This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 002049 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE, D. TEITELBAUM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MDC ON MARCH ELECTIONS; FUTURE EFFORTS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Chris W. Dell under Section 1.5 b/d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Over dinner on December 8, Morgan Tsvangirai 
and the MDC leadership laid out their plans for contesting 
the March parliamentary elections, should they decide to 
participate.  The Ambassador said the SADC countries appeared 
ready to bless the March elections regardless; Tsvangirai and 
his aides agreed.  MDC Secretary General Welshman Ncube 
argued that turning land reform against the GOZ could be a 
key not just to this election but to future elections as 
well.  The Ambassador urged that the MDC get better organized 
for the long fight ahead to bring democracy to Zimbabwe. 
Tsvangirai argued that the West could best help by &using8 
 
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the inevitable ZANU-PF overtures following the election 
rather than &spurning8 them.  Tsvangirai said he would 
carry that message to Washington in January, where a meeting 
with the President would be most welcome.  End Summary. 
 
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The March Elections and Beyond 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) During a wide-ranging discussion with MDC leader 
Morgan Tsvangirai at dinner December 8, Tsvangirai agreed 
with the Ambassador,s observation that it was increasingly 
clear that SADC countries would bless the elections, 
regardless of the outcome or process.  Tsvangirai added that 
the regional governments were showing signs of fatigue and 
wanted Zimbabwe &normalized,8 something that would never 
happen until there was real reform.  He said the MDC would 
make a final decision on whether to participate within the 
next two weeks.  (Comment: It,s increasingly clear the MDC 
will participate; SADC,s stance leaves then no real option.) 
 MDC Secretary General Welshman Ncube noted that the actual 
fraud would be less in the vote count than in the 
registration and delimitation (i.e., gerrymandering) 
processes going on now.  The Ambassador suggested it was 
important to get non-governmental regional groups, such as 
trade unions, churches, and other elements of African civil 
society to observe the elections and issue their own 
assessments likely to counter-balance the SADC white-washing. 
 
¶3. (C) During a discussion of land reform,s impact on the 
election, Ncube said turning this issue against the 
government would be a key to MDC electoral success not only 
in this but in future elections as well.  The precipitous 
decline in the agriculture sector had weakened the ZANU-PF 
since its base was with rural voters.  The MDC had to develop 
a message that ZANU-PF,s land reform had failed.  First, it 
had destroyed productivity.  Second, it had merely replaced a 
handful of large white commercial farmers with a handful of 
large black commercial farmers with close ties to the 
government.  He thought this message could resonate with 
rural voters but that the MDC also needed a positive message 
to restore agricultural productivity and to move the issue 
beyond race. 
 
¶4. (C) Tsvangirai agreed that rural voters had suffered 
disproportionately in the past three years from the regime,s 
economic policies.  He argued they were now more politically 
active than urban voters.  The MDC could win their votes if 
it could overcome their fear of the ruling party.  He 
suggested that one tactic would be to encourage rural voters 
to remain at the polling booths after voting and bear witness 
to the process.  This could serve to limit fraud.  In the 
cities, the MDC also had a difficult challenge: to inspire 
anew voters who had become cynical and apathetic as a result 
of two rigged elections and the survival of a regime that was 
destroying their standard of living.  Tsvangirai regretted 
that the MDC,s task was made immeasurably more difficult by 
its lack of access to the media, which put a premium on the 
MDC,s ability to organize at the grass roots level and get 
out the vote. 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador said this was exactly the right lesson 
to learn.  The MDC had to accept that it was in a long-term 
fight and had to organize to win that fight.  One suggestion, 
based on his recent trip to South Africa, was that the MDC 
assign working level operatives there to organize the 
Zimbabwean expatriate community.  This sizeable community was 
a potential source not just of important political support 
but of funding as well.  These operatives could also 
coordinate and push civil society organizations in South 
Africa with an interest in Zimbabwe but that too often became 
distracted by other matters. 
 
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ZANU-PF Party Congress 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked for MDC views of the recently 
concluded ZANU-PF party congress.  Tsvangirai said it had 
been a significant event.  Mugabe had shown that he was 
absolutely determined to have his way on the presidential 
succession.  However, the fallout from his heavy-handed 
tactics could be hard for him to manage.  The choice of Joyce 
Mujuru as his successor was likely to increase ethnic 
friction within the party since she came from the same ethnic 
sub-group as Mugabe.  If Mugabe failed to satisfy other clans 
within the Shona, Tsvangirai said anything was possible, 
including the disintegration of the ZANU-PF.  He also 
suggested that moderate elements within the ZANU-PF, with 
whom the MDC could work, were in the ascendancy following the 
congress.  Ncube disagreed, arguing that the extremists would 
remain in charge as long as Mugabe remained in charge. 
 
¶7. (C) Tsvangirai speculated that Mugabe might be planning to 
turn the reins of government over to Mujuru in the near 
future, perhaps after the elections if ZANU-PF obtains a 
two-thirds majority and can amend the constitution at will. 
Mugabe would retain his position as President of ZANU-PF, 
allowing him to wield effective power while delegating to 
Mujuru the task of negotiating an end to Zimbabwe,s 
political and economic crises with the opposition and the 
international community.  Ncube was quick to disagree, 
suggesting that Mugabe would never voluntarily relinquish the 
presidency and would likely run in 2008.  Both agreed, 
however, that Mujuru was genuinely popular, would be a 
formidable candidate and that the MDC had to tread carefully 
in attacking her. 
 
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U.S. Trip 
--------- 
 
¶8. (C) Tsvangirai said he had had a successful trip to London 
in November where he had made a pitch that bashing all things 
ZANU was counter-productive.  He was planning a trip to 
Canada and the U.S. for late January and would have a similar 
message.  The West should be prepared for overtures from the 
GOZ and he recommended that we &use8 those overtures to 
influence the regime rather than &spurn8 them. 
 
¶9. (C) Tsvangirai said his plan was to arrive in Washington a 
day or two after the inauguration.  The Ambassador cautioned 
that this was usually a time of great turbulence in 
Washington and asked if the visit could be delayed a week. 
Tsvangirai said the parliamentary elections were likely to be 
 
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in early to mid March and he and his team needed to be in 
Harare at least a month ahead of time.  Given those 
conditions, he thought a trip the last week of January would 
work. 
 
¶10. (C) The Ambassador suggested that Tsvangirai give some 
thought to whom he would want to see.  The Ambassador 
recommended that Tsvangirai ask to see Secretary-designate 
Rice, NSC Hadley, and key Senators, Congressmen, and their 
staffs.  Tsvangirai thought a meeting with President Bush 
would resonate positively and would demonstrate the depth of 
the U.S. commitment to democracy in Zimbabwe and Africa.  The 
Ambassador said he would discuss the possibility of such a 
meeting with Washington. 
 
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Comment 
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¶11. (C) We strongly support a meeting with the President and 
recommend it be discussed at the planned DC on Zimbabwe. 
Tsvangirai is for now the visible face of the democratic 
 
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opposition in Zimbabwe and the signal such a meeting would 
send would be a powerful reaffirmation that while we are 
prepared to work with the Mugabe regime, our goal remains a 
stable multi-party democracy in Zimbabwe.  In that regard, 
Ncube may be the more important interlocutor over time.  He 
seems to have a better feel than Tsvangirai of the importance 
of better organizing the MDC: in effect making the transition 
from a mass movement to a broad-based political party. 
DELL