This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 002036 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2009 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MDC OFFICIALS ON ELECTION PLANS, INTER-PARTY 
RELATIONS 
 
REF: HARARE 1562 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.5 b/d 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: During a lunch at the Residence on December 
8, MDC National Campaign Coordinator Ian Makoni and MDC MP 
(Mutare) Innocent Gonese updated the Ambassador on MDC 
election plans and inter-party relations.  They reported that 
the MDC was better organized than it had been in previous 
elections and was exploiting gradually opening campaign 
space.  The pair asserted that the opposition could win 85 of 
the 120 seats under the best of circumstances, that 60 would 
be a practical victory, and that 40 would likely be the low 
end absent massive fraud.    END SUMMARY. 
 
Election Preparations 
------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) According to Makoni, the MDC's election strategy had 
four pillars: (1) pressure for free and fair elections; (2) 
preparation for the elections; (3) campaigning; and (4) 
securing the vote.  He asserted that the party had learned 
lessons from previous elections, when it had underestimated 
the extent to which the ruling party would rig the election. 
This year the party would likely eschew street action in 
favor of focusing on the polling station.  He acknowledged 
that International Republican Institute representatives who 
were working with the party were disappointed not to see more 
visible activism, but stressed the importance of grassroots 
electoral organization, which was "almost done." Gonese added 
that full access to the media was the potential key to an MDC 
success in the elections. 
 
¶3.  (C) Makoni reported that the opposition was much better 
organized than it had been for the national parliamentary 
elections in 2000 or the presidential election in 2002.  This 
would be the first time the party had structures all the way 
down to the village level.  The party previously relied 
largely on establishing an emotional connection with the 
electorate; now it had recognized individuals who could 
engage on a personal level in practically every community. 
This would be especially important on election day if the 
party hoped to counter an intimidating ZANU-PF presence at 
many polling stations.  In this vein, Makoni reported that 
MDC voters would be encouraged to remain at polling stations 
after they had voted -- a safety-in-numbers strategy.  The 
party nonetheless still needed to develop more street-level 
structures analogous to the ZANU-PF cells.  The two conceded 
that there were frictions within the opposition but 
maintained that Morgan Tsvangirai continued to enjoy broad 
and deep support throughout the party. 
 
¶4.  (C) The pair confirmed that the party was continuing to 
see more campaign space in some areas (a trend noted three 
months ago in reftel).  Police were being more responsive to 
applications for meetings and were suppressing violence in 
some areas on a non-partisan basis.  Chiefs and war veterans 
in certain areas were actively contributing to a lowering of 
temperatures, and party supporters were wearing MDC T-shirts 
in areas previously regarded as "no-go" zones.  No-go areas 
remained and intimidation continued to be a significant 
obstacle but party structures were alert to exploit space as 
it opened. 
 
Election Prospects 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Makoni and Gonese ruminated on their party's 
prospects for the March parliamentary elections.  Makoni said 
he considered 40 seats "safe" for the MDC and another 45 
"marginal" seats that could go either way.  (N.B. Leaving 35 
safe seats for ZANU-PF.)  He said for the opposition to win 
85 seats the election playing field would have to be level. 
Realistically, the MDC hoped to get 60 seats -- half the 120 
contested seats (30 more seats are appointed by the 
President) -- which would be a significant moral and 
practical victory.  If the party were able to win an outright 
majority of the seats, it would not change the actual 
imbalance of power given the executive's dominant authority 
under the constitution, but it could force ZANU-PF to deal 
with the MDC.  Even the low end of 40 seats would be a 
success in the sense of consolidating the tradition of a 
signficant opposition presence in Zimbabwe's parliament. 
 
Speculating on Ruling Party Intentions 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶6.  (C) Asked to comment on ruling party intentions, the pair 
dismissed the possibility that the GOZ would conduct 
by-elections to fill the seats recently vacated by MDC MP 
Stanley Makwembebe's death and MDC MP Roy Bennett's 
incarceration.  (Note: If won by ZANU-PF, the two seats would 
give it a 2/3 majority in Parliament -- sufficient to amend 
the constitution on its own.  End note.)  Bennett was 
appealing and there was insufficient time to give adequate 
legal notice and conduct the elections in any event, 
especially given the ruling party's absorption with its 
legislative agenda and primaries.  Moreover, ZANU-PF was 
confident it would win a 2/3 majority in the March election 
and planned to engineer the constitutional amendment then. 
 
¶7.  (C) Makoni noted the convergence of interests within 
ZANU-PF for a new constitution and prospects for Mugabe to 
step down.  The new constitution was expected to require that 
a Vice-President assume the Presidency for the remainder of 
the President's term if he stepped down, instead of requiring 
a national election within 90 days as stipulated by the 
current constitution.  This essentially would permit Mugabe 
to have his chosen successor remain in office for an extended 
period, rather than submit to the uncertainty or potential 
divisiveness of an immediate election.  Makoni speculated 
that Mugabe would then run in 2008, only to step down quickly 
in favor of a presumably trusted successor to hold office 
(and protect him) until 2014. 
 
¶8.  (C) The pair expressed little doubt that Mugabe would be 
able to hold his party together for the foreseeable future, 
notwithstanding the very real divisions exposed in the run-up 
to the ZANU-PF Party Congress.  They forecast that many of 
the upcoming ZANU-PF primaries would be tense, not so much 
over tribal issues as intense personal rivalries. 
 
Comment 
------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) The substance and tenor of the pair's remarks give 
every indication that the MDC will eventually end its 
"conditional suspension of participation" in the March 
elections.  Re-entry into the race poses some interesting 
challenges to the opposition, though.  Given its stated 
condition for re-entry -- a level playing field -- re-entry 
risks conferring some implicit degree of legitimacy on 
ZANU-PF's superficial measures to address electoral 
imbalances.  At the same time, the ruling party shows growing 
signs of wanting the MDC in the election so as to confer 
legitimacy, so re-entry is a substantive political chit (one 
of the few that the MDC holds) for which the MDC will want to 
derive maximum payment.  Re-entry also will technically 
qualify the MDC for access to the state media pursuant to 
SADC electoral principles and guidelines to which the GOZ has 
subscribed.  Finally, officially rejoining the race and 
campaigning more vigorously may provoke an increase in 
political violence that so far has remained below historical 
levels associated with elections.  The party's national 
executive reportedly will meet this weekend to reconsider its 
participation. 
DELL