This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003647 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2014 
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: A DPP PERSPECTIVE ON TAIWAN ETHNIC POLITICS 
 
REF: TAIPEI 3604 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason 1.4 (B/D) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary: The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
believes it could benefit in the December legislative 
election from its efforts to define and build a Taiwan 
identity that is "multi-cultural," and it aims to broaden the 
appeal of the DPP beyond its traditional ethnic Taiwanese 
base of support.  Long seen by the Taiwan electorate as a 
party representing primarily ethnic Taiwanese (benshengren) 
interests, the DPP is increasingly trying to appeal to Hakka 
and Aborigine minorities.  DPP outreach to the Hakka and 
Aborigine populations -- estimated at 22 per cent of Taiwan's 
total population -- were effective in garnering support for 
President Chen Shui-bian during the presidential elections 
this spring.  DPP officials say their party continues to make 
inroads into the grass-roots organizations of these minority 
ethnic groups that traditionally had been heavily 
pro-Kuomintang (KMT) and are projecting that the DPP will 
expand its support in those constituencies.  Most DPP 
strategists, however, are content with playing the Taiwanese 
versus Mainlander ethnic card and painting the opposition 
Pan-Blue camp, especially the People First Party (PFP), as 
dominated by Mainlander Chinese.  End Summary. 
 
Building a Taiwan Identity for "Everyone" 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) DPP Director for Ethnic Affairs Yang Chang-cheng told 
AIT on November 8 that President Chen articulated in his May 
20 and October 10 speeches a vision for a more open, 
tolerant, and unified society with deeper roots in Taiwan. 
Chen's aim, according to Yang, is to lay a foundation from 
which to reconstruct Taiwan's national identity.  Yang 
asserted that such a project will entail redefining Chinese 
culture and its role within a new Taiwan national identity. 
He said one of the key challenges would be going beyond the 
narrow vision many Taiwanese intellectuals present of an 
ethnic Taiwanese-centric identity and to avoid continuing to 
alienate ethnic Mainlanders from the DPP cause. 
 
Wooing the Hakka Vote 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The more pragmatic side of the DPP offers a vision of 
a "multi-ethnic" Taiwan identity in order to expand the DPP's 
appeal to Taiwan's Hakka population, which comprises about 20 
percent of the island's inhabitants and is key to the DPP's 
efforts to build a lasting majority.  Yang said that that DPP 
expects to pick up 30 to 40 percent of the Hakka vote in 
Taoyuan, Hsinchu, and Miaoli counties where Hakka make up 40, 
70, and 67 percent of the population, respectively.  He 
projected that support levels for DPP candidates as a whole 
in these areas are unlikely to exceed the 40 percent mark 
reached in the 2004 presidential election.  Yang attributed 
growing DPP support among Hakka communities to the extensive 
attention President Chen has paid to promoting Hakka issues 
and interests, both at the local and national level, such as 
the promotion of Hakka language, television shows, and 
cultural activities.  Hakka leaders have been "pleasantly 
surprised" with Chen's support for the Hakka since 2000. 
Yang stated that DPP-backed Hakka candidates are unlikely to 
run campaigns exclusively along ethnic lines for fear of 
alienating potential support from ethnic Taiwanese. 
 
Making Inroads with Aborigines 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) The DPP's outreach efforts to Taiwan's aboriginal 
peoples have enjoyed less success.  Yang highlighted DPP 
difficulty in penetrating the existing tribal-based 
grassroots political networks that largely continue to feed 
into the Pan-Blue camp.  Nevertheless, Yang projected that 
the DPP is sure to pick up one aborigine seat from the plains 
districts and has a good chance of picking up another seat 
from the mountain districts.  Any gains among the aborigine 
vote would be a big achievement since the DPP currently has 
no legislators from the aborigine districts. 
 
But Writing off the Mainlanders, For Now 
---------------------------------------- 
¶5. (C) The DPP rhetorical appeal to a more inclusive Taiwan 
identity and national polity has largely failed to win much 
support with the ethnic Mainlander electorate or even among 
DPP campaign officials.  Yang said most of his colleagues 
planning DPP election strategy do not actively discuss how to 
win over the ethnic Mainlander vote, which they see as a lost 
voting block.  In many areas, the DPP continues to promote 
subtle "ethnic Taiwanese-first" themes to draw attention to 
the Mainlander-dominated leadership of the Pan-Blue.  For 
example, during the presidential campaign many DPP posters 
urged voters to "elect a Taiwanese (Taiwanren) president," 
playing on the popular perception that KMT candidate Lien 
Chan, who was born on the Mainland to a Taiwanese father and 
Mainland mother, is at best only a "half-Taiwanese."  Senior 
ethnic Taiwanese KMT officials regularly complain to AIT that 
the DPP is increasingly successful in eroding the KMT's 
ethnic Taiwanese base.  However, many KMT moderates assert 
that the anti-mainstream policies of the KMT leadership 
contribute at least as much to this trend as divisive DPP 
ethnic appeals (Reftel). 
 
¶6. (C) While the DPP has generally written off Mainlanders 
for the December election, the party will be sponsoring a 
series of conferences next year to start a dialogue with 
ethnic Mainlanders so as to not alienate them permanently 
from the DPP or marginalize them from participating in the 
national polity.  Yang said he expects President Chen to 
renew his efforts to appeal to Mainlanders after the December 
elections.  Separately, Taipei County Magistrate Lin Hsi-yao 
told AIT that the DPP will at least try in the medium term to 
minimize hostility among ethnic Mainlanders to the ruling 
party.  Lin, a confidante of Presidential Office Secretary 
General Su Tseng-chang, asserted that Su has already decided 
that when (and if) he is appointed Premier, he will choose 
ethnic Mainlander Finance Minister Lin Chuan as his deputy to 
demonstrate that the DPP is not only a party of and for 
Taiwanese.  Lin's moderate DPP New Tide faction has been 
particularly aggressive in promoting Mainlander members.  The 
faction's current leader, Tuan I-kang and DPP Deputy 
Secretary General (and New Tide member) Chung Chia-bing, are 
 
SIPDIS 
both ethnic Mainlanders. 
 
Ethnic Politics: The Final Frontier 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Comment: The DPP's push to win over ethnic minorities 
is a major change from its past "ethnic Taiwanese-first" 
focus and a key element of its plan to establish a 
sustainable ruling base.  Minority politics used to be the 
preserve of the KMT, which effectively used resources and 
personnel appointments to secure support from aborigine and 
Hakka communities.  As in many other areas, the DPP is taking 
a page out of the KMT's book, lavishly spending government 
funds to promote Hakka and aboriginal culture and appointing 
minorities, like Hakka Vice Premier Yeh Chu-lan, to senior 
positions in government.  While this approach seems to be 
showing some results, especially with the Hakka community, 
Mainlanders will remain a hard target.  For many Mainlanders, 
aversion to the DPP is not only a matter of ethnicity but 
extends to the DPP's core Taiwan-first ideology. 
PAAL