This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 005302 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/UMB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UP RS PL EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU COMMITTED TO SENDING A POSITIVE MESSAGE TO KIEV 
 
REF: A. BRUSSELS 5258 
 
     ¶B. WARSAW 5290 
     ¶C. KIEV 4927 
     ¶D. MOSCOW 15312 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF EMAZUR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) The December 13 GAERC endorsed a European Neighborhood 
Policy "Action Plan" (AP) for EU-Ukraine cooperation, billing 
it as part of an effort to send a positive signal to Kiev. 
In fact, the AP's provisions remain unchanged from the draft 
which existed prior to the recent events, and offer little to 
Ukraine, especially on the big question of possible EU 
accession.  Member States, we are told, remain split along 
geographic lines regarding Ukrainian membership.  Those who 
support the idea are moving slowly to get opponents 
&accustomed to the thought8 of Ukraine in Europe.  The EU 
is pleased its recent efforts demonstrated EU willingness to 
act, even in the face of Russian opposition.  End Summary. 
 
Going the extra mile for Ukraine? 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The December 13 General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) session endorsed the EU's Action Plan (AP) 
for Ukraine (along with several others) under the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP).  Council official Carl Hartzell 
told us that the GAERC understood the importance of sending a 
positive signal to Ukraine to reinforce the country,s 
democratic changes.  Hartzell said the GAERC also tasked the 
High Representative Javier Solana and External Relations 
Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner with preparing a proposal 
that would commit the EU to be more &forthcoming in setting 
an ambitious agenda.8  According to Hartzell, Solana and 
Ferrero-Waldner will probably present their ideas as soon as 
the next GAERC on January 31, 2005.  He suggested the 
February GAERC may decide on its adoption.  Hartzell noted 
that the EU,s &philosophy8 toward Ukraine remains 
unchanged: Ukraine must deliver on common values, such as 
commitment to democracy, human rights, and media freedom. 
What is different, he said, was that with a new Ukrainian 
president in office, the EU would be willing to set the AP 
provisions in motion.  Heads of State and Government at the 
European Council meeting on December 16-17 will issue brief 
Conclusions on Ukraine reflecting the GAERC discussions. 
 
No support for membership, for now 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The EU,s attitude regarding Ukraine,s EU accession 
likewise remains unmoved.  The Commission's Head of Unit for 
Political Affairs for Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus 
Hilde Hardeman (protect) shared with us that on December 8 
the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) President 
assessed Ukraine,s EU accession chances as having &no 
shadow of support.8  Hardeman and Hartzell separately 
dismissed Ferrero-Waldner,s statement that the EU is ¬ 
closing any doors8 as the RELEX Commissioner's personal 
opinion -- one that would not affect the EU,s final 
decision.  Hartzell added he would be "extremely surprised8 
if the European Council raised the issue in the next few 
months.  Similarly, Polish First Secretary Cezary Bardzinski 
(protect) told us it would &take a miracle8 for the EU to 
offer Ukraine membership even in a long-term perspective.  At 
most, he said, in 2006 the EU might revise the Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) to include a &vague vision 
of potential membership.8 
 
¶4. (C) Explaining the EU stance, Hartzell argued that free 
and fair elections were an insufficient criterion for EU 
membership, pointing to Moldova,s free and fair elections 
that failed to qualify the country as a candidate.  Hartzell, 
however, acknowledged that free and fair elections in Ukraine 
would constitute a new circumstance that would require the EU 
to respond with a positive signal, which he was certain would 
be limited to a more generous assistance package. 
 
The EU satisfied with its approach 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The EU appears pleased with its recent efforts on 
behalf of Ukraine, such as the adoption of the Action Plan 
and Solana,s mediation.  Council Secretariat,s Carl 
Hallergard told us that the timing of the AP's endorsement 
was chosen to send a decisive signal of the EU,s support for 
the democratic process in Ukraine.  The endorsement 
demonstrated the EU,s willingness to push despite Russia,s 
refusal to engage on the EU neighborhood policy.  Hartzell 
acknowledged that the Council was satisfied with Solana,s 
role in &setting the rules of the game8 and &felt much 
better8 after the Rada approved what the EU viewed as the 
crucial issues -- the electoral law reform and the dismissal 
of the Central Electoral Commission (note: the Rada also 
passed constitutional amendments). 
¶6. (C) Nevertheless, EU officials and diplomats agree that 
the ball is in Ukraine,s court, which must demonstrate its 
long-term commitment to democracy and human rights.  For its 
part, the EU is now focused on providing approximately 3 
million euros funding and observers for the December 26 third 
election round.  There is political will to have as many 
observers as possible, according to Hallergard.  At the same 
time, Hartzell and Council Secretariat,s Annika Weidemann 
shared with us that the OSCE officials had told them that 
they might be unable to handle more than 1,000 observers for 
logistical reasons. 
 
Getting to a yes: a long-term perspective 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The EU,s approach toward Ukraine will remain 
&neither yes nor no8 regarding the country,s candidacy, 
according to Bardzinski, partly because Member States are 
almost equally split along geographic lines in their attitude 
toward potential Ukrainian accession.  Bardzinski said 
Poland's views face &significant resistance8 from Germany, 
France, the Benelux, and the countries of the Mediterranean. 
He said that Poland would work on changing the opponents, 
current &allergic reaction8 to Ukrainian EU membership by 
getting them &accustomed to the thought8 that Ukraine 
belongs in Europe over the next several years.  Bardzinski 
told us that opponents feared Russia's reaction, and also 
worried about language creep in which a reference to 
potential long-term Ukrainian accession evolves into a 
surprise membership offer.  Nevertheless, Member States such 
as the Nordics, the Baltic states, and the Visegrad four 
insist the EU must act immediately to intensify cooperation 
with Ukraine beyond the Action Plan and refocus the EU's 
attention more eastward than it has done thus far. 
 
¶8. (C) European Commission,s Russia Desk Officer Michael 
Miller (protect) told us that Russian aggressive Cold War 
rhetoric on Ukraine would be difficult for Russia to reverse. 
 He noted that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
was &extremely emotional and irrational8 about US 
assistance to Georgia, and linked the democratic developments 
in Tbilisi to the events in Ukraine as both US-funded and 
US-instigated.  Miller shared with us that the Russian MFA 
warned the EU that a potential split in Ukraine would be the 
West,s fault.  Miller noted that the Ukrainian election 
provided an opportunity for the US and the EU to work 
together on the shared goal of promoting democracy and human 
rights. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) Recent events in Ukraine have not altered the current 
EU policy toward Ukraine in any fundamental way.  The EU has 
offered to include the country in its &ring of friends8 -- 
and no more.  Mention of a distant accession appears to 
prompt an allergic reaction in some major Member States. 
They insist on keeping Ukraine in the ENP category -- 
effectively excluding it from eventual membership -- despite 
the push by some veteran and new members to move beyond the 
ENP,s Action Plan.  The possible election of opposition 
candidate Victor Yushchenko may force the EU to redefine its 
relationship and could increase pressure on the EU to 
consider the possibility of eventual EU membership.  EU 
advocates of Ukrainian accession have little leverage over 
the opponents, who already consider the EU overwhelmed by the 
last round of EU enlargement, and are struggling with their 
crucial decision on Turkey. 
 
MCKINLEY