted 
Golkar's regaining a plurality in the DPR during the 2004 
elections, and its disproportionate share of DPR commission 
chairmanships.  The recent elections had given Golkar much 
influence, even though the party did not occupy strategic 
positions in the executive branch, Akbar noted, delivering a 
subtle jab at Vice President Kalla, who did not receive 
official party support for his election campaign. 
 
USING THE RULES TO AKBAR'S ADVANTAGE 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) During December 16 debate over the Congress' rules of 
procedure, Akbar Tandjung and his allies on the Congress 
Steering Committee pushed through a critical change, 
expanding voting rights for the mass organizations associated 
with Golkar and offering voting rights to the party's 440 
district-level branches.  The total number of votes in play 
therefore rose from 36 to 484, with one vote each for the 
Central Board, 33 provincial branches, 440 district branches, 
and 10 mass organizations.  This move proved widely popular, 
as the newly empowered delegates knew that candidates for the 
chairmanship would offer handsome financial incentives. 
While the revision boosted Akbar's popularity, his team 
members acknowledged he was forced to change the dynamic, 
because he lacked sufficient support among the provincial 
branches. 
 
¶7. (C) Several contacts on Akbar's side told us that Kalla 
lacked the Golkar experience required to fulfill the 
eligibility criteria required by draft rules of procedure. 
Steering Committee members (disproportionately pro-Akbar) 
engineered the ratification of the rules with few changes. 
Afterwards, Akbar's team members jubilantly told us that 
Kalla would be disqualified; Kalla's backers, however, 
insisted they remained confident and could document that the 
Vice President had the necessary experience, thanks to a 
period of service on South Sulawesi's provincial board in the 
1970's.  (Note: Kalla's curriculum vitae in the 1999-2004 
parliamentary directory listed no such experience.  End Note.) 
 
BOTH SIDES' LAST-MINUTE MANEUVERS FAIL 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) As the vote drew closer, however, Akbar's team became 
more somber.  Offering voting rights to the district level 
boards had given the beleaguered Chairman a new lease on 
life, but his close associates confided to us that he could 
not afford to match the incentives Kalla offered, even as he 
twisted associates' arms, exhorting them to raise funds. 
Furthermore, Kalla's team appeared undaunted by the 
eligibility criteria, and it became clear that a substantial 
number of delegates would riot in the event of the Vice 
President's disqualification by a verification team 
consisting of Akbar loyalists.  (Incidentally, the rule of 
procedure also disqualified retired General Wiranto from 
contesting the chairmanship.) 
 
¶9. (C) On the night before the chairmanship vote, Akbar's 
associates lobbied to break up Kalla's team, aiming 
particularly to secure the defection of Agung Laksono. 
(Agung, they noted, helped to offset Kalla's reputation as 
overly Islamic.)  Meanwhile, Kalla courted retired General 
Wiranto, who had sided with Akbar.  Akbar had offered Wiranto 
the chairmanship of Golkar's Board of Advisors, which would 
hold enhanced power; Wiranto also would secure seats on the 
Central Board for his loyalists (up to 40 percent of the 
Central Board's seats, according to one source).  Both 
coalitions held up until the end, however. 
 
THE VOTE 
-------- 
 
¶10. (U) As the vote approached, on the night of December 18, 
facing a storm of anxious interjections from Kalla's 
supporters, Congress Chairman Abdul Gafur announced that the 
verification team had difficulty confirming Kalla's 
eligibility for the chairmanship.  Kalla's nomination for the 
Vice Presidency by parties other than Golkar, along with his 
having been sanctioned by the Central Board prior to the 
presidential runoff election, called into question whether 
Kalla met the subjective requirements concerning dedication, 
loyalty, and acceptability.  Ultimately, however, the 
verification team deferred to the delegates, who would decide 
the matter with their votes. 
 
