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Viewing cable 04BRASILIA3100, DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVSIOR SHIRZAD'S NOV,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04BRASILIA3100 2004-12-17 18:39 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BRASILIA 003100 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR FARYAR SHIRZAD/TOM SHANNON 
STATE PASS USTR 
DEPT OF TREASURY FOR FPARODI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2014 
TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD ECIN EINV BR BL AR
SUBJECT: DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVSIOR SHIRZAD'S NOV, 
22-23 MEETINGS WITH BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC POLICYMAKERS AND 
PRIVATE SECTOR CONTACTS 
 
REF: BRASILIA 2447 
 
Classified By: ECONOMIC COUNSELOR BRUCE WILLIAMSON, REASON 1.4(B). 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.  At a November 22 dinner 
for visiting Deputy National Security Advisor Faryar Shirzad 
and NSC Director Del Renigar,  senior executives of key 
Brazilian and multinational companies questioned Brazil's 
continued membership in Mercosur (in its current 
configuration as a customs union), noting that Argentina, in 
particular, is preventing Mercosur from entering into 
meaningful trade agreements.  The next day Shirzad and 
Renigar traveled to Brazilia for a series of meetings with 
senior GOB economic policymakers.  Among the delegation's 
interlocutors were Finance Minister Antonio Palocci, Central 
Bank Governor Henrique Meirelles, Presidential Foreign Policy 
Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia, and Foreign Ministry Under 
Secretaries Clodoaldo Hugueney (WTO and Bilateral Trade) and 
 
SIPDIS 
Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares (South America and FTAA).  The 
wide-ranging discussions with the GOB touched upon a variety 
of issues, including prospects for the Doha Round, views of 
Brazilian business towards trade talks, regional economic 
integration, the future of Mercosur, the state of play on 
FTAA, and macro-economic, monetary, and tax policy.  The 
highlights:  U/S Hugueney had specific thoughts about how to 
best proceed on the Doha Round; Presidential Advisor Garcia 
disclosed that the GOB did not plan to renew its IMF Standby 
program upon when it expired in March 2005; Finance Minister 
Palocci expressed concern about the need for an adjustment in 
the USG's current account; and Central Bank Governor 
Meirelles made it very clear that he and FinMin Palocci were 
the ones dictating GOB orthodox macro-economic policies (and 
that these policies would continue). END SUMMARY AND 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 
WTO Doha Agenda 
--------------- 
 
2.  (C)  Ambassador Clodoaldo Hugueney, Under Secretary for 
Economics and Technological Affairs, provided a comprehensive 
review of GoB interests and expectations for progress in the 
WTO Doha Development Agenda trade talks.  Hugueney was 
explicit that the Doha Round is the GoB,s top trade 
priority.  He said the GoB prefers multilateral negotiations 
because they will provide greater commercial gains than 
bilateral or regional accords due to Brazil,s diversified 
trade structure (in terms of products and export markets). 
Hugueney noted that a recent World Bank study had reached a 
similar conclusion, and registered concern that the growing 
number of bilateral and regional negotiations could divert 
attention from the Doha Round.  Hugueney pointed out that 
certain issues, such as agricultural subsidies, which are 
central to agricultural liberalization -- a key GoB interest, 
can only be solved at the WTO level.  As a further benefit of 
the multilateral talks, he noted the more abundant 
opportunities for various trade-offs, which can help to 
facilitate negotiations from the domestic side.  (Note. 
Hugueney added that he believed fewer trade-off possibilities 
was largely to blame for the failure to conclude FTAA and 
Mercosur-EU negotiations.) 
 
Doha Timing 
----------- 
 
3.  (C)  According to GoB thinking, the Doha Round needs to 
be completed by the end of 2006 -- before the mid-2007 
expiration of an extended Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). 
Should the negotiations drag into 2007, Hugueney contemplated 
two scenarios, both undesirable from a GoB perspective.  In 
one scenario, negotiators facing a mid-2007 cut-off would 
adopt a quick-fix, reducing the scope of the agreement. 
Alternatively, he foresaw the possibility of protracted 
negotiations, extending way beyond 2007 due to a hiatus 
awaiting passage of new TPA legislation.  Hugueney downplayed 
any possible affect from Brazilian presidential elections in 
2006 on a Doha timeframe, claiming a broad domestic consensus 
exists in favor of the negotiations and Itamaraty,s handling 
of them. 
4.  (C)  Hugueney argued that the following elements need to 
be in place by the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial to 
make possible a 2006 end-date: agreement must be reached on 
modalities for agriculture negotiations; there must be a 
refinement of the scope for industrial products; revised 
offers for services must be made; as well as progress on 
development issues, including cotton, implementation, and 
special and differential treatment.  While noting that 
"accidents," such as TPA initial expiration, changeover of EU 
Commissioners, and CAP reform, could complicate the 
discussions, he believed these objectives are feasible by the 
Hong Kong meeting.  While not mentioning Brazil,s own 
candidate for the WTO DG job, Hugueney said he hoped the 
selection process would be less contentious than last time 
lest it slow down the negotiations.  Certain institutional 
issues, such as inadequate secretariat funding and 
ineffective organization for support of the negotiations, 
also need to be addressed, but he believed could be handled 
in discussions parallel to the substantive negotiations. 
 
