This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 002496 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA, WHA/CEN, AND WHA/PPC, AND DS 
STATE FOR INL, INL/LP, INR/C, INR/AN/IAA, 
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CEN AND DCHA/DG/ROL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2014 
TAGS: PGOV KCOR KJUS KCRM ECON PHUM PINR EAID HO
SUBJECT: HONDURAN AG NAVARRO SEEKS SOLUTION TO PARALYSIS AT 
THE PUBLIC MINISTRY OVER CORRUPTION CASES CRISIS 
 
REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 2434 
     ¶B. TEGUCIGALPA 2356 
     ¶C. TEGUCIGALPA 2123 
     ¶D. TEGUCIGALPA 1690 
     ¶E. TEGUCIGALPA 729 
     ¶F. TEGUCIGALPA 400 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Larry L. Palmer; 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Negotiations continue at the Public 
Ministry (PM) between Attorney General Ovidio Navarro and 
federal prosecutors (fiscales) after many fiscales walked off 
the job October 19 following Navarro's termination of ten and 
transfer of six others for their public criticism over the 
PM's decision to drop all pending corruption charges against 
ex-president (and National Party leader) Raphael Leonardo 
Callejas and a number of Callejas associates (ref B).  The PM 
has remained paralyzed since then as both sides continue to 
exchange charges of political cronyism and incompetence. 
Representatives of both sides are seeking a workable 
compromise as the unrest moves into its third week.  Since 
its inception ten years ago, the PM has demonstrated little 
ability to tackle high-profile criminal cases in Honduras. 
END SUMMARY 
 
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Navarro Butts Heads With Career Prosecutors 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Negotiations continue at the Public Ministry (PM) 
between Attorney General Ovidio Navarro and prosecutors 
(fiscales) after many fiscales walked off the job October 19 
due to Navarro's decision to terminate ten and transfer six 
others for their public criticism over the PM's decision to 
drop all pending corruption charges against ex-president (and 
National Party leader) Raphael Leonardo Callejas and a number 
of Callejas associates (ref B).  Navarro justified the 
decision based on his view that the terminated fiscales were 
politically motivated and/or incompetent.  The PM has 
remained partially paralyzed since then as both sides 
continue to exchange charges of political cronyism and 
incompetence.  Fiscales originally called for Navarro, also a 
National Party member, to resign, something he has stated 
both publicly and privately he will not do.  Navarro claimed 
he would not reverse his earlier decision to follow-through 
on removing insubordinate fiscales although both sides appear 
to be moving toward a compromise, especially after an October 
27 ruling by the Constitutional Chamber of the Honduran 
Supreme Court that the PM did not have the authority to drop 
the cases against Callejas and his associates. 
 
¶3. (C) Eight of the ten fiscales who were fired agreed to 
receive severance packages rather than return to the PM and 
Navarro agreed to halt the transfer of the six others.  The 
final sticking points revolve around fiscales' demands that 
Navarro sack Jaime Banegas, Director of Fiscales and 
reinstate the two other fiscales who were dismissed. 
Fiscales claim that, since assuming the position of Director 
in February, Banegas has acted inappropriately by putting 
pressure on fiscales to drop corruption cases against 
politically-connected individuals and obstructing business at 
the PM by transferring fiscales to other positions due to 
their desire to push corruption cases forward.  According to 
news reports, Banegas officially made the decision to drop 
all corruption cases against Callejas since Navarro had 
recused himself due to his past legal representation of 
Callejas.  Post believes, however, that Navarro ordered the 
cases be dropped. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Navarro agreed to form a commission, which includes 
representatives of both the PM and the fiscales, to 
investigate charges that Banegas has acted inappropriately. 
Navarro subsequently disbanded the Commission when he 
received word that a few members intended to publicize the 
charges against Banegas in the name of transparency.  Navarro 
saw the Commission's role as gathering facts and providing a 
recommendation to him.  He reserved the right to make the 
final decision on keeping or dismissing Banegas.  Navarro has 
said that he will discuss the Banegas matter directly with 
the Association of Fiscales.  For their part, the fiscales 
have said that they will maintain pressure on Navarro through 
a variety of measures. (COMMENT:  Prior to the crisis, Post 
had fielded complaints from fiscales concerning Banegas' 
heavy-handed approach and questionable behavior.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
---------------------- 
Navarro Meets With DCM 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) On October 29, DCM met with Navarro regarding the 
situation at the PM.  Navarro insisted that his decision to 
discipline certain fiscales was based on his view that they 
were not competent and had acted in an insubordinate manner. 
He particularly mentioned Soraya Morales, head of the PM's 
anti-corruption office, as an individual who was not doing a 
good job and had a political agenda.  (COMMENT  Morales was 
not among the fiscales affected by the PM's recent decision, 
as she was in Japan at the time of the firings, although a 
few who worked for her were dismissed.  Morales called 
publicly in August for the PM to close its anti-corruption 
office due to the PM's inability to prosecute meaningful 
corruption cases.  She also frequently confided to Post her 
frustration in not being able to move cases forward; 
something she blames on the PM's leadership.  In point of 
fact, many of these dismissed cases had not moved forward 
during the leadership of the two prior Liberal Party Attorney 
Generals.  END COMMENT)  Navarro also noted the partisan 
manner in which the anti-corruption office conducted its 
business, noting that they were preparing cases only against 
Nationalists, including presidential pre-candidates Pepe Lobo 
(President of the Congress) and Miguel Pastor (Mayor of 
Tegucigalpa). Charges were also being developed against Oscar 
Kilgore (Mayor of San Pedro Sula, the commercial center of 
Honduras). 
 