¶11. (U) Four candidates passed the verification phase: Akbar, 
Kalla, Golkar Vice Chairman Slamet Effendy Yusuf, and Golkar 
Vice Chairwoman Marwah Daud Ibrahim.  The Congress proceeded 
to determine which candidates had the necessary backing (a 
minimum of 150 votes) to compete for the chairmanship. 
Slamet Effendy Yusuf announced prior to this stage that he 
would withdraw from the competition.  Marwah decided to press 
on, however.  The nomination process (by sec-ret ballot) 
showed Kalla in the lead, with 269 votes, while Akbar 
received 191.  Marwah pulled in 13 votes, while two voters 
abstained and seven ballots were spoiled.  (Two branches 
failed to complete the necessary processes to vote.) 
 
¶12. (U) After the nomination phase, Akbar delivered a brief 
speech tracking closely with his opening remarks (para five). 
 He also highlighted his support from Wiranto, noting that 
the pair provided balance as representatives of Javanese and 
non-Javanese ethnic groups, with one being a civilian and the 
other having a military background.  Subtly reminding the 
delegates of Kalla's other responsibilities, he pledged to 
devote all his time to the party.  Kalla delivered brief 
remarks, departed from the podium, but then immediately 
returned onstage to acknowledge his top backers, calling on 
(in order) media mogul Surya Paloh, DPR Speaker Agung 
Laksono, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X, former Minister of Justice 
Muladi, Economic Coordinating Minister Aburizal Bakrie, 
retired General Prabowo Subianto, and House of Regional 
Representatives (DPD) Chairman Ginandjar Kartasasmita. 
 
¶13. (U) Around 5:30 a.m. on December 19, the final vote tally 
showed that the Congress elected Kalla to a five-year term as 
Golkar Party Chairman, 323 votes to 156.  In Kalla's victory 
speech, the Vice President thanked Akbar Tandjung for his 
service to the party and pledged that Golkar would continue 
to act as a counterweight to the Yudhoyono administration, 
consistent with a system of checks and balances, although the 
party would do so in an "objective" fashion. 
 
VOTE-BUYING 
----------- 
 
¶14. (C) According to multiple sources close to the major 
candidates, Kalla's team offered district boards at least 
200,000,000 Rupiah (over 22,000 USD) for their votes. 
Provincial boards -- which had the same voting right but also 
could influence subordinate district boards -- received 
500,000,000 Rupiah or more.  According to one contact with 
prior experience in such matters, board officials received 
down payments from both sides and would expect full payment 
from the winner, in cash, within hours of the vote.  With 243 
votes required to win a majority, the Golkar Chairmanship 
likely cost well over six million dollars, not counting the 
cost of luxury hotel rooms, plane tickets, and other expenses 
that the candidates offered to cover.  One contact claimed 
that Agung alone -- not the wealthiest of Kalla's backers -- 
had allocated (if not actually spent) 50 billion Rupiah (over 
5.5 million USD) on the event.  According to rumor, Economic 
Coordinating Minister Aburizal Bakrie spent 70 billion Rupiah 
(almost 8 million USD). 
 
¶15. (C) Money did not represent the sole factor in the 
chairmanship election, however.  Our contacts widely 
acknowledged that, besides cash, Kalla offered Golkar 
officials the chance to move from the uncomfortable role of 
opposition party to the more familiar position of supporting 
(and receiving support from) the administration.  Many of the 
district and provincial board leaders have their eyes on 
regent and governor positions that will be up for election in 
2005, and they likely hope that the Vice President, as party 
Chairman, can help their reelection efforts in symbolic or 
concrete ways that an opposition figure cannot. 
 
THE NEW GOLKAR TEAM 
------------------- 
 
¶16. (U) In his appointments to Golkar's Central Board, Kalla 
stacked the Board of Advisors with his key backers.  Media 
mogul Surya Paloh chairs the Board of Advisors.  Members 
include Economic Coordinating Minister Aburizal Bakrie, 
Sultan Hamengku Buwono X, Manpower Minister Fahmi Idris, 
retired General Prabowo Subianto, 2004 Vice Presidential 
candidate Siswono Yudo Husodo, and Kalla associate Tanri 
Abeng (a former Minister for State Owned Enterprises 
implicated -- but never charged -- in the 1999 Bank Bali 
scandal).  DPR Chairman Agung Laksono became Central Board 
Deputy General Chairman (a newly created position).  Former 
Justice Minister Muladi, former Communications Minister 
Syamsul Muarif, DPR Commission I Chairman Theo Sambuaga, 
Joyokusomo (the younger brother of Sultan Hamengku Buwono X) 
and Agus Kartasasmita (the son of Ginandjar) are among the 
party's Vice Chairmen. 
 