Progress by Hong Kong 
--------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  The agriculture modality talks will hinge on market 
access, according to Hugueney, who described market access 
barriers as the last line of defense for many developing 
countries, which do not have the resources to utilize export 
and domestic support.  He argued against a legalistic 
approach toward defining criteria for graduation of 
developing countries, which he claimed would mire the 
negotiations.  Instead Hugueney pressed for a more common 
sense approach saying its obvious that the same rules cannot 
apply to vastly different types of countries, such as 
Switzerland and India.  When asked by D/NSA Shirzad to 
elaborate, Hugueney cited the extent of a country,s rural 
poverty and subsistence farming as examples of factors that 
should be considered.  However, he claimed Brazil would be 
willing to take on different market access commitments from 
other developing countries because of its overall 
competitiveness in agriculture, despite the fact that it also 
still has severe problems with rural poverty. 
 
6.  (C)  Hugueney said Brazil will continue to play a key 
role in keeping the G-20 constructively engaged in the 
process, but cautioned that a refusal by others to make 
accommodations in market access rules for members which are 
more defensive on agriculture would likely push them more in 
line with the protectionist G-10, making an agreement much 
more difficult to reach.  Although diverse tariff structures 
and differences in offensive and defensive interests present 
challenges for the G-20, Hugueney said the group will 
continue to formulate proposals.  He added that the G-20 is 
committed to achieving agriculture modalities by Hong Kong. 
(The next G-20 Ministerial is slated for February in New 
Delhi.) 
 
How to Move Forward 
------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  Hugueney opined that the Five Interested Parties 
(FIP) group worked well when convened at minister level, but 
was frustrating at the high-official level.  He said the GoB 
recognizes that some type of small group process is essential 
for making deals, but did not think it useful to reconvene 
the FIPs until perhaps March or April next year.  In the 
intervening months, Hugueney suggested ramped-up 
consultations, perhaps even a mini-ministerial, to assuage 
the concern of some countries over exclusion from the FIP 
process and to better identify issues.  An FIP meeting in 
March/April could then kick off a more intensive phase of 
negotiations to produce results before the last sessions of 
the Agriculture Committee and General Council in July.  At 
that point, it should be possible to articulate what would be 
the preferred/possible outcome in Hong Kong -- if not full 
modalities for agriculture, perhaps a partial package.  In 
the run up to Hong Kong, attention would have to be paid to 
both specific issues and to the emerging package as a whole. 
 
 
Receptiveness of Brazilian Industry to Trade Talks 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
8.  (C)  D/NSA Shirzad queried Hugueney regarding the 
attitudes of Brazilian industry towards multilateral trade 
talks and whether the GOB periodically consulted with the 
country's private sector.  Hugueney replied he regularly 
conducted such consultations, and that one could detect three 
general clusters of industry views.  First, there was a bloc 
of modern firms, whose managers strongly favored trade 
liberalization as their competes were well positioned to take 
advantage of increased opportunities in foreign markets.  A 
second cluster of companies, still most dependent on domestic 
sales, was less enthusiastic about trade talks, though with 
support and a new generation of investment would be able to 
compete should highly-efficient foreign firms enter the 
market.  Problems arose, however, with regard to the third 
cluster of firms, which if further market opening took place 
would not be competitive no matter how much time they had to 
prepare.  Fortunately, he said, this third cluster -- which 
vehemently opposed the FTAA -- has not been vocal in 
opposition to the WTO Doha Round. 
 
