This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 002071 
 
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AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2009 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MDC OFFICIAL ON POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS, CHALLENGES 
TO PARTY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.5 b/d 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: MDC Secretary for Presidential Affairs 
Gandhi Mudzingwa on December 15 updated poloff on MDC 
priorities and activities in the run-up to the March 
parliamentary elections.  He identified steps ZANU-PF had 
taken that were leading to a more open political 
environment, but said the progress to date was insufficient 
and that the MDC faced a dilemma as a result: how to 
exploit these new opportunities without conceding their 
participation in the elections.  He reported that Nigerian 
President Obasanjo recently told opposition leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai that he would engage South African President 
 
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Mbeki and Mauritius President Berenger about Zimbabwe and 
favored a negotiated settlement.  Mudzingwa also said that 
Tsvangirai did not want to put off a visit to Washington 
 
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until February, when he may need to be immersed in 
campaigning, but recognized the need for flexibility.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
The Dilemma of Opening Political Space 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶2.  Mudzingwa noted that the regime's moderating public 
tone was being matched by some opening of political space: 
 
-- He confirmed previous reports that the party generally 
was more successful in getting its public political 
gatherings approved by the police nationally, although 
significant problems remained.  (Note: A few days later, 
police denied approval for major MDC meetings in Harare and 
Chitungwiza and police broke up a meeting Tsvangirai was 
holding in Masvingo.  End note.) 
 
-- In many areas, police were enforcing the law in a less 
obviously partisan manner.  Police had arrested 18-20 
ZANU-PF perpetrators of violence during the last six to 
eight months, an unprecedented level of enforcement against 
the ruling party at the local level.  Mudzingwa asserted 
that at least a couple of ZANU-PF partisans had been 
convicted and other prosecutions were going forward. 
(Note: The vast majority of those arrested for political 
violence over the past few years have been MDC members but, 
like those ZANU-PF members arrested over that period, 
detainees usually had charges dropped, were acquitted, or 
were released upon payment of a fine.  End note.) 
 
-- The GOZ had not withheld food or other assistance on a 
partisan basis "for months."  (Note: A visiting team from 
Human Right Watch told poloff last week that the 
organization had been unable to confirm any reports of the 
GOZ using food as a "weapon" since the first half of the 
year.  End note.) 
 
-- The MDC was having a greater impact in Parliament.  The 
ruling party still controlled the legislative agenda but 
was exhibiting more inclination to compromise. 
 
-- In this vein, ZANU-PF had agreed to some (not all) 
potentially significant compromises on the election bill, 
including one provision that would require opposition 
parties to get access to the state media. 
 
-- Minister for State Security Goche had told MDC Shadow 
Minister for Youth Affairs Nelson Chamisa that "a decision 
had been taken" to permit the independent daily newspaper, 
The Daily News (TDN), to publish again.  (Note: Publisher 
Strive Masiyiwa three days later reportedly sold TDN to the 
newspaper's management team, headed by Editor Sam Nkomo. 
End note.) 
 
-- The party leadership was pleasantly surprised that 
Tsvangirai retained his passport and ability to travel -- 
 
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an important asset for a party.  (Note: The GOZ had seized 
Tsvangirai's passport in connection with his first treason 
 
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trial, preventing his international travel for over a 
year.  Upon his acquittal the GOZ returned the passport and 
so far has opted not to retain it during the  pre-trial 
portion of his second treason trial.  End note.) 
 
¶3.  (C) Mudzingwa stressed that these positive developments 
cumulatively did not come close to giving the MDC a fair 
chance in March.  The MDC thus faced a dilemma: how to 
exploit the new opportunities that had opened up without 
conceding MDC participation in the elections.  The party 
had yet to decide whether to participate and was hoping for 
more concessions but any public acknowledgement of 
progress, however insufficient, risked giving ZANU-PF and 
SADC additional ammunition in their efforts to depict the 
elections as free and fair.  The dilemma was vexing party 
tacticians.  Mudzingwa said the party, for example, had not 
planned a media campaign yet, although it would be able to 
"within days" once a decision had been taken to pursue 
one.  (Note: We have been unable to confirm a Washington 
Times report on December 21 that the state-controlled 
Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation had recently refused to 
air MDC campaign advertising.  End note.) 
 
Key Factors for MDC : Community Empowerment ... 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
-------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Mudzingwa said that a key to electoral success for 
the MDC lay in empowering communities -- giving citizens a 
sense that they could act politically without retribution. 
Whether the opposition would re-enter the election race 
would hinge on several factors all of which boiled down to 
one thing: the political will of the ruling party to let 
the MDC connect with the electorate.  For instance, while 
the opposition was demanding the repeal of repressive 
legislation it recognized that more important in the short 
term was how the GOZ applied the laws.  He claimed that MDC 
Secretary-General Welshman Ncube and Justice Minister 
 
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Patrick Chinamasa had discussed a practical accommodation, 
which would permit each side to go forward without losing 
face.  Mudzingwa added that voter education and "peace 
committees," which would mediate between the parties at 
local and national levels, were also potentially critical 
to community empowerment. 
 
... And GOZ-ZANU-PF Separation 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Another central issue for the MDC in weighing a 
return to the race would be the extent to which state 
machinery could be divorced from ruling party control. 
Having the GOZ resources behind ruling party efforts, 
including the impunity for ruling party violence, was a 
huge practical and psychological obstacle for the MDC, 
particularly in the rural hinterland.  The GOZ's use of 
food and other official largesse for political advantage 
may have lessened but still presented a problem for the 
election environment.  The GOZ was, for instance, now 
taking its limited largesse and distributing broadly it in 
key districts  to reinforce the message that the ruling 
party was delivering the goods. 
 
Obasanjo Engagement 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Reporting on Tsvangirai's mid-December trip to 
Nigeria, Mudzingwa said President Obasanjo had undertaken 
to approach South African President Mbeki and Mauritius 
President Berenger about the Zimbabwe situation.  According 
to Mudzingwa, Obasanjo said he wanted to see a "political 
solution" not a "legislative one" in Zimbabwe.  This meant 
some negotiated interim arrangement, an approach that was 
acceptable to Tsvangirai.  However, the MDC doubted the 
ruling ZANU-PF party's political will to reach such a 
negotiated solution.    Obasanjo and Tsvangirai agreed that 
a greater degree of tolerance between the parties and more 
open political space would be primary factors in generating 
progress in Zimbabwe. 
 
Tsvangirai's Washington Visit 
 
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-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Turning to Tsvangirai's planned visit to 
Washington, Mudzingwa advised that the Tsvangirai's 
calendar revolved around the elections, a date for which 
had yet to be announced.  If it were scheduled in the first 
two weeks of March, Tsvangirai may be compelled to remain 
on the campaign trail in Zimbabwe throughout February and 
would then prefer to visit Washington in late January. 
That said, he understood the scheduling challenges posed by 
inauguration and other Washington priorities and would 
remain as flexible as possible; the Washington visit was a 
high party priority. 
 
Comment 
------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) The MDC cannot have its cake and eat it too: to 
retain credibility with the electorate and in the region, 
it will have to hazard pursuing the limited opportunities 
presented by the GOZ, even if that would superficially 
bolster the ruling party's case for legitimacy with SADC. 
The opposition's dilemma alludes to a related USG policy 
challenge: is there a point at which our leverage and 
credibility will be served by acknowledging positive GOZ 
gestures while maintaining credible pressure for further 
meaningful change? 
 
DELL