¶6. (C) Navarro assured DCM that he wants to make progress in 
fighting corruption and that over the next few months he 
expected several high-level cases would be brought forward. 
Navarro continued to insist, however, that the Congress must 
act on pending legislation outlining implementing procedures 
for how individuals who previously enjoyed immunity would be 
prosecuted.  The current draft legislation before Congress 
outlining procedures for how to prosecute some 400 high-level 
government officials previously immune from prosecution calls 
for these cases to be brought before a magistrate of the 
Supreme Court for a preliminary determination of the merits 
of the case.  If, and only if, a Supreme Court justice 
determines a case should be brought forward can an individual 
be prosecuted.  If this process is implemented in a 
transparent and impartial manner, this could be a positive 
development.  However, if past history prevails, this 
legislation offers corrupt individuals with contacts in the 
Supreme Court (another politicized institution not known for 
its zeal in fighting corruption) an opportunity to quash 
prosecutions altogether. 
 
------------------- 
PM In The Spotlight 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) On October 27, Ambassador and DCM raised U.S. concerns 
with President Maduro about perceptions that Honduras is 
backsliding on anti-corruption efforts and the recent 
decision by the PM to dismiss corruption cases against 
leading political figures (ref A).  Also, representatives of 
the G-17 donor countries and cooperating institutions 
(including the Ambassador) met with a Honduran Congressional 
delegation headed by President of the Congress Porfirio 
"Pepe" Lobo.  In this meeting, G-17 representatives expressed 
their concern over the situation at the PM and their desire 
to see Honduras make meaningful progress in the fight against 
corruption. 
 
¶8. (U) A number of civil society organizations and the 
Popular Block (a configuration of leftist groups) staged 
peaceful protests outside the PM demanding action against 
corruption in Honduras.  These groups have also been joined 
by sympathetic fiscales.  To make a point that speaking out 
against corruption was taboo at the PM, striking and 
dismissed fiscales lined up outside the PM's headquarters on 
November 2 dressed in black with tape across their mouths. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
PM Needs to Make Impact on Fighting White-Collar Crime 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶9. (SBU)  COMMENT:  In its ten-year history, the PM has never 
been effective at prosecuting high-profile white-collar crime 
in Honduras.  Whether through lack of resources, political 
will, incompetence of poorly-trained front-line prosecutors, 
or negligence, the institution seems unable to make concrete 
progress on this front.  This inaction has led many in 
Honduras to view the institution with justified skepticism 
regarding the PM's ability to make a dent in the fight 
against corruption.  If the PM were to move a few high-level 
cases successfully through the system, it would go a long way 
toward assuring the people of Honduras and the international 
community that the government is able to fight corruption. 
END COMMENT. 
Palmer