FTAA 
---- 
 
9.  (C)  Ambassador Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares, Under 
Secretary for South America, provided a less detailed and 
 
SIPDIS 
less enthusiastic discourse on FTAA negotiations to Shirzad, 
Renigar and emboffs.  First, Macedo Soares emphasized the 
importance of South America in President Lula,s foreign 
policy, noting institutional changes within the Foreign 
Ministry that reflect its commitment to follow through on 
this long-standing Brazilian interest.  On the negotiations 
themselves, he recapped the main FTAA events leading up to 
last year,s Miami Ministerial, as well as the subsequent 
Trade Negotiating Committee meeting in February of this year 
and smaller group discussions, which failed to reach 
agreement on implementation of the Miami compromise.  Macedo 
Soares insisted that Mercosul,s proposal last year to change 
the FTAA reflected an interest in finding a way forward for 
the negotiations given the paralysis that existed within the 
negotiating groups, a paralysis resulting not from Brazilian 
interests, but from differing positions between all the FTAA 
countries. 
 
10.  (C)  Although the FTAA negotiations are currently 
"dormant," Macedo Soares opined that all parties want to go 
on with the negotiations once establishment of the framework 
is complete.  On timing, he said he "supposed" the 
negotiations will be complete next year, after first saying 
the GoB was "open to," he then changed to "would like to" 
host a ministerial in the first semester of next year.  When 
asked by D/NSA Shirzad about implications should the FTAA 
remain stalled, Macedo Soares noted that the U.S. has active 
bilateral negotiations within the region and that it is in 
the interests of all that there be an agreement covering 
Mercosul as well.  He claimed there should be no doubt 
Mercosur favors free-trade and said characterization of 
Mercosul as "systemically less ambitious" is unfair, even if 
there are instances when economic interests and asymmetries 
warrant less ambition. 
 
Mercosur-EU 
---------------- 
 
11.  (C)  According to Macedo Soares, the GoB has lost no 
enthusiasm for reaching a trade deal with the EU, and has 
interpreted agreement by the new EU Commission to hold a 
meeting shortly after its investiture as signaling a similar 
level of commitment from that bloc.  (Note: The December 2 
meeting in Rio is reportedly only to allow technical staff to 
set up a work plan; a Ministerial is planned for next March. 
End note.)   Macedo Soares confirmed GoB aspirations for 
Mercosur to transform into a EU-type common market.  He noted 
Brazilian interests in strengthening the political dimension 
of the bloc, including development of a Mercosur Parliament, 
and the on-going work to update the 1994 Ouro Preto protocol 
to reflect institutional changes over the last ten years.  He 
downplayed the bloc,s internal difficulties assuring us that 
the EU has had its share of problems without facing collapse, 
and rejected recent calls from some quarters for Brazil to 
negotiate trade agreements independent from its Mercosur 
partners, claiming it is precisely negotiation as a bloc that 
prompted EU interest in a trade deal.  (Note.  Roberto 
Gianetti da Fonseca, new head of the Sao Paulo Federation of 
Industries, Foreign Trade Department, recently proposed that 
Mercosul devolve into a free-trade area allowing its members 
to negotiate separate trade agreements.) 
 
State of Play in South America 
------------------------------ 
 
12.  (C)  "Very bad" was Macedo Soares, stark assessment of 
the state of affairs in South America.  This is one reason, 
he noted, for the current push toward regional integration -- 
to establish a "system" of countries that can act as a 
support structure and to foster greater cooperation.  (Note. 
Unclear if he was referring to the South American Community 
of Nations initiative to be signed in Cuzco, Peru on December 
9. End note.)  He pointed out the substantial physical 
barriers to movement between the countries of South America 
and identified transportation infrastructure projects as a 
priority for the region.  He also noted that politically, 
countries of the region are becoming much more open to 
cooperation, placing aside issues of sovereignty in accepting 
assistance from neighboring countries.  A case in point was 
the solicitation by a number of countries (Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua, Ecuador) for Brazilian support during the recent 
Rio Group meeting.  The GoB is also trying to strengthen 
President Mesa of Bolivia by providing deliverables, such as 
forgiveness of the Bolivian debt, but Macedo Soares described 
his situation as precarious. 
 
Central Bank Governor Meirelles and FinMin Palocci 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
13.  (SBU)  D/NSA Shirzad also met (separately) with Central 
Bank Governor Henrique Meirelles and Finance Minister Antonio 
Palocci.  Meirelles stated that Brazil is living its best 
economic moment in his lifetime.  GDP growth rates over the 
last three quarters had exceeded six percent, he said, and 
the economy was continuing to grow strongly, albeit at a 
decreasing rate.  While in the past Brazil had experienced 
brief episodes of growth (average growth over the last 
decade, for example, was only 1.8%), the current expansion, 
he argued, was on a much more sustainable footing than past 
recoveries, primarily because of the strongly positive 
external accounts.  The trade surplus, he declared, driven by 
booming and well-diversified exports, had led to a strong 
current account surplus.  Debt levels were falling, as were 
risk indicators such as exports as a percentage of GDP.  The 
trade surplus was feeding the foreign exchange market at the 
rate of $150 million/day, he observed, and the dollar was 
weakening against the real.  The recovery was also capital 
goods and consumer-durables led, which suggested increasing 
investment. 
 
