This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006816 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR H - HEATHER HOPKINS AND EUR/SE 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
H-PASS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP PREL MARR PGOV ECON IZ TU
SUBJECT:  Scenesetter for Codel Hastert 
 
Ref:  STATE 247385 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Your visit to Turkey comes at a bumpy 
period in the bilateral relationship, in large measure 
connected with developments in Iraq.  This message 
provides a brief overview of the state of bilateral 
relations, cooperation in Iraq, Turkey's EU accession 
prospects and the state of the economy.  End Summary. 
 
The Bilateral Relationship 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Bilateral relations have entered another choppy 
period.  The Turks are freely criticizing U.S. policy in 
Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East, but do not offer 
constructive alternatives.  A barrage of media 
disinformation about Falluja and U.S. actions in general 
in Iraq -- fanned by statements by PM Erdogan and by 
Foreign Minister Gul alleging excessive use of force and 
civilian casualties - is creating negative public 
opinion.  Some observers have characterized the general 
attitude in Turkey toward the U.S. and our role in the 
world as the most negative in memory. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The negative Turkish attitude towards the U.S. 
reverberates in other areas.  During a recent visit by 
Greek Orthodox Americans to discuss religious freedom, 
Turkey dug in its heels reiterating its resistance to 
reopening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki 
Seminary and the ecumenical nature of the Patriarchate 
in Istanbul (an ecumenical nature recognized in 
Orthodoxy since the sixth century).  The delegation's 
visit set off a round of accusations that the U.S. 
refused to respect "Turkish sensitivities" and had an 
ulterior motive. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Turkey shares our goals for Iraq: a secure and 
stable, democratic country, united and territorially 
whole.  To that end, Turkey has provided valuable 
assistance and cooperation.  Ankara offered to send 
peacekeeping troops to Iraq in October 2003, approved 
the use of Incirlik Air Base for tankers to refuel 
aircraft on support missions for both Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 
authorized the transit of US troops from Iraq on 
rotation out, and permitted the transit of supplies for 
our forces and humanitarian goods.  Turkey is also 
active in reconstruction efforts, including providing 
electricity for Iraq and training Iraqi diplomats, and 
has offered senior military leadership training in 
Turkey as its contribution to NATO's Iraq training 
mission. 
 
¶5. (SBU) This cooperation is provided despite the fact 
that our actions in Iraq are highly unpopular with the 
Turkish public.  Many Turks in and out of government 
worry about the fragility of Iraq's territorial 
integrity, fearing that the Kurds in the north aspire 
for independence and that the tensions between Sunni and 
Shia Arabs might become intractable.  The Turks insist 
on interpreting U.S. failure to date to go directly 
after the Kurdish PKK terrorist organization in northern 
Iraq, the friendly U.S. attitude toward northern Iraqi 
Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talebani, and the U.S. view 
that the number of Turkmen in Iraq is significantly 
lower than the figure cited by Turkey as "evidence" that 
the U.S. supports both the PKK and an independent 
Kurdish state.  The future of oil-rich Kirkuk is a 
particular source of concern, as the return of Kurds 
forcibly expelled by Saddam could disrupt an uneasy 
balance between resident Arabs and Turkmen, the latter 
with whom the Turks feel a bond of kinship.  The Turks 
have gone on record supporting the IIG and full 
participation in elections, which they want to see move 
forward by January's end. 
 
¶6. (SBU) More recently, the rising number of Turkish 
truckers abducted and executed in Iraq has raised 
concerns among the public and Turkish officials.  To 
address this issue, the first trilateral US/GOT/IIG 
talks on security in Iraq were held on November 30. 
 
Counter-Terrorism/Non-Proliferation 
----------------------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) The Turks have been an active partner on other 
fronts in the global war on terrorism and international 
security:  Our militaries coordinate assistance to 
Georgia and Azerbaijan, improving their abilities to 
protect important energy transportation routes.  Turkey 
subscribes to every arms control arrangement it is 
eligible to join, including the Proliferation Security 
Initiative.  Ankara has been supportive of international 
efforts to press Iran to meet its commitments to the 
IAEA.  The Turkish military's Partnership for Peace 
Training Center provides counterterrorism and other 
training to personnel from PfP partner countries.  The 
military has recently established a NATO Center of 
Excellence for the Combat Against Terrorism that will 
provide more specialized training opportunities for both 
NATO partner nations and alliance members.  And Turkey 
will again assume the command of ISAF in Afghanistan in 
February for a six-month period during which they will 
significantly increase their contribution to this 
important NATO mission. 
 
EU Accession 
------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) The European Commission in its October 6 report 
recommended the EU open accession talks with Turkey.  At 
the December 17 Summit, the EU is widely expected to 
follow through on this recommendation by setting a date 
for talks.  This would be a major step forward in 
anchoring Turkey's future and in our strategic vision 
for Turkey and the region.  However, the GOT is 
concerned about some of the conditions that may be 
attached to the EU offer.  They worry the EU is still 
not committed to its membership and continues to raise 
barriers.  For example, the EU is pressing the Turks to 
sign, before the Summit, a protocol extending the EU 
Association agreement to the 10 new EU members, 
including the Republic of Cyprus.  GOT officials say 
they are willing to negotiate on this point, but insist 
they are not required to sign before beginning accession 
talks, and they tell us this is presented as a 
concession to and recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, 
something they are only willing to see as part of a 
settlement of the island's division. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Turks are also concerned about how the EU 
will define the "open ended" nature of accession talks. 
They recognize the successful outcome of the talks 
cannot be pre-determined.  GOT officials say they cannot 
accept language indicating that Turkey may be offered 
something less than full membership even if it meets all 
accession criteria, as some (the Austrians, German CDU 
leader Merkel) have suggested. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The EU has indicated that it plans to apply a 
"screening process" before opening formal talks on each 
chapter of the EU acquis.  The Turks say they can accept 
this, as long as the screening begins in early 2005 and 
the formal talks start later in the year.  However, they 
reject any arrangement that would postpone the start of 
formal talks until 2006. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Many in Turkey see the U.S. and EU 
relationships as a zero-sum choice.  They believe that 
relations with the EU can improve by distancing 
themselves from us.  Others also look for a third 
alternative based on partnership with Russia - which was 
a theme in the recent Putin visit. 
 
Economy 
------- 
 
¶12. (U) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from 
the financial crisis of 2000-2001 and is growing at an 
annual pace of around 10 percent.  However, the recovery 
remains vulnerable due to a large current account 
deficit (about 5 percent of GDP) and a large debt with a 
short maturity structure.  Unemployment and poverty 
remain high, and ordinary people have not felt much 
benefit from the overall macroeconomic improvement. 
Macroeconomic success has also bred a sense of 
complacency about the need to persist with difficult 
reforms, such as privatization, and reform of the 
banking, social security and tax systems, all of which 
are being addressed in a new three-year IMF standby 
program. 
 
¶13. (U) Due to historic economic/political volatility 
and opaque regulatory/judicial systems, Turkey has long 
received less foreign direct investment than other 
countries of similar size and potential.  Many in the 
Turkish elite are convinced that there will be a flood 
of foreign investment if the Turks get a date for EU 
accession negotiations later this month.  However, this 
is unlikely to materialize unless more is done in the 
area of structural reform.  In addition, there appears 
to be a lack of appreciation for the enormous challenges 
Turkey will shoulder in the accession negotiations, for 
the fact that EU accession will affect nearly aspect of 
their lives, and that it may in the end be quite costly 
for Turkey to comply with EU directives in environmental 
protection and other areas. 
Edelman