This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 003977 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR TSHANNON AND CBARTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA'S MAGNATE DISCUSSES CHAVEZ AND THE REGION 
 
Classified By: William R. Brownfield, Ambassador, 
for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C ) SUMMARY.  Gustavo Cisneros, who has massive business 
interests in Venezuela and throughout the Western Hemisphere, 
believes we should prepare for a more confrontational, 
long-term approach to Hugo Chavez; we have a lot of work 
ahead of us to develop a coherent regional containment 
policy; and the USG should engage more broadly in Latin 
America.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) At his request, Venezuelan magnate Gustavo Cisneros 
(Cisneros Group, Univision, Venevision, Direct TV, Regional 
Beer) met with Ambassador evening of December 28.  Cisneros 
planned to meet with the President in early January and 
wanted to compare notes on Venezuela before the conversation. 
 In light of Cisneros' meeting, his key points are summarized 
below.  Please protect. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Venezuela Internal: Stay Focused; Think Long Term 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶3. (C) Cisneros believes Chavez came out of the recall 
referendum stronger than before.  We must think of him as a 
long-term problem.  He will be weakened and vulnerable 
eventually, but not now. 
 
-- There is no political opposition at present.  It is 
completely atomized.  USG short-term internal policy should 
focus on the independent press.  Among the newspapers, only 
"El Nacional" and "El Universal" are reliable opposition 
supporters.  All other print media has caved in to Chavez. 
 
-- USG should pick carefully the issues on which it confronts 
Chavez.  Don't respond to him.  Challenge him on issues that 
he does not want to discuss. 
 
-- We should pay attention, monitor, and collect information 
on the corrupt activities of Chavez supporters.  These are 
not front burner issues today, but will eventually pay big 
dividends. 
 
-- Sumate is the most effective opposition NGO in Venezuela 
today, even after four months of legal intimidation by 
Chavez.  That said, the USG should be careful about funding 
it.  Sumate needs more funding from European sources to 
protect it from accusations of being a US pawn. 
 
-- The USG should be clear and precise in its criticism of 
Chavez.  Internal opposition and regional governments need to 
know that they are not tackling Chavez alone. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Venezuela External: Tough Times for Containment 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4. (C) Cisneros believes that regional and international 
containment is the only realistic policy toward Chavez right 
now.  He is not optimistic about massive support.  He is 
convinced that without clear US leadership, there will be no 
containment whatsoever. 
 
-- Among the Europeans, Spain is the greatest disappointment. 
 The loss of Aznar was fatal.  Zapatero not only will not 
confront Chavez; he is actively courting him and blocking EU 
efforts to challenge Chavez. 
 
-- The UK and Netherlands are the only Europeans willing to 
make an effort to take on Chavez.  Italy's Berlusconi will 
engage if the issue is brought to him, but his Foreign 
Ministry and Embassy in Caracas are adamantly opposed to 
political engagement. 
 
-- France has a good and tough Ambassador in Caracas, but he 
cannot deliver his government. 
 
¶5. (C) The Latin Americans are in full flight: 
 
-- Lula in Brazil is increasingly annoyed and frustrated with 
Chavez.  But he will not risk being outflanked from the left 
by actively taking him on. 
 
-- Cisneros once thought Chile's Ricardo Lagos had the 
stomach to stand up to Chavez, but Lagos is now contemplating 
an early 2005 invitation to Chavez for a state visit. 
Cisneros suspects Lagos is reinforcing his coalition's left 
flank in preparation for the 2005 presidential elections. 
 
-- Colombia's Uribe has the biggest problems with Chavez of 
 
all the Latin Americans, but Cisneros thinks he will accept a 
deal with Chavez to give him some stability on the border 
with Venezuela. 
 
-- Vicente Fox has backed off confrontation with Chavez, 
probably to avoid giving Lopez Obrador a leftist campaign 
issue against the PAN in the next presidential elections. 
 
-- Chavez has purchased most of the Caribbean micro-states, 
as well as the Dominican Republic, with subsidized oil sales. 
 
-- The lack of Latin American leadership on Venezuela makes 
the selection of the next OAS Secretary General incredibly 
important.  El Salvador's Flores is clearly the candidate 
most willing to take a firm line on Chavez.  Cisneros was 
also positive on Chile's Insulza.  Cisneros found him to be 
tough and pragmatic.  Mexico's Derbez would be a disaster; 
once clear of Fox's oversight and control, he would lurch to 
the left. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
U.S. Policy in the Region: Time to Re-engage 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Cisneros closed by assuring that he would urge senior 
USG officials to re-engage in Latin America.  During the 
three-plus years that we had focused on international 
terrorism and the Middle East, China had moved visibly into 
the region.  Our relatively passive position gave Hugo Chavez 
operating room.  Cisneros thinks the solution for the U.S. 
was partly one of resources (i.e. ) put more money into 
Latin American programs) and partly a question of greater USG 
visibility. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) Mr. Cisneros is a man of strong opinions.  That said, 
when he cites the position or opinion of a Latin American or 
European leader by name, odds are good that he has actually 
heard it directly from the leader's own mouth. 
Brownfield 
 
 
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      2004CARACA03977 - CONFIDENTIAL