14.  (SBU)  According to Meirelles, despite the current 
elevated growth numbers, potential GDP growth was only about 
3.0 to 3.5%. When inflation began to re-emerge, he continued, 
the Central Bank tightened monetary policy to try to bring 
growth towards that level.  Meirelles felt that an 
inflationary bias in the economy still remained from the 
period of hyperinflation, when industrialists played the game 
of adjusting their prices faster than wages could adjust.  He 
called such price increases short-sighted, as the erosion in 
workers' purchasing power had contributed to subsequent 
recessions.  It would take continued growth in investment 
levels to expand the economy's potential growth capacity, he 
concluded. 
 
15.  (SBU)  Meirelles felt that the GOB's microeconomic 
agenda (i.e, bankruptcy reform, judicial reform, creation of 
a mortgage market) would begin to improve the business 
environment.   Central Bank independence would help, he 
added, although he was uncertain the proposed legislation to 
implement this would be approved next year.  Moreover, he 
suggested that the Administration's focus on Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) as tools to attract necessary 
infrastructure investment was overblown, arguing instead that 
straightforward concessions made more sense.  He was cautious 
about how quickly these measures would have an effect, 
venturing that "Brazil won't hit sustained 6% growth right 
away."  But, even sustaining 3.5% growth would be double the 
rate of the last decade, he continued, and sustained growth 
would, in turn, encourage investment. 
 
16. (SBU) Having just returned from the Berlin finance G-20 
meeting, Meirelles was not concerned in the short-run about 
the weakening dollar.  There is no reason to panic, he said, 
although there clearly needed to be an adjustment of the U.S. 
current account numbers in the longer term.  Finance Minister 
Palocci, by contrast, appeared concerned about the manner in 
which this adjustment took place.  He stated that an 
adjustment must be made, and could be implemented either by 
the market or by monetary authorities.  Palocci said he hoped 
the U.S. authorities would do so, in order to ensure it was a 
gradual process.  It is the uncertainty about the manner of 
adjustment, less so than the adjustment itself, that could 
hurt open, emerging markets such as Brazil, Palocci opined. 
 
17.  (SBU) Palocci assured Shirzad that, while occasionally 
the subject of public controversy, there would be no 
backtracking on the GoB's orthodox macroeconomic policies. 
The task for the future, he stated, was to consolidate the 
microeconomic reforms, e.g., improving the business 
environment, strengthening credit markets and extending their 
reach, and improving the functioning of securities markets. 
The tax burden was high, Palocci admitted, noting the GOB was 
targetting tax reductions to stimulate long terms savings and 
reduce the tax burden on items that are staples for the poor. 
 He added that tax reductions also would be accorded to small 
businesses through a bill, recently sent to Congress, that 
would reduce the number and rates of taxes on small 
businesses and simplify business registration in an effort to 
reduce informality in the economy. 
 
18. (SBU) Turning to regional issues, Palocci admitted that 
he had some concerns about Argentina and Bolivia.  If 
Argentina did not reach a reasonable agreement with its 
creditors and its current growth stalled, it could cause some 
pain in the region, he said.  He did not foresee much direct 
effect from an Argentine crisis on the markets' pricing of 
Brazil risk, but worried about the liquidity effects as 
investors reconsidered their overall appetite for emerging 
market risk.  Bolivia, is "always tense," Palocci ventured, 
adding that the GOB has had an ongoing dialogue with both 
President Mesa and the opposition.  In addition to urging 
moderation, he observed, Brazil hopes to develop useful 
relationships that would allow it to play a mediating role, 
if necessary. 
 
Slightly Different View from Presidential Advisor Garcia 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
19.  (C)   In addition, D/NSA Shirzad met with GOB 
Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia, a 
long-time Workers Party stalwart with close ties to Lula. 
Garcia spent much of the meeting discussing the economic 
chaos Lula inherited upon assuming office and the steps the 
president has taken to right the economy.  Although Garcia 
cited much the same glowing economic numbers as Central Bank 
Chief Meirelles and FinMin Palocci, his presentation differed 
in several important respects. 
 
--  While Meirelles merely referred to the possibility of the 
GOB declining to renew its Standby Agreement with the IMF, 
Garcia stated that a definitive decision had been taken to 
forego an IMF program when the current agreement expired in 
March 2005, 
 
--  Unlike Meirelles - who thought that the maximum the 
Brazilian economy could expand without reigniting inflation 
was 3 to 3.5 percent - Garcia opined that sustainable growth 
of 4.5 to 4.7 percent was possible.  (Garcia noted that 
between 1930 and 1980, the country grew at an average growth 
rate of 6.7 percent.) 
 
