This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 003001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2014 
TAGS: PREL TU CY GR PGOV EUN
SUBJECT: DUTCH ASK USG HELP WITH TURKEY ON CYPRUS, AND 
GREECE 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Daniel Russel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Still expecting a positive outcome on 
December 17 for Turkey, the Dutch DG for the EU, Marnix Krop, 
sees trouble brewing on Greece and Cyprus and has asked the 
U.S. to help in two specific ways.  First, urged us to 
impress upon Turkey the problems that Turkey's Aegean flights 
have for Greece at this time.  Second, U.S. assistance would 
be helpful in encouraging the Turks to deal directly with the 
Greek Cypriots. Krop reported Austria is getting traction 
with some new EU 10 members (including Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Hungary) by suggesting that Turkish accession would force 
them to make undesirable financial sacrifices.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Marnix Krop, MFA DG for Enlargement, told the DCM on 
November 18 that the EU is on track to set a date for 
accession talks with Turkey at the December 17 Council, but 
some serious obstacles remain.  He said the Netherlands is 
working for a Council decision on December 17 that sets the 
opening of accession talks with Turkey in the second half of 
2005 with no need for another decision.  The Dutch are 
working to dissuade those who seek open-endedness in the 
negotiations or any additional decision points along the way. 
 Krop expects the Council results to be more stringent on 
Turkey than the Commission report.  Krop added that he would 
not expect full Turkish membership before 2017, and at that 
time there might be put in place controls (or at least 
transition periods) on labor migration. 
 
¶3.  (C) Krop said Turkey could help its case now, by taking 
"symbolically important" unilateral steps to improve the 
atmospherics, both for the December 17 negotiations and for 
the lukewarm-at-best European public opinion.  These could 
include setting up an extra, independent monitoring mechanism 
for torture or reopening the Halki Greek Orthodox seminary. 
Turning to Greece, Krop said it seems clear Greece "really 
wants Turkey in the EU."  He specifically asked for U.S. help 
now to make Turkey aware of the problems Turkish flights over 
the Aegean near Greece are causing, in order to head off "a 
new Greek tragedy."  The Greek Foreign Minister, in The Hague 
on November 17, proffered "new, troubling language for the 
Council decision that would be a brake to the accession 
talks," Krop said.  The DCM noted the Political Director 
Siblesz-U/S Grossman call (of the same day) and said that the 
USG has heard the Netherlands request "loud and clear." 
 
¶4.  (C) Turning to Cyprus, Krop said in no uncertain terms 
that "Cyprus will veto Turkey" if Turkey does not find a way 
to send a "credible signal" to Cyprus on recognition on or 
before December 17 (even if action comes further down the 
road).  There are different legal and strategic opinions on 
how far Turkey's signal of recognition really has to go, Krop 
admitted.  He "did not think it necessary for Turkey to give 
Cyprus full recognition at this time," but "a solution would 
have to be found somewhere."  The minimum would be that 
Turkey act on the Council's invitation to sign the protocol 
to the Ankara Agreement.  Krop added, "If Turkey does just 
this one step, we are not sure if it would be enough for 
Cyprus.  It might be, if Turkey is forthcoming on confidence 
building measures and atmospherics."  Such a measure from 
Turkey might include a "unilateral declaration" on how Turkey 
would foresee dealing with the GOC in the period of the 
negotiations, such as "recognition without prejudice to the 
outcome of the unification issue," Krop surmised. 
 
¶5.  (C) Krop said he saw a need but did not quite know how to 
bring Turkey and Cyprus together to speak directly about all 
these variables and possible outcomes.  The key is to remove 
unpredictability between two sides that practice brinkmanship 
negotiations.  It was critical to choreograph the talks from 
now until December 17 and perhaps some third party might have 
to play a convening role.  Krop was not sure this job could 
fall to the Dutch, who want to avoid being at cross-purposes 
with their Presidency.  He asked that the U.S. help persuade 
the Turks to have some contact with the GOC. 
 
¶6.  (C) The Austrian led, German CDU inspired, effort to seek 
a "third way" solution causes problems for the Dutch. 
Austria's real goal is to have the Council set a second date, 
around 2014, for taking a second look at Turkish membership, 
in conjunction with the negotiations over institutions and 
financing.  They argue that Turkish membership would 
over-stress the Union's absorption capacity, Krop said.  This 
lobbying is "falling on fertile ground in Slovakia, Slovenia 
and perhaps Hungary," Krop reported, explaining that Austria 
is scaring them about the effect of Turkish membership on 
their new agricultural, structural and solidarity payments 
from the EU, which presumably would dwindle when resources 
shift to the much poorer (by comparison) Turkey after her 
accession. 
SOBEL