¶17. (C) Former Attorney General Marzuki Darusman, who was 
recently purged from Golkar along with Fahmi Idris, failed to 
return to the Central Board.  Marzuki told us Kalla held 
lingering resentment against him because he (Marzuki) had 
served as then-President Abdurrahman Wahid's messenger when 
Wahid fired Kalla (from his position as Minister for Industry 
and Trade) in April 2000.  Rival candidates for the 
chairmanship Slamet Effendy Yusuf and Marwah Daud Ibrahim 
were both excluded from the new Central Board.  After the 
announcement of the new Board's composition, a former Golkar 
executive (not included in the new Board) told us many Golkar 
officials were disappointed with the Board's composition. 
 
AKBAR'S FATE 
------------ 
 
¶18. (C) Former Golkar Chairman Akbar Tandjung has lost his 
formal role in party affairs.  While his most loyal 
associates were purged from the Central Board, Akbar retains 
strong ties to Golkar's faction in parliament, having played 
a key role in constructing the party list.  While it is 
unclear how Akbar might try to return to power in Golkar, 
many expect him to begin plotting with that aim in mind.  One 
contact told us, "Even if Akbar dies, you have to wait a week 
to be sure he doesn't come back." 
 
RAMIFICATIONS FOR MEGAWATI 
-------------------------- 
 
¶19. (C) The Congress outcome has dire ramifications for 
former President Megawati Soekarnoputri.  As one of the 
co-founders of the National Coalition, Megawati worked with 
Akbar Tandjung to control a majority of the seats in the DPR. 
 Prior to the Party Congress, the National Coalition 
consisted of parties representing 58 percent of the DPR. 
While Kalla stopped short of declaring the National Coalition 
dead, virtually all of our contacts are certain of Golkar's 
defection, which would leave the National Coalition with only 
Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle (PDI-P), 
Abdurrahman Wahid's National Awakening Party (PKB), and two 
smaller parties -- all in all, 186 of the DPR's 550 
legislators (just under 34 percent). 
 
¶20. (C) The failure to maintain a majority in the DPR will 
reflect poorly on Megawati; her reported drive to destroy 
Yudhoyono (politically) leaves PDI-P out in the cold so long 
as Yudhoyono is President and Megawati chairs the party. 
PDI-P's Party Congress is scheduled for the end of March. 
While no other figure in PDI-P can match Megawati's name 
recognition and appeal to grassroots voters, her opponents 
likely sense that the new political map has made her more 
vulnerable than before.  One PDI-P Central Board official, 
citing former Minister for State Owned Enterprises Laksamana 
Sukardi as her source, claimed that Megawati's husband, 
Taufik Kiemas, was hospitalized in serious condition upon 
hearing the news of Kalla's victory. 
 
WIRANTO NEEDS NEW STRATEGY 
-------------------------- 
 
¶21. (C) The Congress has dealt another setback to third-place 
presidential contender Wiranto.  According to former close 
associate Muladi, Wiranto took the unusual step of teaming up 
with Akbar -- who was widely recognized as having undermined 
Wiranto's presidential candidacy in the 2004 election -- 
because Wiranto saw he would more likely be able to use 
Golkar as his vehicle in 2009's presidential election if 
Akbar controlled the party, rather than Kalla.  Muladi also 
claimed Wiranto was influenced by former Golkar Chairman 
Harmoko, who dislikes Kalla. 
 
¶22. (C) Several of Wiranto's sidekicks were at the Congress 
site, including retired Generals Suaidi Marasabessy, Fachrul 
Rozi, and Tulus Sihombing.  Tulus told us after the vote that 
Wiranto's path to the presidency now appeared unclear.  He 
estimated that the team would take a month to recover from 
the defeat and then reexamine Wiranto's options for the 2009 
election.  (Note: During the Congress, we received further 
confirmation that Wiranto remained discredited by unpaid 
debts to Golkar officials -- ref A.  End Note.) 
 