--  In contrast to Meirelles and Palocci, who made clear that 
the GOB would maintain high interest rates as long as needed 
to staunch inflation, Garcia thought it essntial to lower 
interest rates as soon as possible to simulate investment. 
BNDES and the state-run commercial banks (Banco do Brasil, 
Caixa Economic Federal, and the GOB's Savings and Loan Bank) 
could shoulder the burden of financing much-needed public 
infrastructure investment, but lower rates overall were 
needed to generate a public/private investment boom. 
 
--  Garcia stated that the GOB would likely soon begin 
replenishing its international foreign exchange reserves 
given that the real had appreciated against the falling 
dollar.  With the lapse of the IMF Stand-by Program next 
year, he said, the GOB would have to do without immediate 
access to USD 25 million in potential IMF support -- though 
the GOB's estimated USD 9 billion current account surplus 
made the problem of foreign exchange supply much less acute. 
 
--  Garcia also proved fairly sanguine regarding the ability 
of the GOB to straighten out in short order its social safety 
net programs,  He thought that the Bolsa Familia program in 
which 4.5 million families participated in 2003, could be 
expanded to 6 families by the end of 2004 and 40 million by 
the end of 2006.  Similarly, he foresaw expansion in the 
coming months of the GOB's agricultural credit programs for 
small farmers -- which help sustain the rural poor. 
 
20. (C)  In reponse to a question from D/NSA Shirzad about 
GOB plans regarding tax policy, Garcia noted that under the 
previous Cardoso Administration taxes as a percentage of GDP 
had increased from 28 percent to 38 percent during a span of 
8 years.  The Lula Administration, he said, planned to 
implement a series of targetted VAT tax cuts aimed at 
stimulating key sectors -- such as investment and basic 
consumer goods.  Simultaneously, the GOB planned to simplify 
its VAT tax regime by imposing a uniform VAT tax rate across 
all its states (i.e., end the current "guerra fiscal," 
whereby states compete in offering ever-sweeter tax breaks 
for industry relocation).  As for the income tax, Garcia 
declared, plans were in the works to make the system more 
progressive by increasing the number of tax brackets.  (He 
did not specify whether the GOB would make this move 
revenue-neutral.) 
 
21. (C)  Comment.  While Garcia's slightly different take on 
the sustainable growth rate of the economy and the need for 
lower interest rates reflects the  traditional PT emphasis on 
national development, Palocci and Meirelles remain firmly in 
charge of macro-economic policy.  Or as Meirelles put in at 
one point, "as long as Palocci and I are around we are going 
to make sure that economic policy is based upon concrete 
data, not wishful thinking. However, if you see us leaving 
the government, then I would start to worry." 
 
Dinner with Sao Paulo Business Leaders 
-------------------------------------- 
 
22. (SBU)  Sao Paulo Consul General hosted a dinner for D/NSA 
Shirzad and Director Renigar on the evening of November 22. 
Dinner guests -- senior executives representing Brazilian and 
multinational companies in the banking, agro-industry, steel 
automobile, and packaging sectors -- noted that they believed 
Brazil and other member countries would be better served by 
converting Mercosur in a free trade area (as opposed to its 
current form of a customs union).  This, they observed, would 
leave individual membes free to negotiate other deals at 
their own pace, without having more protectionist members 
hold everyone else back.  One participant observed tha 
Argentine industry is now merely a shell of what it once was, 
commenting that his factory operating there is making a lot 
of money because all his Argentine competition went broke. 
The same participant criticized the GOB's ill-prepared 
negotiating procedures, pointing out that the GOB went into 
the recently-failed Mercosur/EU trade talks without 
sufficiently consulting and defining positions/strategies, 
and subsequently had to regroup after it was too late. 
Regarding attempts to resolve bilateral Brazilian/Argentine 
trade disputes, this participant was equally critical of the 
GOB's lack of consultation and preparation.  As a business 
member of the Brazilian team negotiating with Argentine 
counterparts, he stated that the Foreign Ministry gave the 
Brazilian private sector ten points on how to reach an 
agreement that were totally unrealistic, yet the MFA did not 
want to hear any disagreement.  He caustically remarked that 
if he ran a business the same way the GOB ran trade 
negotiations, he would be broke within a week. 
 
23.  (U)  This cable was cleared by D/NSA Shirzad prior to 
transmission.