YUDHOYONO HAS A NEW PROBLEM 
--------------------------- 
 
¶23. (C) Some representatives of political parties that backed 
Yudhoyono when the National Coalition held a majority 
publicly indicated concern that Kalla's victory would lead to 
an unhealthy combination of executive and legislative branch 
power.  Indeed, the Vice President, in his capacity as Golkar 
Chairman, now has the authority to fire Golkar legislators 
(including DPR Chairman Agung Laksono) if they defy the party 
line.  However, it is by no means clear that Golkar will back 
Yudhoyono's interests, should they conflict with Kalla's.  At 
the conclusion of the Congress, one Golkar legislator close 
to Agung even told us he hoped the DPR would proceed with 
earlier plans for Yudhoyono's interpellation (ref B). 
 
¶24. (C) Numerous contacts have mentioned Kalla's strong 
influence during the cabinet-building process.  One source 
recounted that Kalla had pounded on the table and threatened 
to resign as Vice President if Yudhoyono failed to include 
Aburizal Bakrie as Economic Coordinating Minister.  With his 
new control over Golkar and the party's faction in 
parliament, Kalla has added to his influence over cabinet 
members and his strong network in the business community. 
Numerous contacts cautioned that Kalla would prove more 
powerful than Yudhoyono -- particularly given his aggressive, 
hard-charging personality, which contrasts with Yudhoyono's 
more cautious approach (but also rubs against the grain of 
the dominant Javanese political culture). 
 
HOW YUDHOYONO DEALT WITH THE CONTENDERS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶25. (C) In the lead-up to the Congress, we heard credible 
accounts that Yudhoyono supported first Surya Paloh, then 
Agung Laksono for the Chairmanship (ref A).  He also was said 
to have offered support for Kalla's candidacy, as Kalla 
appeared increasingly strong.  Finally, we heard that Wiranto 
felt betrayed by Yudhoyono, because he, too, thought he had 
the President's backing.  These accounts indicate that, while 
Yudhoyono wanted to see Akbar Tandjung overthrown, he also 
sought to avoid a firm commitment (to a potential loser) and 
maintain maximum flexibility. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶26. (C) Yudhoyono now has a Vice President must more capable 
of aiding his administration, or acting independently on his 
own agenda.  Our contacts consistently distinguish between 
the interests of Yudhoyono and Kalla.  The Vice President's 
winning control of Golkar represents his own further 
accumulation of power, which he may or may not deploy on 
behalf of Yudhoyono's administration.  Given Kalla's blunt, 
no-nonsense style, we expect clear, early indications of 
Golkar's new orientation. 
 
¶27. (C) Confronted with Kalla's growing influence, Yudhoyono 
has several options to help offset his deputy's prestige.  He 
could strengthen his ties to Indonesia's Islamist parties, 
whose leaders have supported him up until this point and 
appear to fear being displaced by Golkar.  He could hope that 
an ally replaces Megawati in March's PDI-P Party Congress, so 
that Yudhoyono can strengthen his ties to that party and 
expand his secular base, as Yudhoyono's Democratic Party (PD) 
holds only 10 percent of the DPR's seats.  Finally, as a 
retired military officer, he could enhance the prestige of 
the Armed Forces, which lacks a formal role in domestic 
politics but nonetheless possesses substantial influence. 
 
¶28. (C) It is quite possible, however, for Kalla to decide 
that he is best off throwing his and Golkar's support behind 
the administration, at least for now.  As a businessman, he 
likely realizes that he, his family, and associates gain more 
from stability and effective governance than from political 
deadlock.  Additionally, Kalla's ethnic background, a Bugis 
from South Sulawesi, is a disadvantage for him seeking the 
presidency in a nation still dominated to an extent by the 
majority Javanese.  While we believe Kalla has an eye on the 
2009 election and we expect him to continue building up his 
political base, to some degree at Yudhoyono's expense, he 
would benefit from projecting an image as a constructive 
force rather than a disloyal upstart. 
 
 
PASCOE